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SYNOPSIS 
Remedies play a vital role in copyright law because they are the means by which 
copyright is enforced. In the past, the copying of a work on any major scale 
required the use of extensive and costly equipment. Today, advances in 
technology have made it possible for many of such reproduction equipment, 
particularly the audio and video recorder and the personal computer, to be within 
the affordability of millions of users. With the easy accessibility to reproduction 
equipment, the phenomenon of unauthorised reproduction of copyright works 
likewise assumes a greater degree of severity . As a consequence, many countries 
have resorted to legislating severe penal sanctions against infringers. The 
Malaysian Parliament has also taken a slant towards enforcement by way of 
criminal remedies by stepping up the penal provisions for copyright 
infringements. In addition, Parliament has created a specialised enforcement unit 
vested with wide powers of search and seizure. This unit is entrusted with the 
task of copyright enforcement and the prosecution of offenders. 
The main purpose of this study is to examine whether the tendency 
towards enforcement by way of criminal remedies is justified in view of the fact 
(i) 
that copyright is essentially a civil right and is perceived solely as a private 
proprietary right. Chapter 1, being the introductory chapter, states the objectives 
and scope of this study. Chapter 2 examines the criminal provisions under the 
Copyright Act 1987 which relate to infringements of copyright. It also examines 
the role played by the enforcement unit in the enforcement of copyright. Chapter 
3 explores the interlocutory remedies which a copyright owner may seek in a 
civil action in order to protect his copyright pending trial of the action. Chapter 
. 4 focuses on the civil remedies available after the final hearing of the action. 
This study concludes that the existing civil remedial framework 
offers adequate protection to copyright owners and, therefore, J110re use should 
be made of it without having to resort to extensive criminal provisions. 
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CHAYfER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Remedies are an important aspect of copyright law because they are the means 
by which copyright is enforced. The unauthorised reproduction of copyright 
works especially when carried out on a large scale for commercial gains, 
commonly referred to as "piracy", can seriously undermine the copyright system. 
Such activities deprive copyright owners of the remuneration which they would 
otherwise have enjoyed had legitimate copies been produced. This may have the 
effect of discouraging them from producing further works especially when they 
are dependent on the remuneration for their living. In tum, this may hamper the 
cultural, scientific and educational development of the country .1 Clearly, a 
system of effective copyright enforcement is crucial. 
The problems faced by copyright owners today are a far cry from 
those faced during the days when copying was limited by the natural constraints 
of handwriting or typewriting. Advances in reproduction technology have 
WIPO, 'Piracy of Copyright Works and the Development of Legal 
Remedies' , paper presented at the National Workshop on Copyright 
organised by WIPO and the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Kuala 
Lumpur, May 2-3, 1986. 
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resulted in newer and better methods of reproduction. The development of high 
quality and affordable duplicating machines enables copies of literary works to 
be produced at a low cost and high speed. Similarly , the advent of portable and 
cheap audio visual recorders has revolutionised reproduction of sound recordings 
and films . In addition, advances have also taken place in the field of direct 
broadcasting by satellite and distribution by cable . Also, widespread 
commercialization of the computer has brought about further means of recording 
and communicating information. With such advances, unauthorised reproduction 
has become more prevalent and has acquired an increasingly devious appearance. 
In response to the increasing difficulties in enforcing copyright law 
against infringers, the Malaysian legislature in the mid-1970s began to step up 
the penalty level for copyright offences. 2 Today , enforcement by way of 
criminal remedies features prominently in the Copyright Act 1987 as is evident 
· not only from section 41 but more 'particularly from Part VII of the Act. Section 
. 
41 lists the types of infringing activities which amount to copyright offences. 
Part VII of the Act provides for the setting up of a specialLted enforcement unit 
vested with wide powers of search and seizure and entrusted with the task of 
copyright enforcement. This enforcement unit is also empowered to prosecute 
offenders. · The significant role played by the enforcement unit is evident from 
the numerous complaints on copyright infringement received by the unit since the 
2 The now repealed Copyright Act 1969 was amended twice over a period 
of ten years to increase the severity of the penalty, once in 1975 pursuant 
to the Copyright (Amendment) Act 1975 and again in 1979 pursuant to 
the Copyright (Amendment) Act 1979. For further discussion, see 
Chapter 2 at 2 .1. 3. 
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coming into force of the Copyright Act 1987. Between the period of 1st 
December 1987 to lOth October 1994, a total of 4,641 complaints were received 
throughout Malaysia by the enforcement unit. Prosecutions were brought in 
respect of 4,612 of these complaints and a total of 3,549 of such prosecutions 
resulted in convictions. 3 
At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that civil remedies 
are also available for the enforcement of copyright. Civil remedies are available 
under section 37 of the Act and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. As 
copyright is in nature a civil right, this study examines whether the inclination 
of the legislature towards enforcement by way of criminal remedies should 
continue to be the direction in which copyright enforcement should assume in the 
coming years. This forms the crux of the present study. 
- 1.1 Objectives 
In this study, it is proposed to examine several issues. The flrst is to examine 
the existing criminal remedial framework under the Copyright Act 1987. The 
extent of the need for criminal remedies in combating copyright infringement is 
also considered. 
3 Statistics obtained from the Intellectual Property Division of the Ministry 
of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs as at lOth October 1994. 
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The second is to consider the existing civil remedial framework 
and to assess its sufficiency in curbing the widespread problem of copyright 
infringement brought about largely by the rapid pace of technological 
development. 
The third is to consider the type of remedial scheme which would 
be more appropriate in curbing the current copyright infringement problem in 
Malaysia. 
In examining these issues, this study also suggests improvements 
to the existing civil and criminal remedial schemes available to copyright owners 
under the Malaysian copyright law. It is hoped that these suggestions will 
achieve the aim of providing copyright owners with a more comprehensive 
protection against unauthorised reproduction. In the zeal to achieve this aim, it 
· should not be forgotten that infringers too have fundamental rights accorded by 
. 
the law which must be respected. 
1.2 Scope of Study 
This study is confined to the statutory and judicial remedies available to 
copyright owners in the event of infringement. The statutory remedies refer to 
those remedies explicitly provided under the Copyright Act 1987 while the 
judicial remedies refer to those that are available pursuant to the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court. Throughout this study, copyright infringement is 
presumed to have taken place. 
5 
This study does not extend to an examination of remedies for 
infringement of the author's moral rights. This requires a separate treatment on 
its own. Instead, this study covers only those remedies which are available to 
redress copyright owners in respect of the adverse economic consequences to 
them as a result of the infringement. 
At the outset, it is recognised that new technologies have brought 
forth sophisticated duplicating equipment such as audio and video recorders, 
facsimile machines and computers which are within the affordability of most 
individuals. This has led to the pbenomenon of widespread private copying in 
the privacy of the individual's home thereby rendering it almost impossible to 
detect the infringers. As a result, the judicial and statutory remedies discussed 
in this study are ineffective to cope with this problem. These cases may require 
a consideration of whether there is a need to resort to extra-legal remedies as an 
alternative solution. It is not the ·intention of this study to examine this aspect 
because the problem of private copying merits an in-depth study on its own. 
1.3 Outline of Study 
This dissertation is divided into several chapters each concentrating on a specific 
area of study. 
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Chapter 2 is devoted to a study of the developments made by the 
legislature to enforcement by way of criminal remedies. Special emphasis is 
given to the setting up of a task force by the government to enforce copyright. 
Chapter 3 deals with the interlocutory remedies available to 
copyright owners in the event of infringement. It can safely be said that this 
group of remedies plays an utmost important role in protecting copyright owners 
against infringement because of its ability to provide speedy relief by putting an 
immediate stop to the infringing activities pending trial. Swift pre-action 
discovery of evidence of infringement and the prevention of dissipation of assets 
pending trial are also discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 explores the civil remedies available to copyright owners 
after a final hearing of the matter. At this stage, the court looks into how 
copyright owners can be compensated for the wrong done. Restitution is also a 
possible remedy available to copyright owners. Whether or not punitive damages 
can be awarded under our copyright law to punish infringers is also considered 
in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 is the conclusionary chapter. It analyses the sufficiency 
of the remedies discussed in the preceding chapt~rs. It also highlights the 
weaknesses in the present civil and criminal remedial schemes. 
Recommendations to improve these schemes are also proposed having regard to 
these weaknesses . Finally, and most important, it discusses which remedial 
7 
scheme would be more appropriate in combating the current copyright 
infringement problem in this country. 
1.4 Research MethodoloKY 
The research methodology employed in this study is predominantly library 
research. Relevant books, local and international law reports, reviews, articles, 
reports of various copyright committees and parliamentary debates constituted the 
main source of information for this study. Conference and seminar papers were 
also relied on as a useful source of information. These papers provided 
information on the extent of the problem of unauthorised reproduction in this 
country and the efforts made to combat or, at least, contain it. 
Throughout this study, various provisions of the Copyright Act 
· 1987 and the copyright statutes of other Commonwealth countries were adverted 
to for the purpose of comparing the developments overseas. Proposals for 
improvements to the current copyright remedial schemes in this country were 
made largely on the basis of these developments. 
Locally reported copyright cases, though few in number, were 
resorted to whenever possible to explain the various aspects of the remedies 
under discussion. The extensive use of case law was necessary to provide a 
greater understanding of the function of remedies in copyright cases. As a result 
of a dearth of locally reported copyright cases, constant reference had to be mnde 
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to the developments overseas in the hope that they will shed some light on the 
likely approach of our courts to certain issues and elucidate the meaning of 
certain provisions of the Copyright Act 1987. 
Apart from this, interviews were conducted with a number of 
enforcement officers from the Enforcement Division of the Ministry of Domestic 
Trade and Consumer Affairs, Kuala Lumpur. It was through these interviews 
that an in-depth appreciation and understanding of the operations of the 
enforcement unit, so essential to Chapter 2 of this dissertation, were obtained. 
CHAYfER 2 
CRIMINAL REMEDIES 
Every copyright legislation must contain provisions aimed at providing effective 
enforcement of copyright if such right is to be of any value. As infringing 
activities become increasingly rampant principally as a result of the galloping 
pace of technological advancement in reproduction techniques, the need for a 
regime of relief that has a forceful deterrent effect against infringers becomes 
more urgent. As a consequence, many countries have resorted to the deterrent 
feature of criminal remedies by legislating severe penal sanctions against 
infringers. Although criminal remedies have always been present in the 
copyright statutes of most countries, it is only in recent years that they have 
acquired a heightened level of significance never before in the history of 
copyright law. The response of the Malaysian Parliament was, likewise, to place 
greater emphasis on enforcement by way of criminal remedies. Section 41 of the 
Copyright Act 1987 provides for offences relating mainly to infringement for 
commercial purposes and commercial dealings of infringing copies. 
Significantly, the Copyright Act 1987 creates an enforcement unit to police 
infringing activities. This unit has extensive powers to investigate the 
commission of offences under the Act and to prosecute offenders. In addition, 
9 
10 
the enforcement unit is also vested with very wide powers of entry , search and 
seizure which are akin to the powers given to the police. Furthermore , the Act 
also contains provisions on offences relating to the obstruction by any person of 
the duties of any enforcement officer. This chapter examines the role of criminal 
remedies in copyright law and the offences created by the Copyright Act 1987. 
It also discusses the criminal provisions in other statutes which may be available 
to copyright owners as alternatives . Finally, it discusses how such offences are 
backed up by wide powers given to the enforcement unit. 
2.1 The Use of Criminal Remedies in Copyri2ht Law 
Although copyright is essentially a civil right, provisions for the imposition of 
criminal remedies for copyright infringement are not new and can be found in the 
very early English copyright statutes. 1 Similarly, in Malaysia, provisions for 
criminal remedies were ·..., found in as far back as the Telegram Copyright 
Ordinance 1902 which was the first copyright-related statute to be enacted in this 
For example, the penal provision in clause 1 of the UK Statute of Anne 
1709 was enacted to prevent the illegal printing, reprinting and publishing 
of books and other writings. See, also , Patterson LR, Copyright in 
Historical Perspective (Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1968) at 
143-151. 
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country. 2 The availability of the criminal law in copyright infringement 
continued in subsequent copyright statutes and today, criminal offences for 
infringement are embodied in section 41 of the Copyright Act 1987 with 
accompanying reinforced criminal penalties. In addition, offences relating to the 
enforcement of copyright laws are provided in Part VII of the Act. 
While it is not denied that doubts exist as to the efficacy of 
criminal remedies in deterriilg offenders,3 various justifications have been 
advanced to vindicate the intervention of the criminal law in what is really a civil 
right enforceable by civil action. First, infringement of copyright on a large and 
organised scale is mainly committed by the greedy who parasitically reap huge 
profits out of the intellectual creativity of others without having to bear the initial 
costs of producing the same. This is akin to making profits by stealing the 
creativity of others, which is clearly the concern of the criminal law. Secondly, 
- the penalties imposed on offenders and the likelihood of imprisonment are said 
to have a potential deterrent value. Also, with the increased concern over the 
widespread of music, video and computer piracy, it is no longer either practical 
2 
3 
This Ordinance had application only to the Straits Settlements. Pursuant 
to sections 3 and 5 of the Ordinance, it was an offence punishable with 
a fine for any person, during the period of forty-eight hours from the time 
of lawful receipt of telegraphic messages meant for publication, to print 
and publish such messages or transmit any intelligence from them to 
places outside the Straits Settlements without the consent of the person 
entitled to the exclusive use of such messages. A similar Enactment, the 
Telegram Copyright Enactment Cap 74, applicable to the Federated 
Malay States was passed in 1911. 
See, also, Chambliss WJ, 'Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of 
Legal Sanctions' [1967] Wis L Rev 703. 
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or appropriate to enforce copyright by civil means only. What is needed is a 
more powerful deterrent which is beyond what civil remedies can provide. The 
criminal law can meet this need. A criminal conviction and the possibility of 
imprisonment, even for a short period of time, are the real disincentives to many 
pirates. In our society, a jail sentence is still seen as dishonourable and 
shameful. Thirdly, civil actions can be difficult, expensive and time 
consuming. 4 Rather than subjecting himself to the ordeal of pursuing a limited 
number of small operators, the copyright owner would prefer to entrust the task 
to the appropriate public prosecuting authorities to initiate proceedings. A 
conviction can be obtained at little or no expense to the copyright owner because 
the bulk of the cost is borne by the state instead. Fourthly, searches, seizures, 
arrests and interrogations which are needed to detect and punish the offenders are 
carried out by the prosecuting officers, thus relieving the copyright owner of 
having to confront those involved in the piratical activities. Fifthly, practicality 
- sometimes demands that the copyright owner foregoes his right to bring a civil 
action against the offender as in the case of the latter being a man of little means 
to meet any pecuniary judgment. In such circumstances, it may be unjust to the 
copyright owner if the offender gets off -scot-free and, therefore, criminal 
sanctions may be desirable as an alternative remedy available to the copyright 
owner. Sixthly, copyright piracy is detrimental to the social and cultural 
development of society and threatens the economic viability of various industries. 
4 Note, however, the comments of Chan J in Television Broadcasts Ltd & 
Ors v Mandarin Video Holdings Sdn Bhd [1983] 2 MU 346 where his 
Lordship said that the criminal law can be slow and cumbersome at times 
for it to be effective. 
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The copyright owner should, therefore, not be expected to shoulder all the 
responsibilities of fighting these pirates. 
On the other hand, some argue that the criminal law ought not to 
have any place in copyright matters. One of the reasons given is that criminal 
remedies do not redress the economic injustice caused to the copyright owner as 
a result of the infringement because he does not derive any direct benefit from 
such sanctions nor any compensation. Moreover, since copyright is a civil right 
and perceived solely as a private proprietary right, the onus of protecting and 
preserving these rights should lie with the copyright owner and not with society 
as a whole. Also, the risk of imprisonment for a first offence is low and the 
deterrent effects of a fine can be achieved by way of additional damages or 
exemplary damages. 5 Furthermore, while criminal sanctions such as 
imprisonment may be effected against an individual without much difficulty, the 
· same cannot be said of a body ·corporate because of the impalpable nature of 
a corporation. 6 In addition, the securing of evidence relating to an offence and 
5 
6 
See Chapter 4 at 4. 1. 2. 
This does not pose a problem in the context of Malaysian copyright 
system because of the deeming provision present in both the Copyright 
Acts of 1969 and 1987 which deems every director, secretary or manager 
of the company guilty of an offence where the offence is committed by 
the body corporate unless he proves absence of consent or connivance on 
his part and that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent commission 
of the offence. See Copyright Act 1969, section 15(3) and Copyright Act 
1987, section 41(4). In the absence of such a deeming provision, the 
decision in Dunlop Malaysia Industries Bhd v Public Prosecutor [1985] 
1 MU 313 would prevent the court from arresting or committing any 
officer of the corporation for an offence committed by the corporation. 
Such a provision was absent from the UK Copyright Act 1956 but was 
inserted in the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 vide section 
14 
the initial case preparation are, in some countries , the responsibility of the police 
force and the prosecution the responsibility of a public authority. Such bodies, 
in addition to being limited in their resources, are also not specialised to handle 
copyright cases. Furthermore, they have, as their priority, the detection and 
prosecution of more serious crimes. The criminalising of copyright infringement 
will only further tax these bodies which are already burdened with a heavy 
workload. 7 
Be that as it may, one must concede that the criminal law has a 
role to play in the fight against copyright infringement. The inclusion of criminal 
provisions and accompanying stringent criminal remedies in the copyright statutes 
7 
110, though, unlike the Malaysian provision, the onus of proving consent 
or connivance lies with the prosecution. The Singapore Copyright Act 
1987 (Cap 63, 1988 Ed) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Singapore 
Copyright Act 1987') and the Australian Copyright Act 1968 do not have 
an equivalent provision. The Australian statute dispenses with 
imprisonment where body corporates are concerned but iplposes a heavy 
fine for offences committed by body corporates. See the Australian 
Copyright Act 1968, section 133 . It is submitted that this is a more 
feasible approach. 
Prior to the Copyright Act 1987, the police alone were responsible for the 
investigation and prosecution of copyright offences. · However, the 
Copyright Act 1987 empowers the Assistant Controllers, in addition to the 
police , to detect and prosecute copyright offenders . See Copyright Act 
1987, sections 5 and 44. In Hong Kong, the responsibility for enforcing 
the Copyright Ordinance, Cap 39 LHK 1975 is left with the 
Commissioner of Customs and Excise. Under the UK Copyright , 
Designs and Patents Act 1988, the Australian Copyright Act 1968 and the 
Singapore Copyright Act 1987, the responsibility still lies with the police 
force . 
15 
of most jurisdictions since the early days bears testimony to this .8 This is not 
to say that criminal remedies should assume such significance in the copyright 
system as to overshadow the importance of civil remedies . To do so would be 
an unprecedented change in direction which could possibly lead to criminal 
remedies becoming unnecessarily oppressive. 
2.1.1 Offences relatin2 to Infrin2ement 
Although copyright infringement, whether on a commercial or non-commercial 
basis, is always a civil wrong, some types of copyright infringement also attract 
criminal offences . Section 41 of the Copyright Act 1987 lays down the different 
types of activities which are criminal offences . These are the direct or indirect 
infringement of copyright on a commercial basis, 9 the distribution of infringing 
copies, 10 the possession of infringing copies otherwise than for private and 
· domestic use, the making or possessing of contrivance for making infringing 
copies and the causing of a literary or musical work to be performed in public. 
8 
9 
10 
See Dworkin G & Taylor RD, Bla~kstone's Guide to the Copyright. 
Designs and Patents Act 1988 (London, Blackstone Press Ltd, 1989) at 
122 where the authors acknowledged that the criminal law is of 
considerable value in intellectual property matters. See, too, Brazil P , 
'Infringement of Copyright and the Problem of Piracy ' (1987) 61 AU 12. 
As to direct and indirect infringements, see Copyright Act 1987, sections 
36(1) and (2) respectively. 
As it is not provided that distribution must be in the course of trade, it 
would appear that a person who makes copies of a copyright work and 
distributes them freely would commit an offence under section 41. See 
Khaw L T, Copyright Law in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, Butterworths 
Asia, 1994) at 155. 
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Thus, just about all aspects of unauthorised copying of copyright materials for 
commercial purposes and unauthorised commercial dealings in the copied 
materials are made criminal offences. 
These offences extend to all classes of copyright work. The 
offences as a whole provide protection to the copyright owner at each point of 
time when he is vulnerable to unauthorised exploitation, beginning from the 
production or importation stage to the sale, letting or hire stage. 
The possession of any infringing copy, otherwise than for private 
and domestic use, was made an offence in 1975 following an amendment to the 
Copyright Act 1969. 11 This offence was created by Parliament because it was 
felt that the absence of such a provision was a source of abuse. Many of those 
who were found hoarding infringing copies claimed that they were merely storing 
· the same for third parties and not for any of the commercial purposes laid down 
in the then section 15 of the f969 Act. 12 This provision was re-enacted in the 
Copyright Act 1987 as section 41(1)(d). Pursuant to section 41(2) of the 1987 
Act, any person having in his possession, ·custody or control .three or more 
infringing copies of a work shall be presumed to be in possession of such copies 
11 
12 
By Copyright (Amendment) Act 1975, section 3(i). Possession need not 
be in the course of business unlike in England, Australia and Singapore. 
See section 107(1)(c) of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988, section 132 (2A) of the Australian Copyright Act 1968 and section 
136(2) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987. 
See Minutes of the Second and Third Reading to the Copyright 
(Amendment) Bill 1975 in the Dewan Rakyat, 3 April 1975 at para 3998. 
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otherwise than for private or domestic use. 13 
The 1987 Act also inserted the new offence of causing a literary 
or musical work to be performed in public whether for private profit or not. 14 
It is submitted that the word "causing" suggests that it is the person responsible 
for the performance and not the actual performer who is liable under this 
section. 15 The person responsible for the performance is normally the person 
who makes the necessary arrangements and who organizes the performance. It 
is unlikely that the person who supplies the equipment or provides the premises 
will be deemed to be the person "causing" . 16 However, the playing of a sound 
recording or the showing of a film in public is not an offence, 17 although the 
same may attract civil liability. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
It is to be noted that the word "or" is used in section 41(2) of the 
Copyright Act 1987 while the word "and" is used in section 4l(l)(d). 
Nevertheless, the presumption of possession of infringing copies in 
section 41 (2) is still with respect to the offence of possession under 
section 41(1)(d). See Khaw LT, Copyright Law in Malaysia (1994), 
supra n 10 at 156. 
Section 41(3). In contrast, the Singapore Copyright Act 1987, section 
136(6), requires that the performance be for private profit. 
See, too, Copinger and Skone James, Copyright 13th Ed (London, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 1991) at para 19-4. 
Bainbridge DI, Intellectual Property (London, Pitman Publishing, 1992) 
at 125. 
In contrast, the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, section 
107(3), regards such an act as an offence. 
18 
Except for the offence of causing a literary or musical work to be 
performed in public under section 41(3), all the offences under section 41 are 
seizable offences . 18 Being seizable offences, the prosecuting officers must be 
one of those listed in section 377 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 19 In Public 
Prosecutor v K.M. Basheer Ahmad,20 the complainant instituted a private 
summons against the respondent who was charged under section 15(1)(d) of the 
Copyright Act 1969 for having in possession at his bookshop eighteen infringing 
copies of a literary work. The prosecution was instituted in the Magistrate's 
18 
19 
20 
A seizable offence is defined in section 2(1) of the Criminal Procedure 
Code as an offence for which a police officer may ordinarily arrest 
without warrant according to the third column of the First Schedule . The 
First Schedule of the Criminal Procedure Code describes offences (other 
than those in the Penal Code) as seizable if they are punishable with death 
or imprisonment for three years and upwards. Offences punishable with 
imprisonment for ~ess than three years or punishable with fine only are 
non-seizable. Since an offence under section 41(3) of the Copyright Act 
1987 is punishable under section 43 by a fme not exceeding RM20,000 
or a term of imprisonment not exceeding three years, or both, this offence 
is a non-seizable one . 
Pursuant to section 377 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the prosecuting 
officers in a seizable offence must be either: 
(a) the Public Prosecutor, 
(b) a Deputy Public Prosecutor, 
(c) an advocate, 
(d) in the State of Terengganu, a pleader employed by the 
complainant, or 
(e) a police officer not below the rank of Inspector. 
Where an advocate or a pleader is the prosecuting officer, 
prosecution must be expressly authori.sed in writing by the Public 
Prosecutor or by a Deputy Public Prosecutor, acting under the 
general control and direction of the Public Prosecutor. It is to be 
noted that pursuant to section 53 of the Copyright Act 1987, an 
Assistant Controller also has the authority to prosecute offenders 
in the Sessions Court. 
[1982] 2 MU 78. 
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Court and was conducted by an advocate and solicitor on the basis that it was a 
non-seizable offence. Unknown to the parties , the offence had become seizable 
following the coming into force of the Copyright (Amendment) Act 1979 some 
two months prior to the institution of the prosecution. Being seizable, the 
prosecution for such an offence could not be conducted by an advocate unless he 
obtained a fiat from the Public Prosecutor or the Deputy Public Prosecutor. 
Since this was not obtained, Mohamed Azmi J (as he then was) held that the 
private prosecution before the Magistrate was a nullity ab initio. 21 
2.1.2 Elements of Section 41 Offences 
To prove an offence under section 41(1)(a) to (f), it is necessary for the 
prosecution to establish, first, that copyright subsists in the work;22 secondly, 
that any of the acts stated therein has been committed; and thirdly, that the copy 
21 
22 
In Tara Singh v Public Prosecutor [1954] MU 123, the complainant 
conducted the prosecution against the accused charged with an offence 
under section 338 of the Penal Code which was a seizable offence. 
Although no authorisation in writing to do so was obtained as required, 
the High Court held that the accused had not been prejudiced and that the 
irregularity could be cured by section 422 of the Crimihal Procedure 
Code. See Mimi Kamariah Majid, Criminal Procedure in Malaysia, 
(Kuala Lumpur, Department of Publications, University of Malaya, 1987) 
at 90 where the author was of the view that had Tara Singh been referred 
to the court in PP v KM Basheer Ahmad, ibid, the decision might have 
been different. 
With regard to whether copyright subsists in a work, see Copyright Act 
1987, sections 9 to 11. See, too, Chew Onn Yuen & Anor v Public 
Prosecutor [1977] 2 MU 118, Foo Loke Ying & Anor v Television 
Broadcasts Ltd & Ors [1985] 2 MU 35, Lee Yee Seng & Ors v Golden 
Star Video Bhd [1981] 2 MU 43, Television Broadcasts Ltd & Ors v 
Mandarin Video Holdings Sdn Bhd, supra n 4, and Television Broadcasts 
& Ors v Seremban Video Centre Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MU 171. 
20 
was an infringing copy. As to the offence of making or having in possession any 
contrivance used or intended to be used for the purposes of making infringing 
copies under section 41(1)(g), Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) in In re Kah 
Wai Video (Ipoh) Sdn Bhd23stated that a contrivance is "one capable of use for 
the purpose of making infringing copies". In the case of an offence under section 
41(3), in addition to establishing the subsistence of copyright, it is necessary to 
prove that the person has caused the literary or musical work to be performed in 
public. To "cause" a thing to be done involves some express or positive mandate 
from the person "causing" to the other person or some authority from the former 
to the latter . 24 
(a) Subsistence and ownership of copyright 
The usual way of proving subsistence of copyright in a particular work is through 
the oral testimony and documentary evidence of the author of the work and the 
copyright owner. 25 However, this may not always be possible or expedient 
23 
24 
25 
[1987] 2 MU 459. 
Ali Amberan v Tunku Abdullah [1970] 2 MU 15, McLeod (or Houston) 
v Buchanan [ 1940] 2 All ER 179. See, also, supra at p 17. 
See, for example, Chew Onn Yuen & Anor v Public Prosecutor, supra 
n 22. In that case, oral evidence was given by the composer that 
sufficient effort had been expended on making the musical works so as to 
give them an original character and that the works had been written down 
and reduced to material form. At that time, section 5(1) of the Copyright 
Act 1969 required that authors of the musical works be citizens or 
permanent residents of Malaysia at the time they made the musical works. 
This was proved by the oral testimony of an officer from the Registration 
Department. It is to be noted that this has ceased to be a requirement 
under the Copyright Act 1987. Evidence of ownership of copyright was 
21 
because the creation of a work and the subsequent sale or licensing of the 
copyright in it often involve an international network of individuals from 
different countries of the world. Authors, composers, artists, record and film 
producers , and broadcasters play their individual but vital parts in the creation 
of a successful film or sound recording . The expenses of transporting these 
individuals to Malaysia as witnesses are likely to be alarming. 
An accused who puts in issue questions as to the subsistence and 
ownership of copyright can considerably hamper the prosecution if the copyright 
owner does not have the necessary documentation or witnesses at hand. To 
overcome this problem and to facilitate proof of subsistence and ownership, a 
new section 12A was inserted in the Copyright Act 1969 whereby the copyright 
owner in criminal proceedings can establish these facts by way of an affidavit or 
statutory declaration. 26 Such an affidavit or statutory declaration, once 
· admitted, constitutes prima facie proof of the facts stated therein. The burden 
of proof then shifts to the accused to prove that the matters stated in the affidavit 
are not correct. This section is reproduced in the Copyright Act 1987 as section 
42 with two new features. First, the agent of the copyright owner is allowed to 
swear the affidavit or the statutory declaration. Under the Copyright Act 1969, 
since only the copyright owner was entitled to swear the affidavit, his presence 
in court was frequently required even at the stage of establishing a "prima facie" 
26 
given by the general manager and director of the complainant who orally 
testified to the various formal agreements entered into with the composers 
to purchase the copyright in the songs. 
By Copyright (Amendment) Act 1975, section 2. 
22 
case because he was the maker of the document. It was felt that the section did 
not effectively redress the inadequacies which it was intended to, 27 hence the 
inclusion of the agent as an alternative to the copyright owner in the making of 
an affidavit. Secondly, the section was extended to apply to civil proceedings as 
well . 
Pursuant to section 42(1) of the Copyright Act 1987 the affidavit 
must state that copyright subsisted in the work at the time specified in the 
affidavit and that the deponent is the owner of the copyright. It would appear 
that the words "copyright subsisted" in section 42(1) refer to the subsistence of 
copyright in this country. It is, therefore, submitted that the affidavit should 
specify that copyright in the work subsisted in Malaysia. Support for this view 
may be found in the Singapore case of Chong Loy Sen v Public Prosecutor. 28 
In that case, the court, in dealing with section 5(1) of the Copyright 
(Gramophone Records and Government Broadcasting) Act, Chapter 188 which 
was. similar in terms to our section 42, held that the words "copyright subsisted" 
meant that copyright subsisted in Singapore as that was the copyright 
contemplated and recognised by the law in Singapore . According to the court, 
it was essential as a matter of evidence that an affidavit made pursuant to section 
27 
28 
See Muhammad Shafee, 'Copyright Situation in Malaysia', paper 
presented at the National Workshop on Copyright organised by WIPO and 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Kuala Lumpur, May 2-3, 1986. 
Hong Kong had earlier enacted a similar provision pursuant to section 9 
of the Copyright Ordinance, Cap 39 LHK 1975. See, also, Rawlinson P, 
'Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Hong Kong: What' s 
Available? ' [1993] EIPR 126. 
[1986] 2 MU 364. 
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5(1) should use the words "in Singapore" . Section 42(1)(c) of the Copyright Act 
1987 further requires a true copy of the work to be annexed. It is an offence to 
make a false statement in the affidavit or statutory declaration. 29 
In the case of a corporation, the affidavit shall be made by a 
responsible officer of the corporation. In Television Broadcasts & Ors v 
Seremban Video Centre Sdn Bhd,30 Peh Swee Chin J (as he then was) in dealing 
with section 12A(2) of the Copyright Act 1969, held that a "responsible officer" 
need not be a salaried or high ranking employee. According to his Lordship, 
such a person may include a donee under a power of attorney or other person 
duly authorised by the company or that body of persons in question. 31 
The copyright laws of some countries confer on the court a right 
to allow the deponent to be called for cross-examination before admitting the 
29 
30' 
31 
Copyright Act 1987, section 48( e). This sub-section was inserted in 1990 
vide the Copyright (Amendment) Act 1990, section 14(d). 
Supra n 22 . 
In that case, the defendant contended that the affidavit was improper 
because of a failure to comply with section 12A(2) of the Copyright Act 
1969. In addition to the reasons given by Peh Swee Chin J (as he then 
was.) for rejecting the contention, it is subt:nitted that another basis for 
rejection lies on the fact that an affidavit made pursuant to section 12A(2) 
had no application to civil cases. 
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affidavit or statutory declaration into evidence. 32 To avoid indiscriminate cross-
examination of the copyright owners which may be a delaying tactic on the part 
of the accused or the defendant, as the case may be, the copyright laws of these 
countries require the court to be satisfied that the desire to cross-examine be one 
of good faith. Such a provision has much merit in it because it provides leeway 
for the court to allow cross-examination of a deponent of an affidavit for the 
purpose of testing the veracity of his evidence. The absence of a corresponding 
provision in this country is regretted. 
The facts stated in an affidavit pursuant to section 42 of the 
Copyright Act 1987 are prima facie proof only of subsistence and ownership of 
copyright. These facts may be challenged by evidence to the contrary tendered 
by the accused or defendant. In other words, the burden of proving that 
copyright did not subsist or was not owned by the person claiming to be the 
· owner of the copyright is shifted to the accused or the defendant. The fairness 
of this provision is questionable because a plaintiff is almost always in a better 
position than a defendant to establish how the copyright came into existence . It 
should not be left to the defendant to disprove the subsistence and ownership of 
copyright unless he is also given the opportunity to cross-examine the deponent 
32 See, for example, the Australian Copyright Act 1968, section 134A and 
the Singapore Copyright Act 1987, section 137(2). Recently, in the 
Singapore case of Public Prosecutor v Teoh 'Ai Nee [1994] 1 SLR 452, 
the prosecution tendered an affidavit pursuant to section 137(1) of the 
Singapore Copyright Act 1987. As the defence neither objected to the 
admissibility of the affidavit nor expressed any desire to cross-examine 
the deponent under section 137(2), the court admitted the affidavit as 
evidence and held that the onus then laid on the defence to prove that 
copyright did not subsist in Singapore at the relevant time. 
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on the contents of the affidavit. In this respect, it should be noted that Order 38 
rule 2 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 provides for the defendant in a civil 
proceeding to cross-examine the deponent only if the court thinks it fit to do so . 
Thus, the court has a discretion to decide whether or not a defendant may cross-
examine the deponent of an affidavit. While this provision may assist a 
defendant in a civil proceeding, it has a limited application because it does not 
extend to affidavits tendered in criminal proceedings. 
Furthermore, the fact that section 2 of the Evidence Act 1950 
excludes the application of the Act to affidavit evidence is a source of much 
confusion because it raises uncertainty as to what rules or principles govern 
affidavit evidence. On the one hand, it may be argued that affidavit evidence is 
not governed by any evidential rule and that Parliament had intended it to be so . 
If this is the case, then the consequences are dire because there is nothing to 
regulate the proof of facts or to check the risk of the evidence being untrue or 
unreliable . This can conceivably open the Pandora's box to abuses by deponents 
of affidavits because their evidence can be admitted without satisfying the rules 
' 
of evidence relating to relevancy, hearsay, confession, character evidence, 
competency and the like. 33 
33 A view to the contrary argues that although the Evidence Act 1950 does 
not apply to affidavits, that does not mean that an affidavit can be 
admitted as evidence without the necessity for the deponent to enter the 
witness-box. See Sarkar MC, Sarkar SC & Sarkar PC Law of Evidence 
14th Ed (Agra, Wadhwa & Company, 1993) Vol 1 at 21. 
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On the other hand, it may be contended that there is a lacuna and 
since there is no provision dealing with affidavit evidence in this country, the 
English law of evidence applies. Support for this view may be found in section 
3 of the Civil Law Act 1956 (revised 1972) which provides for the general 
application of English law as at various cut off dates provided there are no 
provisions in any written local law. 34 Under the English law of evidence, the 
contents of affidavits must be confined to such matters as are admissible by the 
rules of evidence . 35 If so, then affidavit evidence in this country are subject to 
the English evidential rules of relevancy, hearsay, competency and the like . In 
particular, the adverse party is entitled as of right to cross-examine the deponent 
of the affidavit. 
It is submitted that the latter view is unlikely to be the position in 
this country because it leads to a result which is in direct conflict with section 2 
of the Evidence Act 1950. This would defeat the intention of Parliament in 
excluding the application of the Evidence Act 1950 from affidavit evidence. It 
is , therefore, submitted that the former view which is that affidavit evidence is 
not governed by any evidential rule is the current position in this country. 
34 As to this , see Chapter 3 at pp 59-60. 
35 Re Cohen (a Bankrupt) [1950] 2 All ER 36. 
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(b) Infringing acts 
The second requirement that the prosecution must prove commission of the acts 
stated in section 41 has been discussed above . 36 
(c) Infringing copies 
As to the third requirement that the prosecution must prove the 
existence of an infringing copy , section 3 of the Copyright Act 1987 defines what 
is an "infringing copy". Prior to the Copyright (Amendment) Act 1990, an 
"infringing copy" was defined as "any reproduction of any work eligible for 
copyright under this Act, the making of which constitutes an infringement of 
copyright in the work". The 1990 Amendment Act added on to this definition 
the case of an article imported into Malaysia without the consent or licence of the 
owner of the copyright. In such a case, an "infringing copy" is any reproduction 
. 
of any work eligible for copyright, the making of which was carried out without 
the consent of the copyright owner. At the same time, the offence under section 
41(1)(f) was also amended so as to be consistent with the definition. With the 
amendment, the offence under section 41(1)(f) now extends only to infringing 
copies and does not include copies made lawfully with the consent or licence of 
the copyright owner. It is submitted that the words "the copyright owner" refer 
to the copyright owner in the country of importation, that is, Malaysia and not 
to the copyright owner in the country in which the copy was made. Support for 
36 Supra at 2 . 1. 1. 
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this view may be found in the recent Singapore case of Public Prosecutor v Teoh 
Ai Nee & Anorl7 . In that case, the High Court interpreted the words "the 
owner of the copyright" which appear in the definition of "infringing copy" in 
section 7 of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987 as meaning the copyright owner 
in the country of importation, that is, Singapore. The definition of "infringing 
copy" in section 3 of our Copyright Act 1987 is substantially similar to the 
definition of "infringing copy " in section 7 of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987. 
Once the prosecution proves the infringer's criminal liability under 
section 41 beyond reasonable doubt, 38 it is for the infringer to prove, by way 
of defence, that he had acted in good faith and had no reasonable grounds for 
supposing that copyright would or might be infringed . This was also the position 
under section 15 of the Copyright Act 1969. What amounts to "good faith" 
under the Copyright Act 1987 is not clear though the words appear to 
contemplate some moral elements of honesty, upright mental attitude and clear 
conscience. "Good faith" in criminal law is different from "good faith" as 
37 
38 
Supra n 32. The effect of this decision was to severely restrict parallel 
imports in Singapore. Subsequently the Parliament of Singapore amended 
the Singapore Copyright Act 1987 vide the Copyright (Amendment) Act 
1994 to reverse this decision. 
Recently, the Supreme Court in Khoo Hi Chiang v Public Prosecutor 
[1994] 1 MU 265 decided that the court, at the close of the case for the 
prosecution, must determine whether or not the prosecution has 
established the charge against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. 
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understood in civil law. 39 In addition to "good faith", the infringer must also 
prove that he had no reasonable grounds for supposing that copyright would or 
might thereby be infringed . As with "good faith", what amounts to "supposing" 
is not clear from the Act although it would seem to connote believing or 
assuming something to be a fact, without reference to the truth or otherwise of 
the matter . 40 
Section 41 therefore relieves the prosecution of the difficult task 
of establishing mens rea on the part of the infringer at the time of the offence. 
Instead, it casts the burden of proving absence of mens rea on the infringer. 
This aspect of section 41 is a statutory exception to the general common law that 
the prosecution has the burden of proving all elements of liability. Section 41 
does not completely reverse the prosecution' s burden of proof but casts on the 
infringer a subordinate burden of proving lack of good faith and absence of 
39 
40 
Gour HS, The Penal Law of India lOth Ed (Allahabad-211001, Law 
Publishers, 1987) at 378 . It is to be noted that section 52 of the Penal 
Code provides that "nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith 
which is done or believed without due care and attention". Although this 
explanation of "good faith" is provided•in the context of criminal offences 
under the Penal Code, the possibility of the courts applying the same 
concept to copyright offences cannot be disregarded. In Public 
Prosecutor v Tunku Mahmood Iskandar [1977] 2 MU 123, the accused, 
who· was convicted of culpable homicide pleaded good faith as a 
mitigating factor. The court held that it was a settled principle that to 
satisfy the court of good faith, a person must show that he acted advisedly 
and that he had no reasonable grounds for believing that he ought to do 
what he did. 
Khaw LT, 'Copyright Law in Malaysia: The Response to Technological 
Development' (unpublished thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, London School of Economics and Political Science), ( 1990) 
at 311. 
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reasonable grounds for supposing that copyright would or might be infringed. 41 
The standard of proof required of the infringer in respect of these two factors is 
proof on the balance of probabilities .42 
In contrast, many other copyright statutes have been reluctant to 
displace the requirement of mens rea. 43 It is to be noted that the Whitford 
Committee, in its report, 44 recommended that the burden on the prosecution to 
prove that the infringer knew he was dealing with an infringing copy should be 
abolished. The Committee recommended that the burden be shifted to the 
infringer to establish that he did not know and had no reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the acts complained of were acts done in relation to infringing 
copies. This recommendation was, however, not pursued by the British 
government as it was felt that it would be unreasonable to expect an honest trader 
dealing in many different products to prove that he did not know that a particular 
· product was made in infringement of copyright. 45 In Australia, pursuant to the 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
Similar provisions which cast on the infringer the burden of proving 
absence of guilty knowledge can be found in the Hong Kong Copyright 
Ordinance, Cap 39 LHK 1975, section 5(1) and the Trinidad and Tobago 
Copyright Act 1985, section 37(1). 
R v Carr-Briant [1943] 1 KB 607 , R v Dunbar [1958] 1 QB 1, Wong 
Chooi v Public Prosecutor [1967] 2 MU 180, Public Prosecutor v 
Yuvaraj [1969] 2 MU 89. 
See, for example, the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, 
section 107; the Singapore Copyright Act '1.987, section 136 and the 
Australian Copyright Act 1968, section 132. 
See comments of Great Britain, Report of the Committee to consider the 
law on Copyright and Designs (London, HMSO, 1977) Crnnd 6732, para 
711. 
See comments of Great Britain, Report of the Law relating to Copyright 
Designs, and Performers' Protection (A Consultative Document) (London, 
HMSO, 1983) Crnnd 8302 at 50. 
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Copyright Amendment Act 1986, it was sufficient for the prosecution to prove 
that the accused "ought reasonably to know" of the infringement.46 A similar 
provision exists under section 136 of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987. In the 
United Kingdom, section 107 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
changed the test of relevant knowledge so that it is no longer necessary to show 
actual knowledge but simply that the defendant had reason to believe the relevant 
fact. The burden of proof in respect of this lesser degree of knowledge still 
remains on the prosecution. 
2.1.3 Punishment for Section 41 Offences 
If criminal penalties are to act as effective deterrents, it is crucial that their 
severity commensurate with the gravity of the offence and the extent of damages 
caused to the copyright owners. Scale of penalties which is outdated or which 
·represents no more than a small fraction of the huge profits derived from the 
infringement will not create ariy impact. Clearly penalties must be substantial 
enough if they are not only to threaten the widespread infringing activities but 
also to rock the economic basis of such activities. 
Recognising this, Parliament has always placed great emphasis on 
the protection and enforcement of copyright law by way of criminal remedies. 
46 See the Australian Copyright Act 1968, sections 132 and 132A. In Hooi 
v Brophy (1984) 52 ALR 710, Pontello v Giannotis (1990) AIPC 90-628 
and Olsen v Hutchison (1992) AIPC 90-928, it was held that constructive 
knowledge was sufficient if proven beyond reasonable doubt. 
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This is reflected in the raising of penalty levels via amendments to the Copyright 
Act 1969 and culminating in the present levels of penalty provided in sections 41 
and 43 of the Copyright Act 1987. The Copyright Act 1969 was amended twice 
over a period of ten years to increase the severity of the penalty , once in 197 5 
and again in 1979. Pursuant to the 1975 Amendment Act, the original penalty 
of a fine not exceeding RM200 per infringing copy with a maximum of 
RM50,000 or one year imprisonment or both was increased to RM2,000 per 
infringing copy with an upper limit of RM100,000. 47 The term of 
imprisonment remained unchanged. The amendment in 1979, in addition to 
further increasing the penalties of each offence, also placed the offence of 
possession of contrivance on a more serious footing than the other categories of 
copyright offences. 48 The making or possessing of any contrivance for the 
purpose of making infringing copies is punishable with a maximum fine of 
RM20,000 for each contrivance or a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten 
- years, or both49 . The other offences are punishable with a maximum fine of 
RM10,000 per infringing copy with an upper limit of RM100,000 or 
imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both. The 1987 Act incorporated the 
47 
48 
49 
Copyright (Amendment) Act 1975, section 3. 
Copyright (Amendment) Act 1979, section 2. 
In Soon Kim Seng v Public Prosecutor [1978] 2 MU 107, the appellants 
argued that section 15(1) of the Copyright Act 1969 did not provide any 
punishment for the offence of possession of contrivance. The · court, 
while upholding the conviction of the offence of possession of 
contrivance, agreed with the appellant that section 15(1) provided 
punishment only for the possession of infringing copies but not for the 
possession of contrivances . The 1979 amendment overcame this 
deficiency. 
33 
same scale of penalty with two main differences. First, there is now no upper 
limit imposed on the amount of penalty. Secondly, subsequent offences carried 
a penalty double the amount of the first offence thus reflecting Parliament's 
abhorrence towards those with a propensity to recidivate. The offence of causing 
a literary or musical work to be performed in public under section 41(3) is 
punishable with a fme under section 43 not exceeding RM25,000 or an 
imprisorunent not exceeding three years or both. As a result of the severe penal 
provisions50 existing now, offences relating to copyright infringements can 
hardly be seen as trivial. 
2.1.4 Criminal Remedies under other Statutes 
Copyright infringement on a commercial basis is often closely associated with the 
contravention of consumer protection statutes. Although these statutes are not 
· directly related to copyright law, they are nevertheless alternative avenues 
available to copyright owners. The availability of these provisions lies mainly on 
50 In contrast, under the Australian Copyright Act 1968, the maximum fine 
for offences in respect of infringing copies of a work other than a 
cinematograph fllm is $500 per infringing copy if the offender is a natural 
person and $2,500 per infringing copy if the offender is a body corporate. 
In respect of offences relating to infringing copies of a cinematograph 
fllm, the maximum fme is $1,500 for each infringing copy if the offender 
is a natural person and $7,500 if the offender is a body corporate. See 
the Australian Copyright Act 1968, sections 132 and 133. In Singapore, 
although the scale of penalties is comparable to ours , the Singapore 
Copyright Act 1987 provides for an upper limit in respect of any fme 
imposed unlike our Copyright Act 1987 which does not set any ceiling to 
the fine imposed. See the Singapore Copyright Act 1987, section 136. 
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the basis that consumers are deceived into believing they are buying genuine 
products. The deception arises from the fact that the infringing copies are 
usually packed in such a way as to be almost indistinguishable from the 
legitimate products . Even the artwork, label, trade name, trade mark and printed 
information about the products are replicated . 
Under the Trade Descriptions Act 1972, it is an offence for any 
person, in the course of a trade, to apply a false trade description to any goods 
or to supply or offer to supply any goods to which a false trade description is 
applied .51 This applies particularly to illegal copies of a work such as sound 
recordings or video cassettes which have been dressed up to look like the genuine 
article. It is to be noted that copyright infringement per se is not the subject 
matter of an offence under the Trade Descriptions Act 1972. Instead, the offence 
51 Trade Descriptions Act 1972, section 3(1)(a). A wide meaning is given 
by section 6 to the word "applies". Pursuant to section 6( 1), "A person 
applies a trade description to goods if he -
(a) affixes or annexes it to or in any manner marks it on or 
incorporates it with - ' 
(i) the goods themselves; or 
(ii) anything in, on or with which the goods are 
supplied; or 
(b) places the goods in, on or with anything which the trade 
description has been affixed or annexed to, marked on or 
incorporated with, or places any such thing with the goods; 
or 
(c) uses the trade description in any manner likely to be taken 
as referring to the goods" . 
A "trade description"is defined in section 4(1) as an indication of any one 
or more of a series of listed matters spelt out in the section which include 
the quality of the goods and the person by whom it was manufactured, 
produced, processed or reconditioned. 
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under the Act lies in the fact that the illegal copies are packaged in such a 
manner as to be taken as referring to the genuine goods. 52 
In addition, where the trade mark of the manufacturer of the 
legitimate product has been wrongfully applied to the infringing copy, the 
proprietor of the trade mark may seek an order from the court declaring that the 
infringing trade mark is a false trade description under section 16(1) of the Act. 
Being a false trade description applied to the infringing goods, an offence under 
section 3 of the Act would have been committed. Pursuant to section 16(3) such 
an order is admissible in evidence as conclusive proof of a false trade description 
in any prosecution under the Act. An offence under this section is punishable 
with a fine not exceeding RM100,000 or imprisonment not exceeding three years 
or both. 53 Subsequent offences are punishable with a fine not exceeding 
RM200,000 or imprisonment not exceeding six years or both. In the case of 
·body corporates, the punishment is a fme not exceeding RM250,000 for the first 
offence and RM500,000 for subsequent offences . It is to be noted also that the 
Trade Descriptions Act 1972 is a penal statute and does not give any civil 
remedy to a deceived or misguided consumer 
52 
53 
Recently, two local companies which were involved in computer software 
piracy were charged and found guilty under the Trade Descriptions Act 
1972. See, New Straits Times, Computimes, 13 October 1994, p 1. In 
Australia, actions have also been brought both under the Australian 
Copyright Act 1968 and the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 
simultaneously. See, for instance, WH Brine Co & Anor v Whitton 
(1981) 37 ALR 190 and Star Micronics Pty Ltd & Anor v Five Star 
Computers Pty Ltd (trading as Computerfair) & Ors (1991) 22 IPR 473. 
Trade Descriptions Act 1972, section 18. 
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Offences under the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 
have also been relied upon by copyright owners, more specifically, in the context 
of audio recordings. Pursuant to section 11(2) of the Act, the name and address 
of the producer of an audio recording must be printed conspicuously on the cover 
or container of the recording. A presumption arises under section 15 that the 
producer whose name or address is printed on the container is the producer of 
the audio recording. A contravention of section 11(2) is an offence punishable 
with imprisonment not exceeding one year or with a fine not exceeding RM5,000 
or both. Therefore, an infringer is bound to disclose his name and whereabouts 
on the cover or container of the recording thereby enabling others to trace him 
easily . If he refuses to furnish these particulars or furnishes false particulars, he 
will be criminally liable under the Act. 
Infringement of copyright can also give rise to offences under the 
·penal Code although there is as yet no locally reported decision on this point. 
Since the business operation of an infringer may involve distributors , middlemen, 
wholesalers and retailers, as is likely to be the case if the business is conducted 
on a sufficiently large scale, these parties could be charged for the offence of 
abetment by conspiracy under section 107 of the Penal Code. Alternatively, they 
could also be charged with the offence of criminal conspiracy under section 120A 
of the Code. 
For the commission of an offence of abetment by conspiracy under 
section 107, there must be a combining together of two or more persons in the 
37 
conspiracy, and some act or illegal omission must have taken place in pursuance 
of the conspiracy . 54 As direct evidence of a conspiracy is rarely available, 
conspiracy may be proved by the evidence of surrounding circumstances. Thus, 
the prosecution may prove the existence of a chain beginning from the infringer 
as manufacturer and linked to the distributors who may in tum be linked to the 
wholesalers or retailers . Each of these individuals would play their part in the 
business transaction with the motive of making illegal profits. The punishment 
for abetment by conspiracy is provided in section 109. The effect of section 109 
is to place the abetment and the offence abetted on the same footing in the case 
where no express provision is made by the Code for the punishment of such 
abetment. Thus, abetment by conspiracy in the context of offences related to 
copyright infringement is punishable to the same extent as offences under section 
41 of the Copyright Act 1987. 
In the case of criminal conspiracy under section 120A of the Penal 
Coqe, it must be shown that there was an agreement between two or more 
persons. In addition, it must also be shown that the agreement was for the doing 
of an illegal act, or for the doing by illegal means of a legal act. 'By the proviso 
to that section, the mere agreement to commit some offence is sufficient. There 
is no further requirement that the offence be carried out unlike the offence of 
abetment by conspiracy . Thus, the arrangement between various parties to 
54 Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Law of Crimes (New Delhi , Bharat Law House, 
1987) at 341; Cheang M, Criminal Law of Malaysia & Singapore: 
Principles of Liability (Kuala Lumpur, Professional (Law) Books 
Publishers, 1990) at 235. 
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systematically pass on the infringing copies down the business hierarchy to the 
retailer who sells, hires, exhibits, distributes these copies or does any other act 
in contravention of section 41 of the Copyright Act 1987 is itself a criminal 
conspiracy. 
Another possible offence that could be charged is counterfeiting 
under section 28 of the Penal Code. A person is said to "counterfeit" if he 
causes one thing to resemble another thing, intending to practise deception. Thus 
pirated copies of a sound recording, video film or computer program could be 
covered by this section. 
Although controversies exist in other countries as to whether 
infringement of copyright is theft, it is submitted that it cannot be theft under the 
theft provision of our Penal Code . . Section 378 which is the provision on theft 
· requires five elements to be satisfied before the offence of theft is made out. 
First, there must be a dishonest intention to take property. Secondly, the 
property must be movable. Thirdly, the property should be taken out of the 
possession of another person. Fourthly, the property should be taken without the 
consent of that person. Fifthly, there must be some removal of the property in 
order to accomplish the taking of it. While section 27 of the Copyright Act 1987 
deems copyright to be movable property, the act of infringement can hardly be 
argued as taking the copyright concerned out of the possession of the copyright 
owner. In addition, there is no physical removal of the copyright, as is required 
by section 378. 
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In England, a person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly 
appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently 
depriving the other of it. 55 Lord Fraser of Tully belton in Rank Film Ltd v 
Video Information Centre56took the view that copyright was not property and 
therefore could never be the subject matter of theft. This was despite section 
36(1) of the UK Copyright Act 195657 which provided that copyright was 
capable of transmission by assignment or testamentary disposition as personal or 
movable property. Likewise, Lord Wilberforce in the same case remarked that 
"infringement of copyright is not theft". 58 The view is generally taken that 
copyright infringement does not deprive the copyright owner of his copyright and 
hence a vital element of theft which is the deprivation of property is not met.59 
Interestingly, in Canada, the Crown has succeeded in relying on 
section 283(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34,60 the provision on 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Theft Act 1968, section 1 ( 1) . 
[1982] AC 380 at 445 . 
Section 36(1) of the UK Copyright Act 1956 appears as section 90(1) of 
the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. ' 
Rank Film Ltd v Video Information Centre, supra n 56 at 443. 
Griew E, The Theft Acts 1968 and 1978 (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1990) at para 2-139; R v Lloyd [1985] 2 All ER 661. 
Section 283(1)(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada provides that 'Every 
one commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or 
fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use 
of another person, anything whether animate or inanimate, with intent to 
deprive , temporarily or absolutely, the owner of it or a person who has 
a special property or interest in it, of the thing or of his property or 
interest in it' . 
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theft. In R v Stewart, 61 the Ontario Court of Appeal had to decide whether the 
illegal photographing or photocopying of the confidential list of employees in a 
large hotel complex amounted to theft. Cory JA, one of the two judges forming 
the majority, was of the view that the list of employees was protected by the 
Copyright Act, R.S.C . 1970, c. C-30 as literary works. Copyright, according 
to his Lordship, was a form of property analogous to personal property which 
could be sold or transferred by will and therefore came within the scope of the 
offence of theft. The photographing or photocopying of the list would convert 
to the use of another the copyright which belonged to the hotel thereby satisfying 
section 283(1). This aspect of the judgment is obviously not in accord with the 
House of Lords decision in Rank Film62 which was not cited by Cory JA. 
2.2 Offences relatin2 to Enforcement 
- The offences under section 41 of the Copyright Act 1987 are backed up by broad 
powers of enforcement provided in Part VII of the Act. This is a unique feature 
not found in the other intellectual property statutes such as the Trade Marks Act 
1976 and Patents Act 1983. Offences relating to the exercise by enforcement 
officers of their powers of investigation, entry and search are also provided in 
this part of the Act. Although these offences do not have immediate relation to 
acts of infringement, they are nevertheless of significance to copyright owners . 
61 
62 
(1983) 149 DLR (3d) 583. 
Supra n 56. See, also, Green BM, 'The Empire Strikes Back: Criminal 
Remedies for Video Piracy' (1984) 1 IPJ 1; Moskoff FR, 'The Theft of 
Thoughts : The Realities of 1984' (1985) 27 Crim LQ 226. 
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This is because they concern deliberate acts by infringers or third parties to 
forestall the enforcement officers' efforts in detecting and apprehending infringers 
as well as in securing evidence. The enforcement unit is vested with extensive 
investigative powers and powers of entry, search and seizure. The remaining 
part of this chapter examines these powers of the enforcement officers and the 
prosecution of offenders. 
2.2.1 Powers of Investigation 
Pursuant to section 50 of the Copyright Act, the power to investigate the 
commission of any offence under the Act is vested in the Assistant Controllers 
and police officers not below the rank of Inspector. The Assistant Controllers 
are appointed by the Minister under section 5. The Minister is also empowered 
to appoint a Controller of Copyright and Deputy Controllers of Copyright whose 
· function is to supervise all matte'rs relating to copyright under the Act. 63 In 
addition, the Controller and Deputy Controllers may exercise such powers as are 
exercisable by the Assistant Controllers. 64 
Under the Copyright Act 1969, the police alone were responsible 
for the investigation of copyright offences. The Copyright Act 1987 now vests 
63 
64 
Copyright Act 1987, section 5(2) . 
Section 5(4) . 
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such responsibility in the police and the Assistant Controllers. 65 The powers of 
the Assistant Controllers to investigate the commission of any copyright offence 
are concurrent with that of the police provided under Part V of the Criminal 
Procedure Code with one exception. 66 This exception lies in the power of the 
police to arrest without warrant in any seizable offence67 which is not available 
to an Assistant Controller. Although the burden of enforcement no longer rests 
solely on the police, they have nevertheless continued to play a significant role 
in investigating copyright offences. 68 Successful raids have also been carried 
out with the joint effort of both the police and the Assistant Controllers.69 
Under the Copyright Act 1987, search and seizure can be 
conducted with or without a search warrant, depending on the circumstances. 
- 65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
A similar vesting of investigative powers in law enforcement agency may 
be found in the Hong Kong Copyright Ordinance, Cap 39 LHK 75. In 
1973, the Hong Kong government established the Copyright Investigation 
Unit which subsequently became the Copyright Division within the 
Customs and Excise Service to enforce the copyright law. This task force 
was empowered to enter, seize, arrest and prosecute copyright offenders. 
See, Lo MH, 'Enforcement of Anti-P.iracy Measures from the Viewpoint 
of Law Enforcement Authorities', paper presented at the National 
Workshop on Copyright organised by WIPO and the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry, Kuala Lumpur, May 2-3, 1986. 
Copyright Act 1987, section 50(2). 
See Criminal Procedure Code, section 23. 
See the observation made in Lim HG, 'Piracy in the Malaysian Music 
Industry' , [1991] 1 MU xxii. 
See, for instance, New Straits Times, 17 March 1993, p 8 where two 
policemen together with enforcement officers from the Domestic Trade 
and Consumer Affairs Ministry were involved in the raid . 
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2.2.2 The issue of Search Warrants 
Section 44 empowers a Magistrate on an ex parte application to issue a warrant 
to any Assistant Controller or police officer to enter the house or premises in 
question for the purpose of a search and seizure provided that the conditions spelt 
out in the section are fulfilled. First, the information must be laid on oath before 
the Magistrate. The section does not prescribe the form which such information 
should be made nor does it require the information to be given in writing. 
However, in In re Kah Wai Video (Ipoh) Sdn Bhd70, Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he 
then was) took the view that such information ought properly to be in the form 
of a deposition stating shortly the facts . 
Secondly, the informant must show that there is reasonable cause 
for suspecting that an offence under section 41 has been committed. "Reasonable 
· cause" describes the weight of the material giving rise to the suspicion.71 It is 
such information as would justify a reasonable person in having the suspicion. 72 
At this stage, it is not necessary for the Magistrate to determine whether the 
information gives rise to a prima facie case that an offence has been committed. 
70 
7 1 
72 
Supra n 23. 
Feldman D, The Law Relating to Entry, Search and Seizure (London, 
Butterworths, 1986) at para 4.17. See, too, Cheang M, 'Entry, Search 
and Seizure in Malaysia' [1990] SCJ 83. 
Ibid. 
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Thirdly, the informant must show that there is reasonable cause for 
suspecting that the items mentioned in section 44 are in the house or premises to 
be searched. "Premises" has been defined broadly in section 3 to include, inter 
alia, any place in the open air, whether such place is with or without enclosure. 
Thus , open air markets and street hawkers would be within the scope of that 
word. 73 The items that may be searched and seized are infringing copies 
including copies suspected to be infringing copies,74 any contrivance used or 
intended to be used or capable of being used for making infringing copies, any 
article, vehicle,75 book or document by means of or in relation to which an 
offence has been committed. The range of items that are liable to be seized 
under this section is therefore very wide unlike the equivalent provision under the 
Copyright Act 1969 which permits the search and seizure of infringing copies 
and contrivance only. 76 The requirement that there be "reasonable cause for 
suspecting" is a less exacting one than that of reasonable cause for believing 
because suspicion is a less assured state of mind than belief. 77 As was stated 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
Khaw LT, 'Copyright Law in Malaysia : The Response to Technological 
Development', supra n 40. 
Pursuant to the amendment to section 44(2) of the Copyright Act 1987 
brought about by section 12(c) of the Copyright (Amendment) Act 1990, 
the enforcement officers are empowered to seize, inter alia, "any copy 
suspected to be an infringing copy". Although section 44(1) was not 
amended correspondingly to include this phrase, the ~ection should be 
construed as empowering enforcement officers to seize copies suspected 
to be infringing copies as well. 
"Vehicle" was inserted by the Copyright (Amendment) Act 1990, section 
12(a) . 
See Copyright Act 1969, section 15(4). 
Feldman (1986) at para 4.18. 
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by Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) in In re Kah Wai Video ,78 "to believe" 
is to regard the fact as true whereas "to suspect" implies a readiness to believe 
without sufficient data. 
It is the duty of the Magistrate to be satisfied that the informant 
has reasonable cause for suspicion before he grants a warrant. Whether the 
"reasonable cause" standard is finally met or not is based on the opinion of the 
Magistrate after considering all the information and not on the informant's 
assessment of his own case. 79 The Magistrate must act judicially in deciding 
whether or not to issue a warrant because the power to enter premises is an 
invasion of an individual 's liberty. 80 If he decides to issue a warrant, it must 
be signed by the Magistrate himself, otherwise he is not issuing it under his hand 
as required by section 44. In Public Prosecutor v Then Mee Kom, 81 Ajaib 
Singh J (as he then was) held that a search warrant under section 15(4) of the 
Copyright Act 1969 which was signed by the Registrar of the Sessions Court and 
not by the Magistrate who issued it was invalid . The court was of the view that 
the phrase "may issue a warrant under his hand" imposed a duty on the 
Magistrate which he could not delegate . It should be noted that the judge in 
Then Mee Kom82 was of the view that the irregularity in the search warrant was 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
Supra n 23. 
Feldman (1986) at para 4.29 . 
Ibid at para 4.08. 
[1983] 2 MU 344. 
Ibid. 
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so serious that it could not be cured by section 422 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code. Although section 44(1) of the Copyright Act 1987 uses the more 
mandatory sounding phrase of "shall issue a warrant under his hand" , it is 
submitted that such a defect in the warrant may now be cured by invoking section 
49 of the Act. 
Since the Copyright Act 1987 does not prescribe the form of the 
warrant of search, such warrant would follow the form as prescribed under the 
Criminal Procedure Code . 83 
2.2.3 Entry, Search and Seizure pursuant to a Search Warrant 
Armed with a valid warrant which is in force, the Assistant Controller or police 
officer is empowered to enter the house or premises at any reasonable time by 
· day or night to execute the warrant. This is in contrast to section 15(4) of the 
Copyright Act 1969 which permits entry during the day time only. There is a 
clear advantage in authorising entry during the night because many outlets 
continue to operate till the late hours of the night. In particular, the night 
markets in Malaysia flourish only after dark. This flexibility of time is 
circumscribed by the requirement that entry has to be made at a reasonable hour. 
Thus, while it may not be unreasonable to effect an entry at night on a premises 
which is opened for business, the same may not always be said of a night search 
of homes unless the search is a matter of urgency to prevent items being spirited 
83 In re Kah Wai Video (lpoh) Sdn Bhd, supra n 23. 
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away or destroyed. 84 Where admittance to the premises is refused by the 
occupier, section 45 of the Copyright Act 1987 authorises the executing officer 
to use force, if necessary, to enter the premises so as to remove any obstruction 
to entry, search or seizure and to detain any person found in the place until the 
search is completed. 
On entry into the premises, the Assistant Controller or police 
officer is not entitled to "tum over" the whole house. Instead, he must exercise 
the powers of search reasonably bearing in mind the purpose for which the 
warrant was given. 85 If the items are suspected to be locked up in a cupboard 
or its like, force may be applied to break such locks under the powers given in 
section 45. 
The provision made in section 44(1) empowering the enforcement 
officer to seize any copy, contrivance, article, vehicle, book or document is 
amplified in section 44(2). 86 ·In addition to the items mentioned above which 
are liable to be seized, section 44(2) also permits the seizure of any copy 
suspected to be an infringing copy. 87 Section 44(1A) enables the enforcement 
84 
85 
86 
87 
Inland Revenue Commissioners v Rossminster Ltd [1980] AC 952. 
Feldman (1986) at para 7 .12. 
It is to be noted that Article 16 of the Berne Convention provides for 
infringing copies of a work to be liable to seizure in any country of the 
union where the work enjoys legal protection. The seizure shall take 
place in accordance with the legislation of each country . Article 16 
leaves the method of seizure to be determined by national legislation. 
See supra n 74. 
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officer to take with him such other persons and such equipment as may appear 
to him necessary, presumably to assist in the investigation.88 On leaving the 
house or premises, the enforcement officer shall , if the house or premises is 
unoccupied or the occupier is temporarily absent, leave it as effectively secured 
against trespassers as he found it. Where it is not practical to remove from the 
premises the items which have been seized by reason of their nature, size or 
amount, section 4 7 allows the enforcement officer to seal such items in the 
premises or container in which they are found. It is an offence punishable under 
section 43 for any person without lawful authority to break, tamper with or 
damage such seal or remove such items or attempt to do so. 
Upon seizure of the items, the enforcement officer shall produce 
them before the Magistrate unless it is not practical to do so by reason of their 
nature, size or amount. In such an event it shall be sufficient for the seizure to 
· be reported to the Magistrate. 89 The Magistrate shall direct the same to be kept 
in the custody of the enforcement officer for the purpose of any investigation or 
prosecution. Where the items have been sealed pursuant to section 47, it shall 
be sufficient for the seizure to be reported to the Magistrate or for. the Magistrate 
88 
89 
This was inserted by the Copyright (Amendment) Act 1990, section 
12(b). 
Copyright Act 1987, section 44(2). The Act does not specify when the 
items seized should be produced before the Magistrate. However, the 
form for a search warrant prescribed under the Criminal Procedure Code 
(Form VIII in the Second Schedule) which is also the form which a 
search warrant under section 44(2) should follow, as was held in In re 
Kah Wai Video, supra n 23, requires that items seized as a result of the 
warrant should be produced forthwith before the Magistrate. 
to view the same in such premises or container. 90 
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After the search, the 
enforcement officer must prepare a list of the things seized and forthwith deliver 
a copy signed by him to the occupier, his agents or servants present in the 
premises .91 If the premises are unoccupied, the enforcement officer shall post 
a list of the things seized on the premises. 
In the context of seizure of items, an important issue that often 
arises is whether the enforcement officers' powers to seize items extend beyond 
the items specified in the warrant. In re Kah Wai Video92 involved a warrant 
issued to the police pursuant to section 15(4) of the Copyright Act 1969 
authorising them to search two premises for certain articles specified in the 
schedules thereto. In conducting the search, the Inspector seized articles which 
came within the precise limits of the schedules to the search warrant as well as 
articles which did not fall within the category of documents mentioned in the 
- warrant. One of the issues before the court was whether the seizing of 
unscheduled articles rendered the seizure illegaL Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then 
was) was of the view that it did not for two main reasons. First, by virtue of an 
implied extension of powers under the warran , the police was authorised to seize 
the unscheduled articles. Reliance was placed on the English case of Frank 
Truman Export v Metropolitan Police Commissioner. 93 This English case held 
90 
91 
92 
93 
Section 44(3). 
Section 46( 1) . 
Supra n 23. 
[1977] 3 All ER 431. 
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that a constable entering a house by virtue of a search warrant for stolen goods 
may seize not only goods which he reasonably believes to be covered by the 
warrant, but also any goods which he believes on reasonable grounds to have 
been stolen. Secondly, apart from this implied power under the search warrant, 
there is also the common law extension of police powers to seize articles not 
falling within the schedule in the warrant. Support for this proposition was found 
in the English cases of Ghani v Jones94 and Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd v 
Jones. 95 In these cases, the courts held that in addition to being entitled to seize 
goods which the police reasonably believe to be material evidence in relation to 
the crime for which entry was made, the police can also seize goods found in the 
premises in the course of their search which implicate the occupier in some other 
crimes. In the instant case, Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) found as a fact 
that the inspector conducting the search had reasonable grounds for believing and 
did believe that the unscheduled articles constituted material evidence in relation 
- to the crime for which he entered the premises or they showed implication in 
some other offences of the same kind. Having concluded that the police had 
powers to seize unscheduled articles, the court had to further consider whether 
these unscheduled articles could be admissible in evidence in a prosecution under 
section 15(1) of the Copyright Act 1969. 96 In deciding in the affirmative, the 
94 
95 
96 
[1970] 1 QB 693. 
[1968] 2 QB 299. 
Section 15(1) of the Copyright Act 1969 relates to offences for 
infringement of copyright. It is substantially similar to section 41 of the 
Copyright Act 1987. 
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court relied on the case of Kuruma v R. 97 In that case, the Privy Council said 
that when considering whether a certain evidence is admissible, the court has to 
determine whether the evidence is relevant to the matter in issue. According to 
the Privy Council, the court should not be concerned with how the evidence was 
obtained . It is to be noted that In re Kah Wai Video98 and authorities relied on 
by the court in that case involved searches by the police who in the first place 
have a special duty to detect crime and preserve evidence for use in court. 
Whether the same powers would apply where the entry, search or seizure is 
conducted by an Assistant Controller . is not clear. It is submitted that since 
Parliament has conferred powers and responsibilities on Assistant Controllers to 
investigate copyright offences and execute warrants, they should be permitted to 
use the powers associated with the police when performing that function. 
It is an offence under section 48(a) and (b) for anyone to obstruct 
an enforcement officer in the course of an entry, search and seizure . Section 
48(c) makes it an offence for anyone to refuse to give information to an 
enforcement officer relating to an offence . Section 48(d) and (e) concern the 
furnishing of false information. These offences are punishable under section 43 . 
97 
98 
[1955] AC 197. 
Supra n 23 . 
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2.2.4 Entry, Search and Seizure without a Warrant 
As discussed above, the normal procedure for entry, search and seizure in 
relation to copyright offences is by way of a warrant issued under section 44(1) 
of the Copyright Act 1987. The proviso to section 44(1) envisages a situation 
where entry , search and seizure have to be conducted without a search warrant. 
This is when the enforcement officer has reasonable grounds for believing that 
by reason of delay in obtaining a search warrant, the items liable to be searched 
or seized may be removed or destroyed . This provision reflects the importance 
of ensuring that vital articles be not removed or obliterated thereby impeding 
investigation into the offence. 
The proviso to section 44(1) was absent from the Copyright Act 
1969 which therefore meant that the police at that time did not have any power 
of search without warrant. Thus , in Public Prosecutor v Then Mee Kom99 
whi.ch arose under the Copyright Act 1969, the raiding of the premises of the 
accused and seizure of video tapes without any search warrant was held to be 
illegal. Unlike an application for a search warrant which requires the lower 
standard of reasonable cause for suspecting the commission of an offence, entry 
without warrant can only be effected where the higher standard of reasonable 
grounds for believing the removal or destruction of the items is met. This higher 
standard is imposed in the latter case because the information is usually not given 
under oath and its veracity is tested only by the enforcement officer. In the 
99 Supra n 81. 
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former case, the Magistrate acting as an independent judicial officer can check 
on the need for the search and satisfy himself on the accuracy of the information. 
Clearly , an advantage of entry , search and seizure without warrant is the element 
of speed and surprise thus preventing the removal or destruction of evidence .1 
2.2.5 Prosecution 
Section 53 of the Copyright Act 1987 provides that any criminal prosecution 
before the Sessions Court for an offence under the Act may be conducted by an 
Assistant Controller or a police officer not below the rank of Inspector. This 
section repeats substantially the essence of section 15A of the Copyright Act 
1969. Three points with regard to the difference in wording of section 15A of 
the Copyright Act 1969 and section 52 of the Copyright Act 1987 are 
noteworthy . First, the court of a Magistrate of the First Class in Sabah and 
· Sarawak mentioned in section 15A is referred to as a Sessions Court with effect 
from 1st January 1981.2 Secondly, as offences under section 41 of the 
Copyright Act 1987 are seizable, prosecutions can only be conducted by , inter 
alia, a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector pursuant, to section 377 
of the Criminal Procedure Code but not by an Assistant Controller unless 
2 
It is to be noted that under the Criminal Procedure Code, a search may 
be conducted without warrant only in three situations. First, under 
sections 62 and 63 in the case of stolen gooct's. Secondly, under sections 
62A and 62B in the case of coinage offences. Thirdly, under section 116 
which is exercisable only if a summons to produce documents or things 
issued under section 51 is not complied with. 
See Subordinate Courts Act (Extension) Order 1980 and section 111 of 
the Subordinate Courts Act 1948. 
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authorised by any written law. 3 Therefore, special provisions were made in the 
Copyright Act 1987 to enable Assistant Controllers to conduct prosecutions as 
well. Thirdly , section 64 of the Subordinate Courts Act 1948 was amended in 
1978 to empower the Sessions Court to pass any sentence allowed by law other 
than the sentence of death. 4 Therefore, unlike section 15A of the Copyright Act 
1969, it became unnecessary for the Copyright Act 1987 to explicitly state that 
the Sessions Court had jurisdiction to award the full punishment for any offence 
under the Act. 
While it is clear that criminal prosecution for copyright offence can 
be brought before the Sessions Court by an Assistant Controller and police 
officer not below the rank of lnspector,5 the Act is silent as to whether 
prosecution can also be brought before a Magistrate. If prosecution before a 
Magistrate is possible, the question arises as to whether such a prosecution can 
· be conducted by an Assistant Controller. Section 53 is clearly not an ouster of 
the Magistrate Court's jurisdiction and the series of reported copyright cases on 
appeal from the Magistrate's decision confirms the existence of the Magistrate's 
jurisdiction. 6 Further, if the Assistant Controllers are empower.ed to conduct 
3 
4 
5 
6 
See. Criminal Procedure Code, section 380. 
By Subordinate Courts (Amendment) Act 1978, section 3. 
Copyright Act 1987, section 53. 
Cases under the Copyright Act 1969 which were tried at first instance by 
the Magistrate included Chew Onn Yuen & Anor v Public Prosecutor, 
supra n 22; Public Prosecutor v K.M. Basheer Ahmad, supra n 20 and 
Public Prosecutor v Oh Teck Soon [1986] 1 MU 488. 
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prosecutions in the Sessions Court, it should be logically inferred that they also 
have authority to conduct prosecutions in the Magistrate's Court. This problem 
did not arise under the Copyright Act 1969 because enforcement then was solely 
by the police who had the power to prosecute copyright offences under section 
377 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
With regard to non-seizable offences, 7 the Assistant Controllers 
have the authority to prosecute these offences pursuant to section 380(2)(b) of the 
Criminal Procedure Code. 
Where prosecution is brought for a copyright offence, section 
51(1)8 of the Copyright Act 1987 provides that any statement, whether oral ·: or 
in writing, made at any time by the accused to the enforcement officer or any 
other person shall be admissible at his trial in evidence. The section further 
· provides that if the person prosecuted tenders himself as a witness, any such 
statement may be used in cross-examination and for the purpose of impeaching 
his credit. By a proviso to the sub-section, no such statement shall be admissible 
if made as a result of any inducement, threat or promise which causes the person 
prosecuted to suppose that he would gain advantage or avoid any evil of a 
temporal nature by making the statement. In addition, no statement made by the 
person after his arrest is admissible unless the person has been cautioned in the 
7 
8 
These offences are found in sections 41(3), 47, 48 and 52 of the 
Copyright Act 1987. 
This section is a reproduction of section 113 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code. 
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words specified in section 51(1)(a)(ii). Such caution is not necessary if the 
statement was made prior to an arrest. If there is no time to administer a 
caution, the statement will not be rendered inadmissible in evidence if it has been 
administered as soon as possible. Section 51 (2) reiterates the contents of the 
caution, that is, that a person accused of an offence shall not be bound to answer 
any question relating to the case after a caution has been administered to him as 
in sub-section (1). 
2.2.6 Forfeiture of articles 
Any item seized shall be liable to forfeiture. 9 Where prosecution is brought 
against an accused, the court at the conclusion of the trial may order destruction 
of those items. In the case of infringing copies, the court may also order the 
delivery up of those copies to the first owner of the copyright, his assignee or 
- exclusive licensee. 10 Where there is no prosecution, the items shall be deemed 
to be forfeited at the expiratimi of one month from the date it was seized unless 
a claim thereto is made before that date. 11 Any claim shall be made by the 
claimant personally or his agent by giving a written notice to an Assistant 
Controller. 12 The Assistant Controller shall then refer the notice to the 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Copyright Act 1987, section 54(1). 
See, too, Chapter 4 at 4.2. 
Section 54(3). 
Section 54(4). 
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Controller. 13 The Controller may then conduct an enquiry and direct that the 
items be released or forfeited or refer the matter to the court. If the matter is 
referred to the court, the court shall summon the claimant and the person from 
whom the items were seized to appear before it. The court shall then proceed 
to examine the claim. If it is proved that an offence has been committed and the 
items were infringing copies, the court shall order their forfeiture. In the 
absence of such proof, the court shall order the release of the items to the person 
entitled to it. 14 Where the items are forfeited under section 54(3), the same 
shall be delivered to the Controller who shall dispose of it as he thinks fit or 
deliver it to the copyright owner. 15 
13 
14 
15 
Section 54(5). 
Section 54(6). 
Section 54(7). 
CHAPTER 3 
INTERLOCUTORY REMEDIES 
A copyright owner who sues for . infringement of his copyright will in most 
instances have, as his primary objective, the aim of putting an end to the 
infringing activities as soon as P?Ssible. Between the commencement of the 
proceedings and the outcome of the trial, which may be some years later, the 
copyright owner needs quick protection from the damaging effects which can be 
caused by the continuing acts of the infringer. Monetary compensation by way 
of damages rarely suffices because of the continuing injury caused if no restraint 
is put on the infringer. In the absence of any urgent relief in the period between 
commencement of proceedings and trial, the harm caused to the copyright owner 
may have detrimental consequences. In this regard, interlocutory remedies play 
a significant role in providing copyright owners with immediate protection. 
The injunction has been said to be the most important remedy in 
copyright infringement proceedings. 1 An injunction is a judicial process 
whereby a party is required to do a particular thing or to refrain from doing a 
Copinger and Skone James, Copyright, 13th Ed (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1991) at para 320. 
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particular thing according to the exigency of the writ. 2 Various forms of 
injunctions are employed in proceedings for copyright infringement. 
Interlocutory injunctions are limited to last either until further judicial order or 
until the final hearing of the case. 3 Quia timet injunctions are granted against 
apprehended or threatened wrongs which have not been committed.4 Final 
injunctions are granted after a final hearing and are directed towards settling the 
issues in dispute conclusively. 5 
The injunction, being a creature of equity, became part of our law 
when equity was received into this country. The English principles of equity 
were first introduced into the former Straits Settlements comprising Penang, 
Malacca and Singapore by the Sec~nd Royal Charter of Justice in 1826. 
Equitable principles were formally incorporated into the laws of the Federal 
Malay States comprising Pahang, Perak, Negri Sembilan and Selangor by the 
Civil Law Enactment in 1937. The Unfederated Malay States comprising Johore, 
Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Terengganu officially received equitable principles 
in 1951 when the Civil Law Enactment 1937 was extended to these states. At 
present, the basis for the application of equitable principles in this country is 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Kerr WW, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Injunctions, 6th Ed 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1981) at 1. 
As to interlocutory injunctions, see infra at 3 .1. 
The most common quia timet injunctions granted in copyright 
infringement proceedings are the Anton Piller order and the Mareva 
injunction. These are discussed in this chapter at 3. 2 and 3. 3 
respectively. 
As to final injunctions, see Chapter 4 at 4.3. 
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section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956 (revised 1972). 6 The High Court is 
empowered by the Specific Relief Act 1950 (revised 1974)7 to issue perpetual 
and temporary injunctions. 8 In addition, paragraph 6 of the Schedule to the 
Courts of Judicature Act 1964 provides for the interim preservation of property 
which is the subject matter of any cause or matter by injunction. Also, the High 
Court which is vested with equitable jurisdiction, has the inherent power to make 
any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the 
process of the court. Such jurisdiction is preserved by Order 92, rule 4 of the 
Rules of the High Court 1980. As the Subordinate Courts Act 1948 is silent on 
the grant of an injunction, it follows that subordinate courts do not have the 
jurisdiction to grant an injunction. Pursuant to section 29 of the Government 
Proceedings Act 1956, injunctions cannot be granted against the government. 
The injunction as a remedy for copyright infringement is well-
established and has been statutorily incorporated since our very earl,Y copyright 
6 
7 
8 
In West Malaysia, the rules of equity that are made applicable pursuant 
to section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956 (revised 1972) are those rules as 
administered in England on 7.4.56. Sabah and Sarawak received the rules 
of equity as administered in England on 1.12. 51 and 12.12.49 
respectively. 
See Specific Relief Act 1950 (revised 1974), sections 50 to 55. 
In Nicholas & Ors v Gan Realty Sdn Bhd [1970] 2 MU 89, the Federal 
Court expressed the view that a temporary injunction under section 50 of 
the Specific Relief (Malay States) Ordinance 1950 (now Specific Relief 
Act 1950 (revised 1974)) had the same meaning as an interlocutory 
injunction. 
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legislation. 9 Currently, section 37(1) of the Copyright Act 1987 provides for the 
grant of an injunction as a statutory remedy in copyright infringement 
proceedings. But where the effect of the injunction would be to require a 
completed or partly built building to be demolished or to prevent the completion 
of a partly built building, an injunction would not be granted. 10 
As the injunction is an equitable remedy, it is granted at the 
discretion of the court. Such discretion extends to deciding which part or parts 
of a work are to be affected by the injunction depending on the extent in which 
the infringement is mixed with the copyright work. If an injunction is granted, 
a deliberate refusal to obey the order is a contempt of court because an injunction 
is an order in personam. 
9 
10 
Instances of such statutory provisions include section 6 of the UK 
Copyright Act 1911 which was in force in Penang and Mala~ca, section 
8(i) of the Copyright Enactment Cap 73 which was in force in Selangor, 
Perak, Pahang and Negri Sembilan and section 17(1) of the UK Copyright 
Act 1956 which was in force in Sabah and Sarawak. These statutes were 
repealed by the Copyright Act 1969 which was itself repealed by the 
Copyright Act 1987. 
Copyright Act 1987, section 3 7 (3). A similar provision was present in 
section 17(4) of the now repealed UK Copyright Act 1956. However, 
this provision was not included in the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act 1988 as the Government felt that the courts could be relied upon to 
exercise their discretion in this matter. See Hart M, 'Infringement and 
Remedies Under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988' [1989] 
EIPR 13. Note, however, the Australian Copyright Act 1968 does not 
contain any restriction on the court's power to grant an injunction. 
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An injunction is available at the option of the copyright owner. 
If an exclusive licensee" seeks a final injunction, he must join the copyrig11t 
owner as a party to the action. 12 However, the exclusive licensee may obtain 
an interlocutory injunction without having to join the copyright owner as a party 
to the action. 13 A non-exclusive licensee can sue in his own name if he joins 
the copyright owner as a party to the action. 14 An equitable assignee 15 may 
commence proceedings for an interlocutory injunction but cannot obtain a final 
injunction without joining the legal owners of the copyright as parties to the 
action at some stage of the proceedings. 16 Alternatively, the equitable assignee 
can compel the assignor to complete the transfer of title by executing a proper 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Pursuant to section 38(9) of the Copyright Act 1987 an exclusive licensee 
is a person who has been given the authority, to the exclusion of all other 
persons, to exercise a right which would be exercisable exclusively by the 
owner of the copyright. 
Copyright Act 1987, section 38(3) . This is because a licence does not 
pass any proprietary interest. The locus standi of a licensee to commence 
action by joining the owner is provided by section 38(2) which deems the 
exclusive licensee as having the same rights of action under an 
infringement proceedings as if the licence is an assignment. 
Section 38(3). 
Television Broadcasts & Ors v Seremban Video Centre Sdn Bhd [1985] 
1 MU 171, Television Broadcasts Ltd & Ors v Mandarin Video Holdings 
Sdn Bhd [1983] 2 MU 346. 
An equitable assignee may derive his interest through an oral assignment 
or through an assignment where the formalities required by law have not 
been complied with or through a trust. 
Performing Right Society Ltd v London Theatre of Varieties Ltd [1924] 
AC 1, Wah Sang Industrial Co v Takmay Industrial Co Ltd [1980] FSR 
303. 
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written assignment before commencing proceedings for copyright 
infringement. 17 
This chapter discusses the principles governing the grant of the 
interlocutory injunction, the Anton Piller order and the Mareva injunction which 
are the main interlocutory remedies in copyright infringement proceedings. It 
finally discusses a preliminary procedure available to copyright owners under 
section 39 of the Copyright Act 1987 to prevent the importation of infringing 
copies. 
3.1 Interlocutory Injunctions 
As stated at the beginning of this c.hapter, it is of paramount importance to the 
copyright owner that the infringing activities be put to an immediate stop. Any 
delay may be so detrimental to the copyright owner because the damaging effects 
of the infringing acts may drive the copyright owner out of business. Also, 
pending any decision by the court, the infringer can continue with his infringing 
activities with impunity. By the time of the trial, many circumstances may have 
changed. The market's demand for a particular work especially musical works, 
films and sound recordings may have diminished drastically and irreversibly 
because the popularity of these works usually endures for only a few months. 
Where computer programs are concerned, developments in technology may 
quickly supersede the novelty of these programs. The inferior quality of the 
17 An equitable assignee may seek an order for specific performance 
requiring the assignor to perform his obligations under the original 
contract. 
64 
infringing copies may be mistaken by the public to be equivalent to the nature 
and quality of the original work and this may destroy the demand for the work 
completely . The copyright owner is particularly vulnerable where the 
infringement occurs at an early stage in the marketing of his work. 
The interlocutory injunction restrains the infringer from infringing 
or continuing to infringe the copyright. Its object is to maintain the status quo 
between the parties as existing during the period immediately prior to the 
application for interlocutory injunction and the hearing of the cause upon the 
merits . 18 The court grants an interlocutory injunction not as a means of 
enforcing and establishing the parties' rights but as a temporary protection of the 
copyright owner against losses caused by the continuing infringing activities. 19 
The interlocutory injunction ensures that any final judgment obtained will not be 
rendered ineffectual. 
An application for an interlocutory injunction can be made at any 
time before or after the trial regardless of whether the copyright owner had 
sought a permanent injunction in his claim. 20 Although the interlocutory 
injunction is normally granted inter partes, the court can grant an ex parte 
18 
19 
20 
American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396. 
Ibid. 
Rules of the High Court 1980, Order 29 rule 1(1). 
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interlocutory injunction in urgent cases. 21 However, this is only applicable 
where the applicant is the plaintiff. 22 
Since the interlocutory injunction is primarily a pre-trial remedy, 
the court, at the hearing of the application for an interlocutory injunction, is not 
concerned with deciding conflicting questions of fact or difficult questions of law 
which call for detailed arguments. At this stage, the court has available before 
it only affidavit evidence, 23 or sometimes no evidence at all especially in an 
urgent case where the application is made ex parte. In addition, much of the 
affidavit evidence of the parties are likely to be in conflict. Neither will there 
be available to the court the full pre-trial process of discovery and inspection of 
documents at this stage. With whatever evidence available to it, the court will 
decide whether to exercise its discretion to grant or to refuse the interlocutory 
injunction. To ensure that such discretion is not exercised arbitrarily, the House 
of Lords in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd24 laid down the principles 
to be applied by the courts in exercising their discretion.25 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Rules of the High Court 1980, Order 29 rule 1(2). 
Prior to August 1991, Singapore had the same provision as ours but the 
Singapore provision was later amended to allow a plaintiff or a defendant 
in an urgent case to apply for an ex parte interlocutory injunction. See the 
Singapore Rules of the Supreme Court (Amendment No 2) Rules 1991, 
rule 16. 
Pursuant to Order 38 rule 2 of the Rules of the High Court 1980, the 
court has a discretion whether or not to allow cross-examination of the 
deponent of the affidavit. 
Supra n 18. 
See infra at 3. 1. 1. 
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The Cyanamid26 principles were first applied in Malaysia in the 
libel case of Datuk Syed Kechik bin Syed Mohamed v Datuk Y eh Pao Tzu & 
Ors Y In that case, Yusoff J took the view that the prima facie test which 
required an applicant to show a prima facie case that he would succeed on the 
merits at trial had been superseded by the Cyanamid28 principles. Since then, 
these principles have been applied unhesitatingly in decisions pertaining to 
applications for interlocutory injunctions in a wide variety of cases. 29 The 
Supreme Court, in the recent case of Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd v Hong 
Huat Holdings Sdn Bhd & Ors30 made it clear that the discretion of the courts 
to grant or refuse an interlocutory injunction must be based on established 
principles as enunciated in the Cyanamid31 case "which has been consistently 
applied by the courts in this countiy". 32 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Supra n 18. 
[1977] 1 MU 56. 
Supra n 18. 
For example, in cases involving passing off (Baskin Robbins International 
Co & Anor v Avonday Sdn Bhd [1992] 2 CU 1198), shares (Hong Kong 
Vegetable Oil Co Ltd v Malin Sirinaga Wick & Ors [1978] 2 MU 13), 
tenancy (Mohamed Zainuddin b Puteh v Yap Chee Seng [1978] 1 MU 
40) and industrial disputes (Sivaperuman v Heah Seok Yeong Realty Sdn 
Bhd [1979] 1 MU 150). 
[1992] 3 cu 1525. 
Supra n 18. 
Supra n 30 at 1530. 
67 
3.1.1 Principles Governing the Grant of an Interlocutory Injunction 
Prior to the House of Lords decision in the Cyanamid33 case., the applicant for 
an interlocutory injunction had to demonstrate that he had a prima facie case. 
He had to show that his copyright existed and that it had been infringed. 34 
Once this hurdle had been surmounted, the applicant had to demonstrate 
irreparable damage that would not be compensated if he succeeded at trial, that 
is, the money obtained at trial may not compensate him.35 Finally, the applicant 
had to show that the balance of convenience favoured the grant of an injunction. 
The requirement for a prima facie case had been variously 
interpreted to mean, inter alia, "that there is a substantial question to be 
decided", 36 "that there is a probability of success", 37 "that there is a sufficient 
likelihood of success" 38 and "that there is a fair chance of success" 39 . In 
addition to the confusion caused by this diversity of interpretation, a practice 
evolved among judges to exhaustively analyse the legal issues involved in order 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
Supra n 18. 
JT Stratford & Son Ltd v Lindley [1965] AC 269. 
Roffman-La Roche (F) & Co AG v Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry [1975] AC 295. 
Great Western Railway Co v Birmingham and Oxford Junction Railway 
Co 17 U Ch 245, 41 ER 1074, Nicholas & Ors v Gan Realty Sdn Bhd 
supra n 8, Holiday Inns Inc v Hotel Enterprises Ltd [1976] 1 MU 213. 
Norman v Mitchell 5 De GM & G 673; 43 ER 1022. 
Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618. 
Parish v World Series Cricket Pty Ltd (1977) 16 ALR 172. 
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to determine whether the applicant had sufficiently established his case. In 
reality, the interlocutory proceedings became a preliminary trial used by the 
parties to obtain an indication of the court's view on the merits. The desirability 
of such preliminary "mini-trials" was questioned, particularly, in view of the fact 
that they detracted from the actual purpose of an interlocutory injunction which 
is to preserve the status quo until the true legal position can be ascertained at 
trial. 
In 197 5, the House of Lords in the Cyanamid40 case sought to 
rectify the situation by formulating new principles upon which the courts should 
exercise their discretion to grant or refuse interlocutory injunctions. In that case, 
the plaintiff claimed that it owned a patent on certain surgical sutures in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, and had marketed its products in the 
United Kingdom. It sought an interlocutory injunction against the defendants to 
restrain infringement of the patent. The defendants had not yet commenced 
manufacture of the sutures in the United Kingdom. Graham J, at first instance, 
and the Court of Appeal approached the case by inquiring as to whether, on the 
whole of the affidavit evidence before the court, a prima facie case of 
infringement had been made out. For a prima facie case to be established, the 
court had to be satisfied that the plaintiff had shown that it was more likely than 
not that it would succeed at the trial. Since the plaintiff had not established a 
prima facie case, the Court of Appeal refused to grant an interlocutory 
injunction. 
40 Supra n 18. 
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On appeal, Lord Diplock, with whom Lords Cross, Salmon and 
Edmund Davies and Viscount Dilhorne concurred, held that the "prima facie 
case" approach was wrong because it fettered the discretion of the court and 
limited its flexibility in granting an injunction. The appeal was therefore allowed 
and the interlocutory injunction granted. 
The following principles were laid down by Lord Diplock who, 
at the same time, made it clear that they were in no way special to actions for 
infringement of patents but had a universal application. First, the court must 
determine whether there was a serious question to be tried. Secondly, if the 
court was satisfied that there was a serious question to be tried, it should 
co~ider whether the balance of convenience lay in favour of granting or refusing 
to grant the interlocutory injunction . In assessing the balance of convenience, the 
most important question to be considered was the adequacy of damages as a 
remedy. On this, the following guidelines should be applied: 
(a) If an interlocutory injunction is refused but the plaintiff 
subsequently succeeds at the trial in establishing his right 
to a permanent injunction, would he be adequately 
compensated by an award of damages for the loss he 
would have sustained as a result of the continuing acts of 
the defendant? If damages in the measure recoverable at 
common law would be an adequate remedy and the 
defendant would be in a financial position to pay them, the 
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court would normally refuse to grant an interlocutory 
injunction, however strong the plaintiff's claim appeared 
to be. 
(b) If damages would not provide an adequate remedy for the 
plaintiff, the court then goes on to consider whether the 
defendant, if he were to succeed at the trial, would be 
adequately compensated under the plaintiff's undertaking 
as to damages for the loss which the defendant would have 
sustained before trial by being prevented from doing the 
acts sought to be restrained. If damages in the measure 
recoverable under the undertaking would be an adequate 
remedy and t:tte plaintiff would be in a fmancial position to 
pay them, there would be no reason to refuse an 
interlocutory injunction. 
(c) If there is doubt as to the adequacy of damages available 
to either party, the court must consider all the other factors 
affecting the balance of convenience. These factors are 
many, depending on the circumstances of each particular 
case and no attempt should be made to list them, but: 
(i) the extent to which each party will suffer 
uncompensatable disadvantages is always a 
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significant factor in assessing where the balance of 
convenience lies, 
(ii) where the factors are evenly balanced, the court 
should make such order as is necessary to preserve 
the status quo, 
(iii) where the uncompensatable damages appear evenly 
balanced, and on undisputed facts one party 's case 
is disproportionately strong to that of the other, "it 
may not be improper" to consider the relative 
strength of each party's case as disclosed by the 
affidavits. 
Lord Diplock also emphasised that there may be other special 
factors to be taken into account in individual cases. This therefore preserves the 
discretionary nature of the remedy. In that case, the House of Lords held that 
there was clearly a serious question to be tried and that the balance of 
convenience favoured the plaintiff for the following reasons. Without an 
interlocutory injunction, the plaintiff would be deprived of the opportunity of 
getting the product established on the market in the absence of competition. The 
defendants were not yet on the market themselves. If the defendant's product 
was allowed on the market, the plaintiff might be unable to enforce a permanent 
injunction because of the damaging effects on the plaintiff's goodwill, forcing 
doctors to abandon a product they had found useful. Since the defendant had no 
business going which an interlocutory injunction would put a stop to, no factories 
would be closed and no jobs would be affected. 
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There are three important factors identified by Professor W. R. 
Cornish41 which need to be taken into account in considering the balance of 
convenience. First, regard must be had to the degree to which the plaintiff and 
defendant are successfully established in business. Where the defendant's 
business has not begun, but the plaintiff is already on the market, the balance 
may lie in the plaintiff's favour. 42 If both plaintiff and defendant are already 
in the market and the plaintiff is struggling to establish himself, the special 
danger posed by the defendant may tip the balance in the plaintiff's favour. But 
if the plaintiff is already well-established and the defendant is unlikely to offer 
major competition in the interim, injunction may not be granted. 43 Secondly, 
if ei~er party appears to lack the financial ability or backing to meet any ultimate 
liability in damages this may operate against him. 44 Thirdly, unnecessary delay 
on the plaintiff's part will weigh against him, at least if the defendant has 
materially altered his position in consequence. 45 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
Cornish WR, Intellectual Property: Patents. Copyright. Trade Marks and 
Allied Rights, 2nd Ed (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1989) at 40. 
Belfast Ropework Co Ltd v Pixdane Ltd [1976] FSR 337. 
Catnic Components Ltd v Stressline Ltd [1976] FSR 157. 
Standex International Ltd v Blades &.Blades Ltd [1976] FSR 114. 
Sirdar Ltd v Les Fils de Louis Mulliez [1975] FSR 309, Radley Gowns 
Ltd v Costas Spyrou [1975] FSR 455, The Great American Success Co 
Ltd v Kattaineh [1976] FSR 554. 
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There was initial opposition to the application of the Cyanamid46 
principles, particularly, by Lord Denning MR in the Court of Appeal but this met 
with little success. In Fellowes & Son v Fisher_,47 which was a case involving 
a restrictive covenant forbidding an employee to compete in a specified area, 
Lord Denning MR refused to follow the Cyanamid48 principles in his dissenting 
judgment. Instead, his Lordship held that no prima facie case had been 
established and therefore refused the injunction. The other members of the Court 
of Appeal, however, felt compelled to abide by the Cyanamid49 principles. The 
"prima facie case" test was once again applied by Lord Denning MR in Hubbard 
v Pitt50 which was a case on picketing by members of a certain locality but did 
not receive the support of the Court of Appeal. 51 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
Supra n 18. 
[1976] 1 QB 122 . . 
Supra n 18. 
Ibid. 
[1976] 1 QB 142. 
The Australian courts have also not followed the Cyanamid principles but 
have continued to rely on their High Court decision in Beecham Group 
Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd supra n 38. The approach in 
Beecham's case is markedly similar to that of the "prima facie case" test. 
See, for instance, Firth Industries Ltd v Polyglas Engineering Pty Ltd 
(1975) 49 AUR 263 and Winthrop Investments Ltd v Winns Ltd [1975] 
2 NSWLR 666. Recently, the High Court of Australia, has begun to 
move away from the Beecham approach and to follow the Cyanamid 
principles. See Castlemaine Toohey Ltd v The State of South Australia 
(1986) 161 CLR 148, A v Hayden (No 1) (1984) 56 ALR 73, Tableland 
Peanuts Pty Ltd v Peanut Marketing Board (1984) 52 ALR 651 and 
Australian Coarse Grain Pool Pty Ltd v Barley Marketing Board of 
Queensland (1983) 46 ALR 398. In Singapore, the Court of Appeal in 
Federal Computer Services v Ang Jee Hai. Eric [1991] 3 MU 341 made 
it clear that the Cyanamid· principles are to be followed in copyright 
infringement cases. 
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In the case of Kwik Lok Corporation v W.B.W. Engineers Ltd52 , 
which came before the Court of Appeal very shortly after the Cyanamid53 
decision was delivered, Russell U and Stamp U readily applied the Cyanamid54 
principles. In fact, Russell U began his judgment by stating that the House of 
Lords had "authoritatively (and mercifully with one voice) laid down the correct 
approach "55 to be adopted when faced with an application for interlocutory 
injunction restraining infringement of copyright. In that case, the plaintiffs had 
sued the defendant for infringement of copyright in drawings relating to 
mechanical parts for an automatic strip closure machine for bags. The plaintiffs 
alleged reproduction of these drawings by the defendant in the form of 
corresponding parts in their own automatic strip closure bagging machines. At 
the .Court of Appeal stage, the parti~s conceded the existence of a serious 
question to be tried. The court then had to consider the adequacy of damages. 
In this regard, it was argued by the plaintiffs that where a purchaser would in all 
probability have bought one of the plaintiffs' machines but for the competition 
' 
posed by the defendant, the plaintiffs would be harmed by being deprived of an 
outlet for futur.e sales of their product. On this point, the court agreed that 
damages might not be a wholly adequate remedy. The court then proceeded to 
the next consideration as laid down by the Cyanamid56 case which was that of 
52 [1975] FSR 237. 
53 Supra n 18. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Kwik Lok Corporation v W.B.W. Enginers Ltd, supra n 52 at 242. 
56 Supra n 18. 
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deciding whether the defendant would be adequately protected by the cross-
undertakings in damages . The court held that the defendant would not be 
adequately protected against possible injustice by the cross-undertakings because 
it would be extremely difficult for the defendant to establish what sales it would 
have made of its machines but for the injunction. Finally, the court proceeded 
to the question of preservation of the status quo. The defendant was in the 
market in a small way, as compared to the plaintiffs who were in the market in 
a considerably more substantial way . Evidence was given that the infringement 
had not affected the substantiality of the plaintiffs' market. As the parties' status 
quo would not be affected, the interlocutory injunction was refused. 
Almost two decades larer, the Cyanamid57 principles are still 
applied by the English courts. Thus, in the recent Court of Appeal decision in 
Entec (Pollution Control) Ltd v Abacus Mouldings, 58 the plaintiff sought an 
interlocutory injunction against the defendants to restrain them from infringing 
its copyright in respect of the plaintiff's septic tanks and cesspools. The Court 
of Appeal, in di~charging the interlocutory injunction granted by the judge at first 
instance, quoted and applied the principles laid down by Lord Diplock in the 
Cyanamid59 case. It is therefore clear that the Cyanamid60 case represents the 
English position on interlocutory injunctions in infringement of copyright cases. 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Ibid. 
[1992] FSR 332. 
Supra n 18. 
Ibid . 
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3.1.2 Interlocutory Injunctions in Malaysian CopyriKht Cases 
The principles laid down in the Cyanamid61 case have been 
applied by our courts in copyright infringement proceedings. In Asia Television 
Ltd & Anor v Viwa Video Sdn Bhd,62 the plaintiffs, who contended that they 
were the owners of the copyright in respect of the cinematograph film63 
contained in the video tape, alleged that the defendants had infringed their 
copyright. The plaintiffs further deposed that the infringing acts were damaging 
their business and it was therefore necessary that the defendants be restrained 
from continuing with their infringing acts. Ajaib Singh J (as he then was) at first 
instance held that there was sufficient evidence to show that the plaintiffs were 
likely to suffer serious and irreparable damage to their business unless an 
interlocutory injunction was granted ~ His Lordship therefore granted an ex parte 
interlocutory injunction. However, on subsequent application by the defendants, 
the ex parte interlocutory injunction was set aside because of failure by the 
plaintiffs to comply with the Film (Censorship) Act 1952.64 Although there was 
61 
62 
63 
64 
Ibid. 
[1984] 2 MU 304 (Federal Court). The decision at first instance is 
reported in [1983] 2 MU 409. 
Pursuant to section 4( 1) of the Copyright Act 1969, cinematograph films 
is a category of work eligible for copyright. 
The plaintiffs' appeal to the Federal Court was allowed and the ex parte 
interlocutory injunction restored but the appeal was confined solely to the 
effect of the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the Film (Censorship) Act 
1952. 
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no direct reference to the Cyanamid65 case in the judgment, his Lordship's 
. 
decision proceeded along the lines of the Cyanamid66 principles. 
Similarly, in Television Broadcasts & Ors v Seremban Video 
Centre Sdn Bhd67, the plaintiffs had obtained an interlocutory injunction 
restraining the defendant from committing various acts of infringement of 
copyright in respect of cinematograph films. The defendant then applied to set 
aside the interlocutory injunction on four grounds . First, it was contended that 
the damage was not irreparable and the injunction ought to be set aside. 
Secondly, the defendant challenged the authority of the general manager of the 
third plaintiff to swear the affidavit. Thirdly, the defendant contended that the 
first. and second plaintiffs, being foreign companies, could not acquire any 
copyright in Malaysia. Lastly, the-defendant challenged the locus standi of the 
third plaintiff to sue in his own name. In dismissing all the four objections 
raised, Peh Swee Chin J (as he then was) held that the onus was upon the 
applicant for an interlocutory injunction to establish that damages would not be 
an adequate remedy. According to his Lordship, one of the ways of establishing 
this was to prove that the injury sought to be prevented was irreparable. On 
the facts, his Lordship was of the view that the proliferation of the 
cinematographic films in the form of video cassettes and the continuing process 
involved in such proliferation established that the damage was irreparable. The 
65 Supra n 18. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Supra n 14. 
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second objection taken by the defendant was dismissed as being a highly technical 
one. As regards the third contention, his Lordship was of the view that section 
6 read together with section 20 of the Copyright Act 1969 enabled a foreigner 
to acquire copyright in Malaysia. In relation to the final contention, his Lordship 
held that the third plaintiff had locus standi to sue since he had joined the 
copyright proprietor as the other plaintiffs . According to the court, since the 
instant application was for an interlocutory injunction, it was not necessary for 
the plaintiffs to conclusively prove a clear title. Again, there was no reference 
made to the Cyanamid68 case in the judgment but the principles applied by Peh 
Swee Chin J (as he then was) in ordering that the interlocutory injunction granted 
earlier be continued resembled the Cyanamid69 principles. 
3.2 Anton Piller Orders 
A copyright owner who decides to institute proceedings for infringement of 
copyright must be certain that he has or is able to secure the requisite evidence 
to support his case at the trial on a balance of probabilities. The Rules of the 
High Court 1980 provide several ways in which evidence may be secured. First, 
discovery and inspection of documents are made possible under Order 24 of the 
Rules of the High Court 1980 which provides for automatic discovery between 
the parties within fourteen days after the close of pleadings in an action begun 
68 
69 
Supra n 18. 
Ibid. 
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by writ or for discovery pursuant to an order of the court in other cases. 70 
Inspection of documents and the making of copies of them are thereafter carried 
out at a specified time and place. 71 Secondly, discovery of facts by means of 
interrogatories addressed to the other party is possible by way of an application 
to court pursuant to Order 26. Thirdly, any party may apply for an order for the 
detention, custody, preservation or inspection of any property which is the 
subject matter of the action under Order 29 rule 2. In granting the order, the 
court may also order entry upon any immovable property by virtue of Order 29 
rule 2(2). 
However, restraints exist in the rules discussed above. One such 
restraint is that inspection is only possible in pending proceedings. The existence 
of the writ itself may cause the defoodant to take evasive actions and destroy any 
evidence which may suggest his involvement in the infringement. Also, 
discovery is normally allowed only after the close of pleadings or after notice 
has been given to the other party. 72 The time that elapses between issuance of 
the writ and discovery affords the defendant the opportunity to dispose of or 
conceal any incriminating evidence thereby frustrating the plaintiff's attempt to 
obtain evidence. Furthermore, the party against whom discovery is made is 
permitted to state in his affidavit whether or not a certain document is in his 
70 
71 
72 
Pursuant to Order 5 of the Rules of the High Court 1980, the other modes 
of commencing a civil action are originating summons, originating motion 
and petition. 
Order 24 rule 9. 
Order 24. 
80 
possession. 73 He may falsely testify that the document is not in his possession. 
In addition, whether a particular document is sufficiently relevant to be 
incorporated in the list of documents to be served on the other party depends on 
the judgment of the party who swears the affidavit verifying the list of 
documents . 74 The party who gives the discovery is therefore able, to some 
extent, to control the extent of the discovery. 
Where copyright infringement is concerned, evidence such as audio 
and video recordings, master tapes, computer software, electronic calculators and 
documents are easily destroyed or concealed. The absence of these evidence may 
leave the plaintiff with insufficient evidence to succeed or to calculate the extent 
of his losses . Very often, infringers work in an organised network with the 
individual retailers at the bottom. Qnce a retailer is served with a writ, usually 
after a trap-purchase, he may quickly dispose off the infringing items to another 
trader and declare that the infringing materials discovered by the plaintiff were 
the only ones he had. The plaintiff is therefore left with nominal damages 
relating only to .the number of infringing items proved by the trap-purchase to 
have been sold by the retailer. In addition, news of legal proceedings against a 
retailer quickly get to the supplier who may disappear at much the same speed 
thereby frustrating the copyright owner's effort to cut off the ultimate source of 
the infringing goods. 
73 
74 
See, for instance, Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282, Rockwell Machine 
Tool Co Ltd v EP Barrus (Concessionaires) Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 693. 
See, for instance, O'Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581, Vickers pic v 
Horsell Graphic Industries Ltd [1988] RPC 421. 
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Clearly, the existing discovery procedures are not suited to 
counteract such a vexing situation. This is not surprising in view of the fact that 
the English court rules, 75 on which our court rules are based, were promulgated 
at a time when new inventions such as audio and video recorders, computer 
hardware and software, photocopiers and reprographic machines which made 
reproduction on a grand scale so simple, had not yet come into being. Neither 
was it conceivable at the time when the copyright laws were first drafted that 
technology would advance to such a level as to facilitate the ease and frequency 
of copyright infringements. As the pace of technology continued to accelerate 
in the 1970s, it came to be recognised that some measures must be designed to 
meet the needs of the copyright owners to obtain essential information and seize 
assets in cases where the defendant would be likely to destroy them as soon as 
he discovers that legal proceedings .have been commenced against him. 
In response to technological advances, the English Chancery 
Division in EMI Ltd v Pandif6 designed a new remedy by the exercise of its 
equitable inherent jurisdiction to make orders allowing swift pre-action discovery 
and preservation of property. In that case, the plaintiff sued the defendant for 
75 
76 
The Rules of the High Court 1980 are adopted from the English Rules of 
the Supreme Court 1965 which themselves are the English Rules of the 
Supreme Court 1883 revised in 1962 and 1965. 
[1975] 1 All ER 418. This is the first reported case in which the court 
went outside the English Rules ofthe Supreme Court 1965. In that case, 
Templeman J (as he then was) referred to three unreported cases decided 
earlier in the same year in which the remedy sought had been granted. 
These were A & M Records Inc v Aram Darakdiian (unreported) and 
EMI Ltd v Khazan (unreported) both decided by Foster J and Pall Europe 
Ltd v Micro Filtrex Ltd (unreported) decided by Goff J . 
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infringing its copyright in certain sound recordings of Indian music. The plaintiff 
applied for and obtained an interlocutory injunction against the defendant 
restraining him from further dealing with the infringing items and requiring him 
to disclose the names and addresses of all persons from whom he had bought and 
to whom he had sold infringing items . In purported compliance with the order 
the defendant swore an affidavit which disclosed only one name and one 
document. The plaintiff adduced evidence that the defendant's affidavit was false 
and therefore applied for an order to enter the defendant's premises to inspect 
and photograph tapes, other infringing material and documents relevant to the 
action. The plaintiff also applied for an order to remove infringing articles from 
the defendant's premises and to test the defendant's typewriter to obtain evidence 
to prove forgery against the defendant. Notice of the application was not served 
on the defendant as required by the court rules because the plaintiff feared that 
the defendant would abscond with all the incriminating evidence. Templeman J 
(as he then was) held that the instant case was an exceptional and urgent one in 
which the court could dispense with notice by virtue of either its power under the 
rules or by the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. His Lordship therefore 
granted an ex parte order to prevent the plaintiff being deprived of the fruit of 
his litigation. The court was, however, careful to stress that the order granted 
did not authorise forcible entry but was a mandatory injunction ordering the 
defendant to permit the entry of specified persons on his premises for specific 
purposes with the consequence that non-compliance could be punished as 
contempt of court. The order was framed in this manner because forcible entry 
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is a criminal offence and common law prohibits the granting of a private search 
warrant. 77 
The practice of granting ex parte orders for inspection was 
approved by the Court of Appeal in Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes 
Ltd78 and confirmed by the House of Lords in Rank Film Distributors Ltd v 
Video Information Centre. 79 In fact, the court in Anton Piller KG80 went a 
step further by affirming the availability of such an order before the issue of a 
summons in order to obtain evidence vital to establish a cause of action .In Anton 
Piller KG, 81 the plaintiffs who were German manufacturers of frequency 
converters for computers alleged that their United Kingdom agents were 
disclosing confidential information abqut the plaintiffs' trade to other German 
manufacturers. The plaintiffs were-fearful that the defendants would dispose of 
the infringing material if they were forewarned of any proceedings . To avoid 
that result, the plaintiffs made an ex parte application for an interlocutory 
injunction to restrain the defendants from infringing their copyright and 
disclosing confidential information. The plaintiffs also applied for an order for 
permission to enter the defendants' premises to inspect all such documents and 
to remove them into the plaintiffs' solicitors custody. Brightman J at first 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
Entick v Carrington (1765) 2 Wils KB 275; 95 ER 807. 
[1976] Ch 55. The Anton Piller order owes its name to this case. 
[1982] AC 380. 
Supra n 78. 
Ibid. 
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instance granted the interlocutory injunction on the plaintiffs' undertaking to issue 
a writ forthwith but refused to order inspection or removal of documents for fear 
that the order would become an instrument of oppression. On appeal, the Court 
of Appeal unanimously reversed this decision and made the order sought. The 
Court of Appeal confirmed that it had an inherent jurisdiction to grant the type 
of ex parte order which the plaintiffs requested. According to Lord Denning 
MR, such order should only be granted where it was essential that the plaintiffs 
should have inspection so that justice could be done between the parties and 
where, if the defendants were forewarned, vital evidence would be destroyed. 
His Lordship took pains to clarify that the order granted was not a search warrant 
and did not authorise the plaintiffs to enter the defendants' premises against their 
will .. The order merely authorised entry and inspection by the permission of the 
defendants. Any failure to obey the"'rder would render the defendants liable for 
contempt proceedings and would afford a ground for drawing adverse inferences 
against the defendants at the trial. The court also emphasised that sue~ an order 
would only be made in exceptional circumstances where the evidence 
demonstrated that intervention in the manner which was sought was required in 
the interest of justice and, if not granted, the plaintiffs might be deprived of a 
remedy. 
The major advantage of the Anton Piller order lies not on its speed 
but on its ability to take the defendant by surprise so that he has no opportunity 
whatsoever to dispose off infringing items and documents. It is a form of 
mandatory injunction which requires the defendant to permit entry into his 
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premises and to rummage through his belongings. Thus, the Anton Piller order 
is a powerful weapon in the copyright owner's armoury. At the same time, the 
Anton Piller order is vulnerable to abuses by unscrupulous plaintiffs.82 For 
example, a plaintiff who alleges that a defendant is infringing his copyright in 
computer programs could obtain an Anton Piller order to enter the defendant's 
premises, rummage through the defendant's belongings and seize the computer 
software thereby putting the defendant out of business until the issue of 
infringement is further considered at the hearing of the inter partes application 
to set aside the Anton Piller order. By the time the order is set aside and the 
injunction discharged, it may be impracticable for the defendant to reinstate his 
business. 
Clearly, the Anton Piller order should be circumscribed and 
granted only in genuinely deserving cases. To this end, Ormrod U in Anton 
Piller KG83 laid down three pre-conditions for the making of the ord~r. First, 
there must be an extremely strong prima facie case. Secondly, the damage, 
potential or actual, must be very serious for the applicant. Thirdly, there must 
be clear evidence that the defendants have in their possession incriminating 
documents or things and that there is a real possibility that they may destroy such 
material before any application inter partes can be made. 84 
82 
83 
84 
See, too, 'The Need for Safeguards' infra at 3.2.2. 
Supra n 78 . 
Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd, supra n 78 at 62. 
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The threshold level for the granting of an Anton Piller order is 
therefore higher than that of an inter partes interlocutory injunction. 85 This 
helps to ensure that the order is granted only in exceptional and urgent cases. 
The second pre-condition relates to assessment of the balance of convenience 
while the third concerns the need for an ex parte order. 86 
As the Anton Piller order developed, its scope was widened from 
the mere searching of the defendant's premises and seizing of infringing materials 
to include obtaining of information such as names and addresses of suppliers, 
places of manufacture, distributors, retailers, places of storage, invoices, records 
and documents. 87 In EMI Ltd & Anor v Sarwar and Haidar, 88 the plaintiffs 
who- were manufacturers of cassette recordings discovered that infringing 
recordings were being sold at a low price in a number of shops. In addition to 
seeking the ordinary orders for search and seizure, the plaintiffs applied to have 
the defendants disclose the names and addresses of the suppliers of the infringing 
material. The judge at first instance granted an order in the Anton Piller form 
but refused the additional relief sought. On appeal, Lord Denning MR assented 
to the enlargement of the scope of the Anton Piller order. 
85 
86 
87 
88 
See supra at 3. 1. 1. 
See Gaze EJ, 'The Anton Piller Order - A Review of its Development 
and Scope' (1985) 13 ABLR 354. 
See, too, 'Privilege Against Self-Incrimination' infra at 3.2.3. 
[1977] FSR 146. 
87 
The Anton Piller order was further widened in Chane! Ltd v ~ 
Pears Wholesale Cash & Carry Co89 whereby the defendant was restrained from 
disclosing without the plaintiff's leave the subject matter of the proceedings so 
as to prevent advance warning being given to the suppliers. The evidence 
obtained pursuant to an Anton Piller order is also not confined to use in the 
pending proceedings but may be used for the purpose of identifying third parties 
such as the manufacturer, the chain of illicit dealers and traders. 90 Even where 
the identity of all the defendants involved in selling the infringing goods cannot 
be ascertained, Anton Piller orders can be granted against a particular defendant 
on his own behalf and on behalf of all other persons engaged in the trade of 
setting the infringing goods provided there is a common interest to link the 
members of the group against whom the injunction is being sought. 91 
During the early stages of development of the Anton P,iller order, 
it was envisaged that the order would be resorted to infrequently in view of its 
extreme nature·. In England, however, the remedy quickly became a common 
and widespread occurrence. 92 In fact, its effectiveness and versatility can be 
89 
90 
91 
92 
[1979] FSR 393 . 
Sony Cornoration v Anand [1981] FSR 398, Sony Cornoration v Time 
Electronics [1981] 3 All ER 376. 
EMI Records Ltd v Kudhail & Ors [1985] FSR 36. 
In Ex parte Island Records Ltd [1978] Ch 122 at 133 , Lord Denning MR 
remarked that the Anton Piller orders were "in daily use, not only in 
infringement of copyright, but also in passing off cases, and other cases". 
See, also , the comments of Goulding J in Protector Alarms Ltd v Maxim 
Alarms Ltd [1978] FSR 442, Graham J in International Electronics Ltd 
v Weigh Data Ltd [1980] FSR 423 and Oliver U in Dunlop Holdings Ltd 
v Stararia Ltd [ 1982] Com LR 3. 
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seen by the extension of its application beyond the field of copyright to any form 
of civil action where the facts justify a granting of the order. 93 Anton Piller 
orders have been granted in breach of contract cases, 94 family law cases, 95 
passing off cases, 96 confidential information cases97 and enforcement of 
judgment cases. 98 The usefulness of the Anton Piller order is confirmed by the 
fact that it has been adopted by other jurisdictions within the common law world 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
Recently in England, a committee of Judges was established by the 
Judges' Council to consider the practical operation of Anton Piller orders. 
The Committee was chaired by Lord Justice Staughton with its other 
members being Lord Justice Scott, Lord Justice Hirst, Lord Justice Simon 
Brown and Mr Justice Hollings. The Committee concluded that Anton 
Piller orders should continue to be available in suitable cases, that it 
should not be inordinately expensive to obtain, that the orders should have 
a more definite basis in law and that the procedure should be subject to 
safeguards. It has now published a report in the form of a consultation 
paper. See 'Anton Piller Orders - A Consultation Paper' '(the Lord 
Chancellor's Department, November 1992). See, also, Watson A, 
'Reforming Anton Piller Orders' (1993) 12 Litigation 229. Likewise, in 
Hong Kong, the Chief Justice has recently established a 'Working Paper 
on Appropriate Safeguards for the Execution of Anton Piller Orders'. See 
Wilkinson M, 'Recent Developments Affecting Anton Piller Orders' 
(1993) 23 HKLJ 79. 
Yousif v Salama [1980] 1 WLR 1540. 
Emanuel v Emanuel [ 1982] 1 WLR 669. 
Ex parte Island Records Ltd, supra n 92. 
Lock International pic v Beswick [1989] 1 WLR 1268. 
Distributori Automatici Italia SpA v Holford General Trading Co Ltd 
[1985] 1 WLR 1066. 
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such as Malaysia, 99 Singapore, 1 Australia,2 New Zealand, 3 Canada,4 Hong 
Kong, 5 Nigeria6 and South Africa7 . 
3.2.1 Anton Piller Orders in Malaysian CopyriKht Cases 
The first reported case in Malaysia where an Anton Piller order was granted was 
Lian Keow Sdn Bhd v C. Paramjothy & Anor. 8 In that case, the plaintiffs, who 
were alleging the existence of a trust in a piece of land, applied ex parte for an 
Anton Piller order to enter the defendant 's premises and to take into custody 
documents which were essential evidence in the action. In granting the order 
sought, the learned Judge examined Anton Piller KG9 and confirmed the 
inher.ent jurisdiction of the High Court to grant such an order. 
99 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Lian Keow Sdn Bhd v C. Paramjothy [1982] 1 MU 217. 
Riedel-de Haen AG v Liew Keng Pang [1989] 2 MU 400. 
EMI (Australia) Ltd v Bay Imports Pty Ltd [1980] FSR 328. 
Thorn EMI Video Programmes Ltd v Kitching and Bushby [1984] FSR 
342. 
Elesguro Inc v Ssangyong Shipping Co Ltd (1981) 117 DLR (3d) 105. 
Technica Electronics Ltd v Shin-Shirasuna Denki Kabushiki Kaisha [1981] 
HKLR 425. 
Ferodo Ltd v Unibros Stores [1980] FSR 489. 
Roamer Watch Co SA v African Textile Distributors [1980] 2 SALR 254. 
Supra n 99. 
Supra n 78. 
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The effectiveness of the Anton Piller order is seen by its 
widespread use in Malaysia so much so that in 1983, Chan J in the case of 
Television Broadcasts Ltd & Ors v Mandarin Video Holdings Sdn Bhd 10 
commented that the order had by then become commonplace. This was the first 
reported copyright case in which the Anton Piller order was granted . In that 
case, the plaintiffs who were copyright owners of certain television films sued 
the defendants for infringing their copyright by making copies of their television 
series and hiring them out on the black market. The plaintiffs applied ex parte 
for an Anton Piller order even before the writ was served so as to take the 
defendants by surprise as the plaintiffs feared that the defendants would destroy 
all incriminating evidence such as their infringing video cassettes, invoices, 
defivery orders, account books and names and addresses of persons who had 
borrowed the pirated tapes . After reviewing with approval the landmark English 
cases 11 on Anton Piller orders, Chan J held that the plaintiffs had established a 
strong prima facie case that the defendants had been dealing in illicit films. 
Consequently, his Lordship granted the Anton Piller order. Anton Piller orders 
were also granted in subsequent copyright cases such as Television Broadcasts 
& Ors v Seremban Video Centre Sdn Bhd12 and Penerbit Fajar Bakti Sdn Bhd 
v Cahaya Surya Buku dan Alat Tulis .13 In Penerbit Fajar Bakti , 14 the court 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Supra n 14. 
Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd, supra n 78 , EMI Ltd v 
Pandit, supra n 76, Rank Film Ltd v Video Information Centre, supra n 
79. 
Supra n 14. 
[1989] 1 MU 386. 
Ibid. 
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held that an Anton Piller order could be made on a mere suspicion that infringing 
materials would be destroyed by the defendant once he had notice of a proposed 
action against him. It is submitted that this decision is given per incuriam 
because it seems to suggest that mere suspicion instead of a strong prima facie 
case of infringement would suffice for the court to grant an Anton Piller order. 
With the Federal Court's decision in Asia Television Ltd & Anor 
v Viwa Video Sdn Bhd15 which reversed the High Court judge's decision and 
restored the Anton Piller orders granted at first instance, it is now settled that 
Anton Piller orders are a part of our law on pre-action discovery, particularly in 
copyright cases. 
3.2.2 The Need for Safeguards ~ 
As mentioned above, the Anton Piller order soon became a commonplace 
recourse despite the exhortation of Templeman J (as he then was) in EMI Ltd v 
Pandit16 that the order be preserved as an exceptional remedy. It was 
recognised since its inception that the order is draconian in nature and vulnerable 
to abuses. The order is essentially an unfair one from the viewpoint of the 
defendant because it is granted ex parte. While it is true that the plaintiff is 
under a duty to disclose all material facts in his affidavit, one cannot expect the 
15 
16 
[1984] 2 MU 304. 
Supra n 76. 
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plaintiff to present evidence in such a way which is detrimental to him. Since 
no adversarial argument is presented before the court, a cogently presented and 
argued application would very likely be allowed. There is therefore a risk of 
unmeritorious orders being granted and misused to obtain information about the 
activities of a trade rival or to close down the defendant's business or to simply 
fish for evidence to support a claim. 
During a raid, an unscrupulous plaintiff may indiscriminately seize 
and detain unauthorised materials. Even if the defendant succeeds in his 
application to discharge the order, the damage may have already been done 
because by then the plaintiff would have obtained access to the defendant's 
confidential trade information. The defendant is left with having to enforce the 
plaintiff's undertaking as to damages which may be difficult to prove and assess . 
Perhaps the most draconian feature of the Anton Piller order is its 
' 
resemblance to the search warrant .17 Fear inflicted on the accused or defendant 
seems to be the. common underlying factor in both the search warrant and the 
Anton Piller order. A person obeys a search warrant because he knows or fears 
the detrimental consequences of disobedience. Likewise, a defendant who is told 
that an Anton Piller order has been issued against him which required him to 
permit entry into his premises failing which he could be imprisoned for contempt 
17 The courts have, however, sought to distinguish the two on the basis that 
forcible entry is not permitted in an Anton Piller order while it is allowed 
in a search warrant. See Lord Denning MR decision in Anton Piller KG, 
supra n 78. 
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of court would be under an immediate obligation to comply with the order. 18 
There is therefore very little practical difference between the effect of a search 
warrant and an Anton Piller order because the end result which is compliance by 
the accused or defendant is the same. Furthermore, even if the Anton Piller 
order has been improperly obtained, the defendant is not entitled to refuse 
permission to enter. In Wardle Fabrics Ltd v G. Myristis Ltd, 19 the defendant 
refused to permit entry into its premises and in due course applied for the Anton 
Piller order to be discharged on the ground that there had not been full disclosure 
to the court. The Anton Piller order was discharged but the defendant was held 
guilty of contempt of court. The court upheld its decision on the basis that if the 
defendant was allowed to disobey the order based on his belief that the order 
would be subsequently set aside on his application, then the system of 
administration of justice would be abrogated.20 
18 
19 
20 
In Anton Piller KG, supra n 78, Lord Denning MR stated that two 
consequences would flow from a defendant's refusal to permit entry. 
First, contempt proceedings may be instituted against him. Secondly, 
adverse inference may be drawn against him at the trial which could be 
fatal to his defence. 
[1984] FSR 263. 
This is also likely to be the position in this country in view of the recent 
Supreme Court decision in Puah Bee Hong & Anor v Pentadbir Tanah 
Daerah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur & Anor (Teo Keng Tuan 
Robert. Intervener) [1994] 2 MU 601 involving an order for sale of a 
piece of land. In that case; the Land Administrator proceeded with the 
public auction despite being informed that the chargors had successfully 
obtained a stay of execution of the order for sale. Although the order of 
stay was subsequently set aside after the public auction, the Supreme 
Court held that the Land Administrator's defiance of the order of stay 
remained an illegal act and the public auction was illegally held. The 
setting aside of the order of stay did not obliterate the Land 
Administrator's disobedience . 
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Recently, the court in Bhimji v Chatwani21 provided some 
clarification on the measures that could be taken by a defendant served with an 
Anton Piller order. In that case, the Anton Piller order contained an undertaking 
by the plaintiffs to advise the defendants of their right to obtain legal advice 
before complying with the order "provided that such advice was obtained 
forthwith". The Anton Piller order was served on the defendants at 8 a.m. but 
immediate compliance with the order was refused. The defendants contacted 
their solicitors for legal advice which was obtained at 11 a.m. Instead of 
permitting entry at this stage, the defendants offered a compromise which was 
rejected by the plaintiffs. The defendants then applied to the judge to set aside 
the order which was heard at about 5 p.m. on that day. The judge refused to set 
aside. the order but instead varied it. Permission was then given by the 
defendants to search their premises in accordance_ with the amended order. 
Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought an order to commit the defendants to prison 
for contempt of court. In his judgment, Scott J proceeded by considering what 
the Anton Piller order required of the defendants. Scott J noted that the 
undertaking by tlle plaintiffs was that the defendants need not permit entry until 
they had taken legal advice provided such advice was obtained · forthwith. 
According to the court, the word "forthwith" required the person on whom the 
order was served to, at once, try to obtain legal advice. The obligation to permit 
the plaintiffs' solicitors to enter did not arise until the defendants had had a 
21 [1991] 1 WLR 989. See, too, WEA Records Ltd v Visions Channel4 Ltd 
[1983] 1 WLR 721, Columbia Picture Industries Inc v Robinson [1987] 
Ch 38 and Arjunan v Kesatuan Kebangsaan Pekerja-pekerja Ladang 
[1993] 1 MU 326. 
95 
reasonable opportunity of obtaining legal advice. On the facts, Scott J was of the 
view that the defendants did obtain legal advice reasonably quickly. Once legal 
advice had been obtained, the defendants must immediately permit the search, 
otherwise he would be in contempt of court. On the facts, the defendants did not 
permit entry until after the application to set aside the Anton Piller order was 
refused. The defendants were therefore in contempt of court and at risk of 
committal to prison. However, Scott J held that the defendants' action did not 
justify the infliction of any penalty because the breach of the Anton Piller order 
was not contumacious. 
Since the Anton Piller order is draconian in nature and vulnerable 
to abuses, the courts need to use extreme caution in granting the order. While 
the three pre-conditions laid down by Ormrod U in Anton Piller KCJ22 serve as 
basic safeguards, the development of the Anton Piller order evinced a need for 
further requirements to reinforce these pre-conditions. 
Tlte liberalistic attitude of the courts was put to a check by the 
decision of Scott J in Columbia Picture Industries Inc v Robinson. 23 In that 
case, the plaintiffs who were copyright owners of certain motion pictures 
obtained a Mareva injunction and an Anton Piller order against the defendant 
who was alleged to have been making illicit copies of the copyrighted movies. 
Following a search of the defendant's business premises and home, a large 
22 
23 
Supra n 78. 
[1987] Ch 38. 
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number of tapes were seized together with cassettes and documents which were 
not included in the order. These were taken away by the plaintiffs' solicitor. 
While in the custody of the plaintiffs' solicitor, some of the items were lost. In 
addition, as a result of the seizure, the defendant had to cease trading. In the 
defendant's application for a discharge of the order, it was revealed that the 
plaintiffs had not disclosed material facts to the court in their application for the 
Anton Piller order. In his judgment, Scott J stressed that an applicant for the 
Anton Piller order was under a strict duty to make to the court a full and frank 
disclosure of all relevant matters. 24 While recognising the potency of the order, 
his Lordship expressed concern as to the unrestrained manner in which the courts 
had been granting Anton Piller orders . According to the court, an undertaking 
by the plaintiffs to compensate the defendant for any damage caused to him was 
not a sufficient safeguard because of the irreversible consequences of a search 
and seizure on the defendant's premises. Neither was the duty of full disclosure 
an adequate safeguard since what is a material fact is not a matter of black and 
white. Nor was it sufficient for the defendant to be given liberty to apply to 
discharge the order because such application cannot in practice be done until after 
the order had been executed. Scott J suggested five procedural safeguards which 
should be observed by the plaintiffs in their application for and execution of an 
Anton Piller order. First, the order should be so drawn as to extend no further 
than the minimum extent necessary to achieve its purpose, namely, the 
preservation of documents which might otherwise be destroyed. Once the 
24 See, also, PMK Rajah v Worldwide Commodities Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MU 
86 where Zakaria Yatim J also. placed emphasis on this requirement. 
97 
plaintiffs' solicitors were satisfied what material existed and had an opportunity 
to make copies, the items should be returned to its owner. Secondly, a detailed 
record of the material taken should be made by the solicitors before removing 
them from the defendant's premises . Thirdly, no material should be taken from 
the defendant's premises unless it was clearly covered by the order. Fourthly, 
materials the ownership of which was in dispute should be handed over to a 
neutral officer of the court or to the defendant's solicitor on an undertaking. 
Finally, affidavits in support of an Anton Piller application should err on the side 
of excessive disclosure. 
Although it was felt that the above safeguards have been heeded 
and that Anton Piller orders were made much more sparingly than previously, 25 
additional safeguards were laid down by the court in Universal Thermosensors 
Ltd v Hibben & Ors26 to further limit the possibility of abuses. In that case, 
the court stated that Anton Piller orders should be executed only on working days 
during office hours when a solicitor can be expected to be available. It is 
submitted that ex~eptions should, however, be made where the Anton Piller order 
is to be served on a trader who operates only after office hours, for example, in 
the night market. If the order is to be executed at a private house, and it is 
25 
26 
See the observation of Sir Donald Nicholls VC in Universal 
Thermosensors Ltd v Hibben & Ors [1992] 1 WLR 840 at 860. 
Ibid. See, too, Lock International . plc v Beswick supra n 97. In 
Singapore, both the Court of Appeal in Computerland Corp v Yew Seng 
Computers Pte Ltd [1991] 3 MU 201 and the High Court in Peters 
Edition Ltd v Renner Piano Co [1990] 1 MU 337 have commented on 
the need to exercise extreme care in granting the Anton Piller order. 
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likely that a woman may be in the house alone, the solicitor serving the order 
must be, or must be accompanied by, a woman. A detailed list of items being 
removed should be prepared at the premises and the defendant given an 
opportunity to check it. The order should not be executed at business premises 
except in the presence of a representative of the company. The search should be 
confined to documents specified in the order. The service and execution of the 
order should be carried out by an experienced solicitor other than a member of 
the firm of solicitors acting for the plaintiff. That solicitor should prepare a 
written report on what occurred when the order was executed and serve it on the 
defendant. The plaintiff should also return to the court shortly after the 
execution of the Anton Piller order and present the report at an inter partes 
hearing. 
In Malaysia, abuses of the Anton Piller order and the appropriate 
safeguards needed to counter such abuses have not been the subject of much 
comments by the courts. In Catemillar Tractor Co v Hock Guan (1960) Sdn 
Bhd27 which was .a case on infringement of trade mark and passing off, Shankar 
J, in passing, drew attention to Columbia Picture Industries Inc v Robinson28 
and stated that the case showed "quite persuasively that many of the previous 
cases had gone too far" . 29 
27 
28 
29 
[1988] 1 cu 787. 
Supra n 23 . 
Supra n 27 at 790. 
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3.2.3 Privile2e A2ainst Self-Incrimination 
As mentioned above, the Anton Piller order was extended from its original form 
of allowing entry and inspection to the wider form of giving answers to 
interrogatories relating to the supply and sale of infringing copies. 30 This wider 
form faced a major setback in Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information 
Centre31 which was a case on infringement of copyright in video tapes of films. 
Whitford J, at first instance, ordered the defendants to permit the plaintiff access 
to their premises for inspection, to give immediate information about their 
sources of supply of copyright material and to disclose and produce documents. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal, by majority,32 discharged the order insofar as 
it related to giving answers to specific q~estions and the disclosure of documents 
upon the ground that it was In breach of the privilege against self-
incrimination. 33 The decision was upheld by the House of Lords which 
reiterated that the privilege could only be invoked where there was a "real and 
appreciable" risk of the defendants being prosecuted in contrast with a "remote 
or insubstantial". risk. In the instant case, there was a real and appreciable risk 
30 
31 
32 
33 
EMI Ltd & Anor v Sarwar and Haidar, supra n 88. 
Supra n 79. 
Bridge and Templeman UJ comprised the majority while Lord Denning 
MR dissented. 
At common law, a person is not obliged to answer any question or 
produce any document if the answer or the document would have a 
tendency to expose that person, either directly or indirectly, to a criminal 
conviction, the imposition of a penalty or the forfeiture of an estate 
Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 KB 253. 
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of criminal proceedings for conspiracy to defraud being taken against the 
defendants, hence the privilege applied in that case. The law lords were of the 
view that prosecution under the Copyright Act 1956 and Theft Act 1968 were 
unlikely and in any event penalty under the former was insubstantial. 
The decision sparked off widespread concern over the 
consequences which the case might have on the effectiveness of Anton Piller 
orders. The practical result of the case was to confine Anton Piller orders to 
their narrow form of entry and inspection. 34 Also, Lord Wilberforce in 
delivering his decision, recognised that the availability of the privilege against 
self-incrimination would create the paradoxical situation whereby the more 
criminal the activities of the infringer, the less effective would be the civil 
remedy that could be granted. In fact, Bridge U and Templeman U at the Court 
of Appeal and Lord Russell at the House of Lords suggested that legislation be 
introduced to remove the privilege insofar as Anton Piller orders were concerned. 
The suggestions were taken up by the UK Parliament by enacting section 72 of 
the Supreme Court Act 1981 which withdrew the privilege against self-
incrimination in connection with proceedings for infringement of intellectual 
property rights or for passing off. The section further provided that any 
statement or admission made would not be admissible in evidence in criminal 
proceedings for a related offence thereby protecting the provider of the 
34 See, generally, Dworkin G, 'Rank Film v Video Information: Anton 
Piller Orders and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination' [1980] EIPR 
300; 'The Rank Film case- Has Anton Piller been Emasculated?' [1981] 
EIPR 180; Gaze EJ, 'The Anton Piller Order - A Review of the 
Development and Scope' supra n 86. 
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information from self-incrimination. The potency of the Anton Piller order in 
proceedings involving intellectual property and passing off was therefore 
restored. 35 
In Malaysia, the status of the privilege against self-incrimination 
in relation to Anton Piller orders is less clear because of two conflicting High 
Court decisions, one of which held that the privilege applied while the other held 
otherwise. In Television Broadcasts Ltd v Mandarin Video Holdings Sdn 
Bhd, 36 the plaintiffs obtained, by way of an ex parte application, an Anton Piller 
order to detain and preserve articles and documents in the possession of the 
35 -
36 
In Hong Kong, the Supreme Court (Amendment)(No. 3) Ordinance 1982 
was passed by the Governor in Council on 13th July 1982. This 
Ordinance introduced a new section 44A into the Supreme Court 
Ordinance which followed, virtually word for word, section 72 of the UK 
Supreme Court Act 1981. In New Zealand, the Court of Appeal in 
Bushby v Thorn EMI Video Programmes Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 461 
overcame Rank Film, supra n 79, by making it a condition to the granting 
of an Anton Piller order that an undertaking be given by the plaintiff not 
to use any document or information obtained from the defendant for the 
purposes of any criminal prosecution of the defendant. In Canada, the 
argument has been made that the self-incrimination privilege does not 
apply to information given under an Anton Piller order because the 
information is not evidence given under oath by a witness in the course 
of judicial proceedings . On this, see, Paciocco DM, 'Anton Piller 
Orders: Facing the Threat of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination' 
(1984) 34 UTU 26. See, too, the Federal Court of Australia decision in 
W annan International Ltd v Envirotech Australia Pty Ltd ( 1986) 67 ALR 
253. In that case, the court, while recognising the value and importance 
of the privilege, stated that there was a need to modify the practice of 
granting the privilege so as to enable information to be obtained while 
preserving the privilege. 
[1983] 2 MU 346. For the facts of the case, see supra at 3.2.1. 
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defendants. At the plaintiffs' inter partes application for the order to be 
continued, the defendants objected to the application on the ground, inter alia, 
of the privilege against self-incrimination. The crux of the matter was whether 
the privilege applied in this country in view of section 132 of the Evidence Act 
1950. Chan J considered the effect of Rank Film37 and held that the privilege 
against self-incrimination was withdrawn by section 132. Relying on the 
authority of several English cases, 38 his Lordship stated that the real reason for 
the privilege was that no one was bound to say anything which might bring him 
into the peril and possibility of being punished or penalised by wrongdoing. 
Thus if circumstances arose such that there was no risk of arrest or prosecution, 
the privilege did not apply. According to his Lordship, section 132(2) removed 
com_pletely the risk of arrest or prosecution and hence the privilege did not apply 
in this country. 39 His Lordship the_n proceeded to consider whether section 132 
would apply to a party served with an Anton Piller order. This depended on the 
interpretation of the word "witness" in section 132. In other words, was section 
132 confined only to persons giving evidence in the witness box or was it 
sufficiently wide to cover any situation where a person was ordered to tender 
evidence? Chan J took the view that a witness is a person who gives or is 
compelled by a court order to give evidence regardless of whether he is a party 
37 
38 
39 
Supra n 79. 
The cases relied on were Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety 
Glass (1934) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395, In re Westinghouse Uranium Contract 
[1978] AC 547 and Redfern v Redfern [1891] P 139. 
Chan J was also of the opinion that s 132(1) of the Evidence Act 1950 by 
itself was wide enough to withdraw the privilege. 
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to the proceedings or not. In coming to that view, his Lordship cited two Indian 
Supreme Court decisions, namely, MP Sharma v Satish Chandra40 and The State 
of Bombay v Kathi Kalu41 for the meaning of the word "witness". Both these 
cases dealt with offences under the Indian Penal Code and their main issue was 
the protection of an accused person as a witness under Article 20(3) of the Indian 
Constitution. 42 The phrase "to be a witness" appearing in Article 20(3) was 
held to mean "to furnish evidence". On the basis of that interpretation, Chan J 
concluded that the word "witness" in section 132 of the Evidence Act 1950 is 
wide enough to include a person served with an Anton Piller order and hence the 
privilege against self-incrimination is withdrawn in respect of such a person. 
On the other hand, Zakaria Yatim J in PMK Rajah v Worldwide 
Commodities Sdn Bhd43 took a contrary view. In that case, the plaintiff obtained 
an Anton Piller order to enter the defendants ' premises for the purposes of 
inspecting and making photostat copies of documents relating to the plaintiff's 
trading account with the defendants as well as removing them into the custody 
of the plaintiff'~ solicitor. The defendants applied to discharge the order on the 
ground, inter alia, of privilege against self-incrimination in that production of the 
documents would incriminate the defendants by providing evidence on which they 
40 
41 
42 
43 
[1954] SCR 1077. 
[1962] 3 SCR 10. 
Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution provides that "no person accused 
of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself". 
Supra n 24. 
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could be prosecuted for offences under the Commodities Trading Act 1980 and 
for conspiracy and fraud. The court had to consider whether, in Malaysia, a 
person served with an Anton Piller order is entitled to claim the privilege against 
self-incrimination as laid down in Rank Film.44 Zakaria Yatim J considered 
Television Broadcasts45 and disagreed with the definition of "witness" laid down 
therein. According to his Lordship, a person who gives evidence need not 
necessary be a witness. To suppport this contention, his Lordship cited section 
139 of the Evidence Act 1950 which provided that a "person summoned to 
produce a document does not become a witness by the mere fact that he produces 
it". In addition, the two Indian cases46 cited in Television Broadcasts47 were 
criminal cases under the Indian Penal Code and therefore could not solely form 
the .basis of a definition of the word "witness" in section 132 of the Evidence 
Act. His Lordship then defined a witness in the context of section 132 as a 
person who testifies on oath or affirmation in a court of law or in a judicial 
tribunal. Since a person served with an Anton Piller order was only required to 
give discovery of the relevant documents and did not testify on oath, he did not 
fall within the meaning of the word "witness" in section 132. Consequently, his 
Lordship concluded that section 132 did not apply at all to discovery under an 
44 
45 
46 
47 
Supra n 79. 
Supra n 36. 
MP Sharma v Satish Chandra, supra n 40 and The State of Bombay v 
Kathi Kalu, supra n 41. 
Supra n 36. 
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Anton Piller order and that Rank Film48 applied in this country. 49 
With the two conflicting High Court decisions discussed above, the 
position with respect to the rule against self-incrimination in Anton Piller orders 
in Malaysia is uncertain. While it is submitted that the reasoning of Zakaria 
Yatim J in PMK Rajah50 appeals more to logic, the consequences of the 
availability of the privilege to a defendant are highly undesirable. 51 PMK 
Rajah52 was recently applied by Abu Mansor J in Arjunan v Kesatuan 
Kebangsaan Pekerja-pekerja Ladang53 which was a labour law case. In that 
case, the defendants successfully obtained a discharge of the Anton Piller order 
made against them on two grounds. First, there was no urgency that any 
evidence will be destroyed or dissipated if an Anton Piller order was not given. 
Secondly, applying PMK Rajah;54 the disclosure of certain materials would 
incriminate the defendants in criminal prosecution. 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
Supra n 79. 
It is regrettable that his Lordship did not consider the effect of section 3 
of the Civil Law Act 1956 on the applicability of Rank Film, supra n 79, 
in Malaysia. 
Supra n 24. 
As to the consequences, see the discussion above on Rank Film, supra 
n 79. 
Supra n 24. 
Supra n 21. 
Supra n 24 . 
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Support for Zakaria Yatim J' s view can be found in the decision 
of the Singapore High Court in Riedel-de Haan AG v Liew Keng Pang-55 which, 
like the above two Malaysian cases, dealt with the availability of the privilege to 
Anton Piller orders. The case turned on the meaning of the word "witness" in 
section 134 of the Singapore Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1985 Ed) which is in pari 
materia to section 132 of the Malaysian Evidence Act 1950. According to Chan 
J, the word "witness" has two connotations. In its broad sense, it means a 
person who has seen a thing or an event and in its narrow sense it means a 
person who goes into the witness box to testify to a fact or thing. Whether a 
broad or a narrow meaning should be given depended on the nature of the 
obligation imposed by the section. Insofar as the word "witness" in section 134 
was_ concerned, Chan J interpreted it in its narrow sense for the following 
reasons. First, section 134(1) referred to an obligation to answer to any matter 
relevant to the fact in issue which implied that questions would be put to the 
witness and this could only be done at a trial. Secondly, section 134(3) which 
required the court to explain the purport of section 134(2) before compelling a 
witness to answer a question which would incriminate him, contemplated an oral 
explanation by the judge. 
55 [1989] 2 MU 400. This case confirms that, in Singapore, a party can rely 
on the privilege against self-incrimination during the course of pre-trial 
proceedings. This case was followed subsequently in Guccio Gucci SpA 
v Sukhdav Singh & Ors [1992] 1 SLR 553, Nikkomann Co Pte Ltd v 
Yulean Trading Pte Ltd [1992] 2 SLR 980, Lee Thin Tuan v Louis 
Vuitton [1992] 2 SLR 273 and Hung Ka Ho v A-1 Office System Pte Ltd 
[1992] 2 SLR 379. In Hung Ka Ho, Kan Ting Chiu JC held that a 
defendant seeking to invoke the privilege had to state in his affidavit in 
support of his application for discharge of the Anton Piller order the basis 
for his belief that the answers would expose him to a real risk of 
prosecution failing which his application should be dismissed. 
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If Zakaria Yatim J's view that section 132 did not abrogate the 
privilege against self-incrimination in an Anton Piller order is based on a correct 
interpretation of section 132, the question that arises is whether the privilege can 
be invoked by a defendant served with an Anton Piller order for infringement of 
copyright. The answer depends to a large extent on whether there is a "real and 
appreciable" risk of the defendant being prosecuted. Unlike Rank Filnr6 
whereby offences under the Copyright Act 1956 are only ancillary remedies 
rarely invoked 57 and carry comparatively trivial penalty, the Malaysian 
Copyright Act 1987 imposes heavy penalties58 and there is a "real and 
appreciable risk" of prosecution under the Act. This means that the privilege 
aga~nst self-incrimination can be invoked by a defendant served with an Anton 
Piller order in a copyright action~ Should the Supreme Court favour PMK 
Rajah, 59 legislation or judicial intervention will clearly be required to restore the 
potency of the Anton Piller order. 60 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Supra n 79. 
Up until 1981 when Rank Film, ibid, was heard, section 21 of the UK 
Copyright Act 1956 which created summary offences had only been 
invoked once, namely, of a prosecution in 1913 under the then Copyright 
Act 1911. 
Copyright Act 1987, sections 41 and 43, See, Chapter 2 at 2.1.3. 
Supra n 24. 
See, Joseph ALR, 'Anton Piller Orders and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Malaysia and Singapore' [1990] 3 MU 1viii; and 'Anton 
Piller Orders and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Malaysia and 
Singapore: Revisited' [1992] 2 MU xliii. See, too, Pinsler JD 'Can a 
party faced with an "Anton Piller" order rely on the privilege against self-
incrimination?' (1986) 28 Mal LR 78 . 
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3.3 Mareva lnjunctions61 
Since piracy often involves an international dimension, there is a risk that the 
financial resources and other assets of a defendant may be removed from the 
jurisdiction in which legal proceedings are commenced against him. Not 
infrequently , a plaintiff who succeeds in obtaining judgment against a defendant 
may all too late find that the judgment is worthless to him because the defendant 
has siphoned off all his assets out of the court's jurisdiction prior to the trial. As 
banking transactions and modes of communication between countries advance 
rapidly, monetary assets can be transferred from one country to another within 
. 
minutes. While interlocutory injunctions and Anton Piller orders are powerful 
weapons in their own right, they are totally helpless in preventing the dissipation 
of assets prior to trial which prima facie is not a wrongful conduct. Clearly, 
there is a need for an order to prevent the defendant from spiriting his assets 
abroad or otherwise dissipating or concealing them during the pendency of an 
action so as to deprive the plaintiff of any monetary compensation should he 
eventually succeed. 
61 The Mareva injunction usually applies to commercial disputes rather than 
to copyright cases. However, it can conceivably have application to 
copyright cases, for example, when a defendant uses one country as a 
temporary stage for piratical activities. 
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In England, prior to 1975, it was not possible to obtain an 
injunction to restrain a man alleged to be a debtor from parting with his 
property . 62 The only remedy then available to an unsecured creditor was to 
obtain his judgment and to take out execution. 63 In May 1975 , Nippon Yusen 
Kaisha v Karageorgis64 came before the Court of Appeal and it concerned an 
action brought by shipowners against charterers in respect of unpaid hire. The 
charterers were out of the jurisdiction and could not be traced, but they had funds 
in bank accounts in London. After the writ was issued, but before any judgment 
had been obtained, the shipowners applied ex parte for an injunction to restrain 
the charterers from disposing of or dealing with their assets within the 
jurisdiction of the English court. The application was refused at first instance but 
allowed on appeal on the basis of s~ction 45(1) of the UK Supreme Court of 
Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 which provided for the granting of an 
interlocutory injunction "in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just 
and convenient". In that case, it was just and convenient to grant ~e injunction 
62 
63 
64 
Robinson v Pickering (1881) 16 Ch D 660, Lister v Stubbs (1890) 
45 Ch D 1. However, by a process called foreign attachment which was 
a custom of England recognised by the merchants of London, if a 
defendant was not to be found within the jurisdiction of the court, the 
plaintiff was able, as soon as the plaint was issued, to attach any effects 
of the defendant found within the jurisdiction of the court. This principle, 
which was applied by the English customary courts in olden times , 
appeared to have fallen into disuse in recent times. See observations of 
Lord Denning MR in Rasu Maritima SA v Pertamina [1977] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep 397 at 401-402; Dine JM & McEvoy JJ, 'Are Mareva Injunctions 
Becoming Attachment Orders?' (1989) 8 CJQ 236. 
Mills v Northern Railway of Buenos Ayres Company (1870) LR 5 Ch 
App 621. 
[1975] 1 WLR 1093. 
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as otherwise the charterers might remove the monies out of the jurisdiction and 
the shipowners would be cheated out of the proceeds of their action, should they 
be successful. 
A month later the Court of Appeal heard Mareva Campania 
Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA65 which involved the same issues 
raised in Karageorgis. 66 As before, the application for the injunction was heard 
ex parte. The court affirmed its jurisdiction to grant such an injunction pursuant 
to section 45(1) of the UK Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 
1925. 
As with the Anton Piller order, a Mareva injunction is a very 
serious imposition on the defend~nt as it is obtained without notice to the 
defendant. Thus, the Court of Appeal and House of Lords have been careful to 
emphasize that the Mareva injunction is an exceptional remedy to be issued only 
if justice and convenience require it. 67 Further developments extended the 
Mareva jurisdiction to include cases in which a defendant is based within the 
65 
66 
67 
[1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep 509. The Mareva injunction owes its name to this 
case. 
Supra n 64. 
Stevenson U and Scarman U in the first inter partes case in MBPXL 
Corporation v Intercontinental Banking Corporation (1975, unreported, 
referred to by Mustill J (as he then was) in Third Chandris Shipping v 
Unimarine[1979] 2 AllER 972. A transcript of the MBPXL Corporation 
appears in Dass KS, Mareva Injunction, (Kuala Lumpur, Asian Book Co 
Sdn Bhd, 1982) at 86-91). See, also, the House of Lords decision in 
Siskina (Owners of cargo lately laden on board) v Distos Campania 
Naviera SA [1979] AC 210. 
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jurisdiction, so long as the circumstances are such that a risk exists of a 
dissipation of assets whether in the jurisdiction or elsewhere. 68 The Mareva 
injunction has also been extended to cover any asset of the defendant wherever 
such asset may be in the world. 69 At times, an order for discovery coupled 
with a Mareva injunction is granted so as to enable the plaintiff to determine with 
greater particularity the extent and whereabouts of the defendant's assets. 70 
Although the Mareva injunction grew up in surroundings relating to ships, it has 
now attained a wide and general application in all litigation.71 As stated above, 
the court's jurisdiction to grant a Mareva injunction was originally founded on 
section 45 of the UK Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 but 
this section has now been replaced by section 37 of the UK Supreme Court Act 
1981 which now represents the statutory source of power to grant a Mareva 
injunction. 
68 
69 
70 
71 
Rahman · (Prince Abdul) bin Turki al Sudairy v Abu Taha & Anor (1980] 
1 WLR 1268. 
Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon [1989] 2 WLR 276. 
House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Waite [ 1985] FSR 173. 
This is not surprising in view of the fact that the function of the Mareva 
injunction is to prevent judgments from being rendered ineffective by the 
dissipation of the defendant's assets and there is thus no reason for 
confining it to shipping cases. See the decision of Sir Robert Megarry VC 
in Barclay Johnson v Yuill [1980] 3 All ER 190 which was endorsed by 
the Court of Appeal in Abu Taha's case, supra n 68. 
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There are four basic requirements for the grant of a Mareva 
injunction. 72 First, the plaintiff must show that he has a valid cause of action 
over which the court has jurisdiction. 73 Secondly, the plaintiff must show that 
he has a good arguable case. Thirdly , the plaintiff must produce evidence that 
the defendant has assets within the jurisdiction. Fourthly, there is a risk of the 
assets being removed before the judgment is satisfied. 
Being a remedy which is usually granted ex parte because speed 
is of the essence, Mareva injunctions, like Anton Piller orders, are open to 
abuses. Cheques drawn on the account may be presented at a time when 
adequate funds are available to meet them but are subsequently dishonoured 
beqmse of the injunction. The reputati~n of the defendant is therefore put at risk 
with the consequence that he is pressurized to settle the action. Also, since 
Mareva injunction has the effect of freezing the defendant's assets, it may be 
abused by an unsecured creditor in order to obtain security in advance of any 
judgment which he may obtain. 74 
72 
73 
74 
Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft GmbH & Co KG 
[1984] 1 All ER 398. 
In Polly Peck International plc v Nadir (No 2) [1992] 4 All ER 769 the 
English Court of Appeal held that a Mareva injunction would not be 
granted if the cause of action which was sought to be protected was 
speculative. 
See the judgment of Mustill J (as he then was) in Third Chandris 
Shipping v Unimarine, supra n 67 at 978 for a discussion of the possible 
abuses. See also Godwin AP, 'The "Mareva" Injunction- Its Use and 
Abuse' [1980] 1 MU 1xxi. 
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As a safeguard against such abuses, Lord Denning in Third 
Chandris Shipping Com v Unimarine SA75 laid down certain guidelines for the 
grant of a Mareva injunction. These are: 
75 
(a) The plaintiff should make full and frank disclosure of all 
matters in his knowledge which are material for the judge 
to know. 
(b) The plaintiff should give particulars of his claim against 
the defendant, stating the ground of his claim and the 
amount thereof, and fairly stating the points made against 
it by the defendant. 
(c) The plaintiff should give some grounds for believing that 
the defendant has assets within the jurisdiction. 
(d) The plaintiff should give some grounds for believing that 
there is a risk of the assets being removed from the 
jurisdiction before the judgment is satisfied. 
(e) The plaintiff must, as in the case of any interlocutory 
injunction, give an undertaking in damages in case he fails 
in his claim or the injunction turns out to be unjustified. 
Supra n 67 at 984-985. 
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In addition, the court may also order that assets of the defendant 
which were purchased with the proceeds of sale of articles which infringed the 
plaintiff's copyright be delivered up for safekeeping to prevent their disposal. 
In CBS United Kingdom Ltd v Lambert/6 the plaintiffs, who alleged that the 
defendants had infringed their copyright in musical recordings, sought both a 
Mareva injunction and an Anton Piller order against the defendants. Evidence 
was given that the first defendant was spending large sums of money on easily 
convertible items including expensive motorcars and other valuable movables 
although he claimed to be unemployed. In the circumstances, the evidence 
disclosed that the first defendant was conducting his affairs in a manner to defeat 
any judgment later given against him. The evidence also seemed to point that the 
profits from infringing the plaintiffs.' copyright were being used to purchase these 
items. The English Court of Appeal, therefore, granted the Mareva injunction 
together with an order for delivery up and discovery. 
3.3.1 Mareva Injunctions in Malaysia 
Unlike in England, Malaysia has section 19(1) of the Debtors Act 1957 which 
provides for pre-trial attachment of assets. 77 However, applications under this 
76 
77 
[1983] 1 Ch 37. 
In addition, section 15(1) of the Debtors Act 1957 provides for the arrest 
of a defendant before judgment provided he carries on business or 
ordinarily resides within the jurisdiction and the other conditions in that 
section are present. 
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section have to comply with strict statutory requirements . First, the application 
can only be made after the issue of a writ. Secondly, the plaintiff must prove 
that he has a good cause of action against the defendant. Thirdly, the defendant 
must come within one of the following : 
(a) that the defendant is absent from the state and his place of 
abode cannot be discovered; 
(b) that service of a writ of summons cannot without great 
delay or difficulty be effected; or 
(c) that the defendant, with intent to obstruct or delay the 
execution of gtny judgment made against him has removed 
or is about to remove, or has concealed, or is concealing, 
or making away with, or handing over to others, any of 
his movable or immovable property . 
The grant of a Mareva injunction, on the other hand, rests with the 
court's general discretion and is not circumscribed by statutory requirements . The 
points requiring proof of a Mareva injunction are, therefore, less demanding than 
those under section 19 of the Debtors Act 1957.78 Section 19 presupposes the 
existence of a writ whereas a Mareva injunction can be granted before the 
78 As noted by Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) in Pacific Centre Sdn Bhd 
v United Engineers (M) Bhd [1984] 2 MU 143. 
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issuance of a writ in urgent cases. Thus a Mareva injunction can be obtained 
more speedily than a section 19 order. Besides that, the plaintiff in a section 19 
application must satisfy the court that he has a good cause of action whereas in 
a Mareva application, he needs only show a good arguable case. Therefore, the 
standard of proof required for a Mareva injunction is lower than that required for 
a section 19 order. Furthermore, where the application is made pursuant to 
section 19(1)(c), the plaintiff must satisfy the court of an intent on the part of 
the defendant to obstruct or delay the execution of any judgment. But a Mareva 
applicant needs only show that there is a risk that the defendant will dissipate 
his assets. Moreover, a section 19 order operates as a right in rem against the 
asset whereas a Mareva injunction operates in personam against the defendant, 
restraining him from dissipating his as~ets. 
The first reported Malaysian case where an application was made 
to the High Court for a Mareva ·injunction was Zainal Abidin bin Hj Abdul 
Rahman v Century Hotel Sdn Bhd79, a case in which the plaintiff claimed 
damages for br~ach of agreement and also applied for an order to restrain the 
defendant from selling, transferring or in any manner disposing of certain lands. 
At first instance, Hashim Y eop A Sani J (as he then was) held that the High 
Court had no power to grant a Mareva injunction because there was no statutory 
provision corresponding to section 45 of the UK Supreme Court of Judicature 
(Consolidation) Act 1925. On appeal, the Federal Court held that Paragraph 6 
of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 supplied the necessary 
79 [1982] 1 MU 40 (High Court), [1982] 1 MU 260 (Federal Court). 
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power to the Malaysian courts to grant a Mareva injunction in appropriate 
circumstances because Paragraph 6 was the equivalent provision to the English 
section 45 . The appeal was, however, dismissed on factual grounds. In S & F 
International Ltd v Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd8~ the Federal Court 
followed Zainal Abidin's case81 and assumed, without deciding, that the High 
Court in Malaya had jurisdiction to grant a Mareva injunction. 
The issue of jurisdiction was again raised in Aspatra Sdn Bhd & 
21 Ors v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor82 The Supreme court, by a 
majority, 83 affirmed the correctness of Zainal Abidin' s84 case and emphatically 
stated that "the Mareva remedy was here to stay" .85 According to the court, the 
mere fact that we did not have exactly the same provision as the English section 
45 was not a sufficient ground for .depriving our courts of jurisdiction to issue 
Mareva injunction. The court held that section 25(2) of the Courts of Judicature 
Act 1964 which under Paragraph 6 of the Schedule included the power to grant 
an injunction, read with Order 29 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 and 
section 50 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 was wide enough to confer the 
necessary jurisdiction to issue a Mareva injunction. The court further opined that 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
[1985] 1 MU 62. 
Supra n 79. 
[1988] 1 MU 97. 
Salleh Abas LP and Mohamed Azmi SCJ comprised the majority while 
Seah SCJ dissented . 
Supra n 79. 
Supra n 82 at 100. 
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section 50 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 gave our courts wider "discretion" in 
granting an injunction than section 45 of the English 1925 Act which restricted 
the English courts jurisdiction to issue injunction to cases where it appeared to 
the court to be just or convenient. Reference was also made by the Supreme 
Court to the High Court decision of Pacific Centre Sdn Bhd v United Engineers 
(M) Bhd86 where Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) took the view that in 
addition to the statutory jurisdiction discussed above, the court had jurisdiction 
by virtue of its inherent powers confirmed in Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of the 
High Court 1980 to grant a Mareva injunction. This view received the support 
of the Supreme Court in Aspatra' s87 case. The development of the Mareva 
injunction in Malaysia has been enhanced by the willingness of the courts to 
ext~nd its application to a wide variety of cases. Thus the Mareva injunction has 
been issued in cases involving, _inter alia, breach of contract, 88 breach of 
fiduciary duty, 89 partnership90 and embezzlement of funds. 91 One can safely 
assume that Mareva injunctions may also be granted in copyright cases where the 
circumstances warrant it. As in England, the Mareva injunction in Malaysia has 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
Supra n 78. 
Supra n 82. 
Zainal Abidin's case, supra n 79, (lease agreement), Pacific Centre's 
case, supra n 78, (sale of land) and S & F International Ltd's case, supra 
n 80, (sub-contract) . 
Bank Bumiputra Bhd & Anor v Lorrain Osman & Ors [1985] 2 MU 236. 
Creative Furnishing Sdn Bhd v Wong Koi [1989] 2 MU 153. 
Abromaritime Technical Service v Azco Supply (M) Sdn Bhd [1991] 2 
cu 982. 
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been extended to cover both cash and movable and immovable properties. 92 It 
is not confined to ex parte applications but can be granted after an inter partes 
hearing. 93 It has also been granted in conjunction with an order for 
discovery. 94 It is now clear that the Mareva injunction has a wide and general 
application in Malaysia and that the power of the courts to grant Mareva 
injunction is firmly established here. 
3.4 Administrative Remedy 
It is an indirect infringement of copyright to import infringing articles into 
Malaysia for the purposes of sale, hire, distribution or trade where the importer 
knoy;s or ought reasonably to know that the making of the articles was carried 
out without the consent or licence .of the copyright owner. 95 Such importation 
of infringing articles, otherwise than for the importer's private and domestic use 
is an offence under the copyright law. 96 Section 39 of the Copyright Act 1987 
provides protection to the copyright owner by enabling him on giving an 
appropriate notice to the Minister97 to have the importation of infringing articles 
prohibited. The copies which may be prohibited as a result of such notice are 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
S & F International Ltd v Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd, supra n 80 . 
Pacific Centre Sdn Bhd v United Engineers (M) Bhd, supra n 78. 
Bank Bumiputra Bhd & Anor v Lorrain Osman & Ors, supra n 89. 
Copyright Act 1987, section 36(2). 
Section 41(1)(f). 
See Copyright (Notice of Prohibition of Import) Regulations 1987, 
regulations 3 and 4. 
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copies of a work made outside Malaysia the making of which was carried out 
without the consent or licence of the copyright owner. 98 The restriction on 
importation does not apply to the importation of any article by a person for his 
private and domestic use99 because such importation is neither an infringement 
under section 36 nor an offence under section 41. The Controller of Copyright 
may require the copyright owner ·to provide such security in respect of any 
liability which may be incurred as a result of the detention of the infringing 
copies. 1 Where security has not been required by the Controller, the copyright 
owner is liable to indemnify the Controller against any liability or expenses 
incurred. 2 
This remedy of restriction on importation is very useful because 
infringing articles, once dispensed.throughout the country, are very difficult to 
detect and identify. Thus prohibiting their entry is crucial and copyright owners 
should therefore give advance notice to the Minister specifying the exact details 
as to the time and place of the expected importation. 
98 
99 
2 
Copyright Act 1987, section 39(2). 
Section 39(3). 
Copyright (Notice of Prohibition of Import) Regulations 1987, regulation 
8. 
Regulation 10. 
CHAPTER 4 
FINAL REMEDIES 
The civil remedies that are available to a copyright owner at the trial of the 
action are provided in section 37 of the Copyright Act 1987. In addition to the 
remedies of damages, accounts and injunction which are explicitly spelt out, 
section 37 also allows the court to grant other types of remedies as are available 
for infringement of other proprietary rights. The equitable remedy of delivery 
up which is available for infringement of patents, registered trade marks, passing 
off, designs and abuse of confidential information has been employed in 
copyright infringement to achieve a more effective scheme of remedies so as to 
put an end to the defendant's infringing activities. Clearly, the possible factual 
situations of copyright infringement are infinite in number and the types of 
remedies which should be granted and their severity must be appropriate to the 
seriousness of each case. 
The final remedies for copyright infringement have to serve the 
needs of two basic types of copyright owners. At one extreme is the one-off 
copyright dispute such as the author of a book or the composer of a song who 
is seeking redress against another individual .who is alleged to have copied the 
copyright work. At the other extreme is the unauthorised reproduction of the 
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copyright work on a wide scale by pirates for commercial gains. Whatever may 
be the type of remedies ultimately granted in each case, it should enable the 
copyright owner to obtain a meaningful redress without unduly punishing the 
infringer. At the same time, the scheme of available remedies must be 
sufficiently stringent so as to deter infringers from reaping the economic fruits 
of the copyright owner. 
Since the trial of the action finally determines the parties' rights 
and liabilities, and consequently the remedies to be awarded, the burden of proof 
lies with the copyright owner to establish the subsistence of his copyright, his 
ownership' and the fact of infringement. This entails proof of facts such as what 
was.made, when and where, by whom and whether the copyright was created in 
the course of employment or under contractual arrangements. Where an 
assignment or licence has been granted, it may be necessary to trace the chain 
of dealings in the copyright work. While these elements usually do not pose too 
great an obstacle to the copyright owner unless he is unfortunate enough to meet 
a vexatious def~ndant who is inclined to put all matters in issue, the proof of 
infringement which requires proof of performance by the defendant of the 
infringing act often does. In this regard, the interlocutory remedies discussed in 
Chapter 3 are linked to the fmal remedies because the former facilitates the 
securing of evidence to establish the defendant's liability which ultimately affects 
Section 42 of the Copyright Act 1987 provides for proof of the 
subsistence and ownership of copyright by way of an affidavit or statutory 
declaration made by any person claiming to be the owner of the copyright 
or by his agent. This section applies to both civil and criminal 
proceedings for infringement of copyright. See, too, Chapter 2 at 2.1.2 . 
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the issue of what suitable final remedies ought to be granted. In a more direct 
sense, the grant of an interlocutory injunction affects the recoverable damages 
since prospective losses may have been largely eliminated. 
The scheme of final remedies commonly employed by the courts 
is directed at providing redress to the copyright owner in two main ways. First, 
the monetary remedy of compensatory damages seeks to compensate the 
copyright owner for his losses caused by the infringement. This does not, 
however, include the injury to the copyright owner's pride and feelings as a 
result of the high-handed manner in which the infringer carried out his infringing 
activities. While it is conceded that injury to pride and feelings cannot be 
qua!}tified monetarily, the remedy of II additional damages 11 attempts to translate 
such injury to monetary terms as t.Q.e best means of compensating the copyright 
owner. As an alternative to compensatory damages, the copyright owner has the 
option to elect the remedy of account of profits so as to strip the infringer of all 
his gains. This not only satisfies the copyright owner in that any benefit obtained 
by the infringer is shifted to him but it also removes any incentive on the part of 
future infringers from calculating that their gain from infringing will exceed the 
compensatory damages payable to the copyright owner. Secondly, the final 
injunction restrains future infringements and is often supported by an order for 
delivery up and destruction of the infringing articles thereby removing completely 
any temptation to stealthily disobey the injunction. 
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Where the copyright owner and the exclusive licensee have 
concurrent rights of action, it is a requirement under section 38(3) of the 
Copyright Act 1987 that the owner or exclusive licensee joins the other party as 
plaintiff or defendant in the action unless the application is for an interlocutory 
injunction or leave of the court is obtained. This chapter examines the principles 
governing the award of damages, additional damages, account of profits, delivery 
up and final injunction as remedies in proceedings for copyright infringement. 
4.1 Monetary Remedies 
4.1.1 Dama~:es 
Damages for infringement of copyright are provided in section 37(1) of the 
Copyright Act 1987. Of all the monetary remedies available for infringement of 
copyright, 2 only damages are purely compensatory in nature. The purpose of 
damages is to compensate the plaintiff for a wrong done to his copyright as an 
incorporeal right. Damages therefore put the plaintiff in the position he would 
have been in if the infringement had not occurred. The measure of damages is 
2 The other monetary remedies are additional damages and account of 
profits. See infra at 4 .1. 2 and 4 .1. 3. In Australia and previously in the 
UK, the copyright statutes provide for an additional financial redress 
known as conversion damages. Such provision deems the copyright 
owner to be the owner of the infringing copies only for the purpose of 
bringing an action for conversion or detinue against the infringer. 
Conversion damages are based on the value of the infringing copies. In 
the UK, conversion damages which were available under section 18 of the 
UK Copyright Act 1956 have now been abolished by the UK Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act 1988 on the recommendation of the Whitford 
Committee. See comments of Great Britain, Report of the Committee to 
consider the Law on Copyright and Designs (London, HMSO, 1977) 
Cmnd 6732, para 702. 
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the depreciation caused by the infringement to the value of the copyright as a 
chose in action. 3 Unlike the copyright statutes in some other jurisdictions which 
relieve a defendant who has infringed the plaintiff's copyright from being liable 
in damages if he can establish innocence, the Copyright Act 1987 does not 
contain any corresponding provision. 4 Damages are therefore available even 
when the defendant was not aware of and had no reasonable grounds for 
suspecting an infringement. As copyright subsists in a work without the need for 
any form of registration, a defendant who wishes to determine the subsistence or 
otherwise of copyright in a work does not have the benefit of consulting any 
register in advance. For this reason, it is submitted that a defendant who is not 
aware of and has no reasonable grounds for suspecting that copyright existed in 
the _work concerned ought to be relieved from having to pay damages. It is 
therefore submitted that a provisiou to that effect should be incorporated in the 
Copyright Act 1987. Interestingly, such a provision was present under the 
Copyright Act 196~ but was not retained in the present Copyright Act 1987. 
Although the measure of damages is the depreciation to the value 
of the copyright, cases show that the courts do not confine such damages merely 
to the difference in market value of the copyright before and after the 
3 
4 
5 
Sutherland Publishing Co Ltd v Caxton Publishing Co Ltd [1936] Ch 323. 
The copyright statutes of UK, Australia and Singapore provide that 
damages are not available in cases of innocent infringement. 
Nevertheless, a copyright owner may obtain an account of profits in such 
situations whether or not any other relief is granted. See infra at 4.1.3. 
Copyright Act 1969, section 14( 4). 
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infringement. 6 Rather, any loss arising as a result of the infringement is taken 
into account subject to the rules of remoteness. 7 The approach adopted by the 
courts in assessing damages varies from case to case depending on how the 
copyright owner exploits the copyright in issue . First, if the copyright owner 
does not himself exploit his copyright in the marketplace but grants licences to 
others to exploit the work on payment of a fixed royalty or licence fee, then the 
measure of damages the defendant must pay will be the accepted royalty rate.8 
Secondly, if the copyright owner himself actually exploits his 
copyright in the marketplace so that the defendant comes into direct competition 
with the copyright owner, then damages will be assessed on a lost sales basis, 
that_ is, the lost profits which the copyright owner would receive had the 
defendant's infringing activities nq_t occurred. 9 There are several methods of 
determining lost sales. 10 One such method is to determine the extent of the 
defendant's sales of the infringing product and use those figures as an 
approximation of lost sales. In Allibert S.A. v 0' Connor & Anor, 11 the 
plaintiffs were copyright owners of drawings relating to fish boxes and were 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Interfirm Comparison (Australia) Pty Ltd v Law Society of NSW [1977] 
RPC 137. 
Ibid. 
Penn v Jack (1867) LR 5 Eq 81, Ting Peng Yew v Singapore Envelopes 
Co Pte Ltd [1991] 2 MU 398. 
Lewis Trusts v Bambers Stores Ltd [1982] FSR 281. 
See Keenon WR, 'Monetary Recovery Under the Copyright Act: 
Calculation of Damages' ( 1986) 65 Oreg L Rev 809. 
[1982] FSR 317. 
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carrying on business as manufacturers of such boxes. The defendants, in 
infringing the plaintiffs ' copyright, manufactured and sold such boxes in direct 
competition with the plaintiffs. In an action for infringement, the plaintiffs were 
awarded damages based on the plaintiffs' loss of profit on the sale of the 
infringing boxes diverted to the defendants. In quantifying the loss of profit, the 
court deducted the purchase price of each of the plaintiffs' fish boxes from the 
costs of producing and marketing one such box and then multiplied that figure 
with the total number of infringing fish boxes sold by the defendants. Lost sales 
may also be determined by the plaintiff establishing actual sales during a pre-
infringement period and using those figures to project what the sales volume 
should have been had there been no infringement, and then comparing that figure 
wit~ the actual sales during the infringement period. 
Thirdly, in some cases, it is not possible to prove the existence of 
a normal rate of profit or a fixed royalty or a licence fee. In such cases, it is for 
the copyright owner to adduce evidence of the surrounding circumstances relating 
to the infringement which will guide the court, such as the going-rate for licence 
fee or royalty in the relevant trade 12 or the loss to the value of the copyright 
caused by the vulgarisation of the copyright work. 13 In Stovin Bradford v 
Vol point Properties, 14 an architect prepared plans for the purpose of obtaining 
12 
13 
14 
General Tire & Rubber Co v Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co Ltd [1976] 
RPC 197. 
Sutherland Publishing Co Ltd v Caxton Publishing Co Ltd, supra n 3. 
[1971] Ch 1007. 
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planning permission. The defendants, without any consent from the architect, 
used the plans in the actual construction of the building. In an action brought by 
the architect for damages for infringement of his copyright, the court awarded 
damages based on what would be a fair remuneration to the architect for a 
licence to use the whole of his plan and drawings for the purpose for which the 
defendant had used them. 
Sometimes the quantum of damages is decided by the court as a 
matter of impression and not based on any meticulous calculation of individual 
items. In Syed Alwi v Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 15 the plaintiff was a well-
known playwriter who was awarded a literature prize by the defendant for his 
pia~ entitled "Tok Perak". The defendant was found to have infringed the 
plaintiff's copyright in the play by _the publication of 5,000 copies of this work. 
In addition, the plaintiff found missing words, textual errors and punctuation 
mistakes in the work as published. The court, without undertaking any 
calculation, awarded damages to the plaintiff in the sum of RM10,000. 
Whichever approach is employed by the courts, the process of 
quantifying damages is ultimately . one of judicial estiination and not precise 
calculation, based on the available evidence. 16 This may sometimes be difficult 
especially when the defendant is able to show that he made sales of the infringing 
works that the plaintiff would not have made even if the defendant had never 
15 [1980] 1 MU 129. 
16 Lewis Trusts v Bambers Stores Ltd, supra n 9. 
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entered the market. 17 There may be other reasons for a falling-off and the mere 
fact of drop in sales need not be decisive. 18 A balance must be struck in each 
case between compensating the copyright owner for what he actually lost and 
ensuring that the defendant is not penalised. 
Where an action seeking damages for infringement is brought by 
an exclusive licensee without joining the copyright owner, 19 the award of 
damages should take into account liabilities in respect of royalties or otherwise 
to which the licence is subjected. 2° Furthermore, regardless of whether the 
plaintiff is the exclusive licensee or the copyright owner, the court must take into 
account any pecuniary remedy already awarded to the other party and any right 
of ~ction exercisable to the other party in respect of the same infringement.21 
4.1.2 Additional Dama2es 
Where copyright infringement is established, the court, in assessing damages, is 
empowered to award such additional damages as are appropriate in the 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
See Brown AS, 'Damages and Account of Profits in Trademark, Trade 
Secrets, Copyright and Patent Law' (1977) 3 Auck UL Rev 188. 
Federal Computer Services Sdn Bhd v Ang Jee Hai. Eric [1991] 3 MU 
341. 
Before such an action can be commenced, leave of the court pursuant to 
section 38(3) of the Copyright Act 1987 must first be obtained. 
Copyright Act 1987, section 38(5). 
Section 38(5)(b). 
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circumstances. 22 In such a situation, the court must be satisfied that effective 
relief would not otherwise be available to the copyright owner, having regard to 
the flagrancy of the infringement and any benefit shown to have accrued to the 
defendant by reason of the infringement in addition to all other material 
considerations . 
"Flagrancy" implies the "existence of scandalous conduct, deceit 
and such like and includes deliberate and calculated copyright infringements" . 23 
It also includes the infliction of humiliation and loss difficult to compensate and 
assess in the normal course. 24 "Benefit" implies that the defendant had reaped 
a pecuniary advantage in excess of the damages he would otherwise have to 
pay ~25 Since the word "additional" neither indicates nor describes the purpose 
for which such additional damages _are to be awarded, the important question is 
to determine what such additional damages really are. Are they intended to 
encompass aggravated but still compensatory damages or do they go beyond 
compensation to cover exemplary damages? Aggravated damages are awarded 
as an extra compensation to the copyright owner for the injury to his feelings and 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Section 37(2). 
Ravenscroft v Herbert & Anor [1980] RPC 193 at 208. 
Williams v Settle [1960] 1 WLR 1072, Nichols Advanced Vehicle 
Systems Inc v Rees [1979] RPC 127, The Lady Anne Tennant v 
Associated Newspapers Group [1979] FSR 298. 
Ravenscroft v Herbert & Anor, supra n 23. 
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dignity caused by the defendant's insulting behaviour.26 Exemplary damages, 
on the other hand, are awarded as a punishment meted out on the defendant 
because of his outrageous conduct.27 Aggravated damages are therefore within 
the compensatory principle of damages while exemplary damages are independent 
of the question of compensation and are punitive in nature. 
Section 37(2) is in pari materia with section 17(3) of the now 
repealed UK Copyright Act 1956 and, therefore, English decisions on section 
17(3) may provide some insight on our court's attitude to the section. When the 
Gregory Committee recommended the introduction of section 17(3), it was of the 
view that the court should be empowered to impose exemplary damages in cases 
whe_re the existing remedies gave inadequate relief. 28 This in itself suggests that 
an award of exemplary damages is. allowed by section 17(3). However, at the 
time the UK Copyright Act 1956 was drafted, there was no distinction in English 
law between the concepts of aggravated and exemplary damages and indeed the 
two terms were used interchangeably. 29 One cannot therefore be absolutely 
26 
27 
28 
29 
McGregor on Damages 15th Ed (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1988), at 
para 409. 
Ibid. 
See comments of Great Britain, Report of the Copyright Committee 
(London, HMSO, 1952) Cmnd 8662, para 294. 
Subsequent to the House of Lords decision in Rookes v Barnard [1964] 
AC 1129, the expressions "aggrav~ted" and "exemplary" damages 
acquired separate and mutually exclusive meanings as terms of art in 
English law. Rookes v Barnard was applied in the Malaysian case of 
Alfred Templeton & Ors v Low Yat Holdings Sdn Bhd [1989] 2 MU 202 
and Cheng Hang Guan v Perumahan Farlim (Pg) [1993] 3 MU 352. 
132 
certain as to which of the two elements of damages was intended by the UK 
Parliament. 
The earlier English cases demonstrate a general willingness of the 
courts to award exemplary damages pursuant to section 17(3) of the UK 
Copyright Act 1956. Thus, in Williams v Settle, 30 the defendant was a 
professional photographer who had taken photographs of the plaintiff's wedding. 
The plaintiff's father-in-law was included in some of the photographs. Two 
years later, the plaintiff's father-in-law was murdered and the defendant sold 
some of these photographs to the press despite the fact that copyright in the 
photographs belonged to the plaintiff. In an action claiming damages for breach 
of c~pyright in the photographs, the plaintiff was awarded damages for copyright 
infringement. In addition, exempl_ary damages under section 17(3) of the UK 
Copyright Act 1956 were awarded because of the scandalous conduct of the 
defendant and his total disregard not only of the legal rights of the plaintiff 
regarding his copyright, but also of the plaintiff's feelings and sense of family 
dignity and pride. 
Subsequent developments in the law commencing from the House 
of Lords decision in Rookes v Bamard31 drew a distinction between exemplary 
and aggravated damages. Williams v Settle32 was characterised as a case of 
30 
31 
32 
Supra n 24. 
Supra n 29. 
Supra n 24. 
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aggravated damages. Although Lord Devlin in Rookes v Barnard33 severely 
restricted the application of exemplary damages, his Lordship reserved his 
opinion as to whether section 17(3) permitted the award of exemplary 
damages. 34 Rookes v Barnard35 was confirmed by the House of Lords in 
Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome. 36 Lord Hailsham in the latter case also left open 
the question as to whether exemplary damages could be awarded under section 
17(3). However, Lord Kilbrandon was of the view that section 17(3) did not 
authorise the award of exemplary damages. 37 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Supra n 29. 
It was in Rookes v Barnard, ibid, that the House of Lords criticised 
exemplary damages as anomalous in English law but recognised that the 
doctrine was sufficiently established in case law to prevent its complete 
abolition. The effect of the decision was to limit the cases in which 
exemplary damages could be awarded to three categories. First, cases of 
oppressive conduct by government servants. Secondly, cases iq which the 
defendant's conduct was calculated by him to make a profit for himself. 
Thirdly, cases where exemplary damages were expressly authorised by 
statute. In the recent case of AB & Others v South West Water Services 
Ltd [1993] 1 AllER 609, the Court of Appeal further curtailed the award 
of exemplary damages in that the award can now be made only where the 
cause of action was one where such an award was made prior to 1964, 
that is, prior to Rookes v Barnard. Rookes v Barnard has not been 
followed in some countries in the Commonwealth. In Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand, the courts continue to award exemplary damages for 
flagrant or conscious wrongdoing. In these countries, exemplary damages 
are also awarded where a person acts maliciously or vindictively with a 
contumelious disregard for the plaintiff's rights. 
Supra n 29. 
[1972] AC 1027. This case was applied in the Malaysian case of Alfred 
Templeton & Ors v Low Y at Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor, supra n 29. 
Ibid at 1134. 
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Further support for the view that section 17(3) did not authorise 
exemplary damages is found in the decision of Ungoed-Thomas J in Beloff v 
Pressdram Ltd . 38 The plaintiff in that case brought an action for infringement 
of copyright in respect of an office memorandum written by the plaintiff 
describing a conversation between the plaintiff and a named cabinet minister 
regarding possible successors to the Prime Minister in the event of the latter's 
accidental death. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, damages for breach of 
copyright together with aggravated and exemplary damages. One of the issues 
was whether section 17(3) permitted an award of aggravated and exemplary 
damages. The court noted that pursuant to section 17(3), additional damages 
would not be awarded unless the court was "satisfied that effective relief would 
not otherwise be available to the plaintiff" . Ungoed-Thomas J was of the view 
that these words focused attention ~m relief to the plaintiff and were concerned 
with purely compensatory damages, so that exemplary damages were excluded 
by the wordings of section 17(3). His Lordship also considered whether section 
17(3)(b) would justify the granting of exemplary damages as falling within the 
second category of permitted exemplary damages decided in Rookes v 
Barnard. 39 This second category deals with cases in which the defendant's 
conduct was calculated to make a profit for himself. While recognising that both 
section 17(3)(b) and Lord Devlin's second category dealt with the unjust 
enrichment by the defendant, Ungoed-Thomas J was of the view that the latter 
38 
39 
[1973] RPC 765. 
Supra n 29. As to the categories of permitted exemplary damages 
decided in Rookes v Barnard, see supra n 34. 
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related to damages as punishment for the defendant's conduct whereas the former 
related to compensation in respect of the benefit obtained by the defendant. His 
Lordship thus ruled that section 17(3) did not permit exemplary damages. 
U ngoed-Thomas J in fact went a step further by holding that aggravated damages 
could not be awarded outside the ambit of section 17(3). His Lordship's reasons 
were as follows. First, section 17 (3) provided for II additional 11 damages without 
making any reference at all to exemplary or aggravated damages. Secondly, 
section 17(3) already provided for the advantage obtained by the defendant from 
the plaintiff's property so there was no necessity to look beyond the section for 
exemplary damages. Thirdly, section 17(3) was a comprehensive section on 
aggravated damages. Fourthly, since additional damages could only be awarded 
if effective relief would not otherwise be available, aggravated damages free from 
such a precondition could not exist~ side by side with additional damages as this 
would defeat the intention of Parliament. Fifthly, section 17 (3) was a code for 
damages which were 11 additional II without providing a place for additional 
exemplary and aggravated damages outside the subsection. Ungoed-Thomas J 
also discussed the significance of the words 11 effective relief would not otherwise 
be available 11 and concluded that the phrase meant that additional damages could 
not be granted in a case where a party could have achieved relief by means of 
another cause of action. 40 The case before his Lordship was such a case since 
an action in defamation would have provided effective relief. It therefore appears 
40 This requirement is no longer necessary under section 97(2) of the UK 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
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that the English courts' view of section 17(3) is that the statutory remedy 
precludes any award of exemplary damages and aggravated damages. 41 
In New Zealand, however, the Court of Appeal in Wellington 
Newspapers Ltd v Dealers Guide Ltd42held that exemplary damages can be 
awarded under section 24(3) of the New Zealand Copyright Act 1962 which is 
in pari materia with section 17(3) of the repealed UK Copyright Act 1956. 
Similarly, the subsequent case of Wilson v Broadcasting Corp of New Zealand43 
also decided that if the facts of the infringement warranted the grant of 
exemplary damages, such damages should be made under section 24(3) of the 
New Zealand Copyright Act 1962. 
In this regard, it . is interesting to note section 115(4) of the 
Australian Copyright Act 1968 and section 119(4) of the Singapore Copyright 
Act 1987 which empower the court to award such additional damages as it 
con~iders appropriate in the circumstances without additionally being required to 
be satisfied ~'that effective relief would not otherwise be available to the 
41 
42 
43 
See, too, Copinger and Skone James Copyright 13th Ed (London, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 1991) at para 11-66; Lester D & Mitchell P, Joynson-Hicks 
on UK Copyright Law (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1989) at 341. 
Contrast the view taken by Dworkin G & Taylor RD in Blackstone's 
Guide to the Copyright. Designs and Patents Act 1988 (London, 
Blackstone Press Ltd, 1989) at 118 which is that exemplary damages are 
authorised by section 97(2) of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988, the equivalent of section 17(3) of the repealed UK Copyright Act 
1956. . 
[1984] 2 NZLR 66. 
[1990] 2 NZLR 565. 
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plaintiff" . The absence of this additional requirement led the Supreme Court of 
South Australia in Concrete Systems Pty Ltd v Devon Symonds Holdings Ltd44 
to conclude that English decisions on exemplary damages are inapplicable in 
Australia. In that case, the court held that section 115(4) is not directed in its 
terms purely to compensatory damages. According to the court, section 115(4) 
gives the court the widest possible discretionary power to compensate the plaintiff 
for loss and damage occasioned by the infringement, whether such loss and 
damage are exemplary or aggravated. Concrete Systems45 was relied on by the 
Federal Court of Australia in Autodesk Pty Ltd & Anor v Cheung46 , a case 
concerning infringement of copyright in computer programs, where a substantial 
sum was awarded for additional damages under section 115(4). Notwithstanding 
this, even if the conditions in section 115(4) were to be established, the court has 
a discretion to refuse additional ~amages, for example, when the award of 
compensatory damages itself casts on the defendant a burden too difficult for him 
to bear47 • 
In Malaysia, the decision of Gunn Chit Tuan J (as he then was) in 
Mokhtar Haii Jamaludin v Pustaka Sistem Pelajaran48 seems to suggest that 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
(1978) 20 ALR 677. 
Ibid. 
(1990) 17 IPR 69. 
Amalgamated Mining Services Pty Ltd v Warman International Ltd & Ors 
(1992) 24 IPR 461. 
[1986] 2 MU 376. 
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aggravated damages for copyright infringement may be granted under the general 
power to award damages provided by section 14(3) of the Copyright Act 196~9 
without having to resort to section 14(5).50 In Mokhtar's case51 , the plaintiff 
who was a writer of literary works had orally agreed with the defendants to allow 
the latter to publish his works. The plaintiff subsequently discovered that the 
words "oleh Mokhtar A.K. " who was another writer were printed on the cover 
of the said works. The plaintiff therefore alleged that the defendants had 
intended to convey the idea that the works were written by Mokhtar A.K. In 
addition, the defendants had also named themselves as the owner of the copyright 
in the work. The issue of infringement had earlier been settled by the parties and 
the only issue left was the assessment of damages. Although the plaintiff was 
en~itled to damages for breach of the oral agreement, the court held that the loss 
in this case was remote and indir~ct. In assessing damages for infringement of 
copyright, Gunn Chit Tuan J (as he then was) referred solely to section 14(3) as 
empowering the court to grant damages. According to his Lordship, damages 
under this section were at large on the authority of the English case of Exchange 
Telegraph Co v Gregory. 52 Being at large, damages were not limited to the 
pecuniary loss that could specifically be proved but extended to the motives and 
conduct of the defendants which aggravated the injury done to the plaintiff 
49 
50 
51 
52 
Section 14(3) of the Copyright Act 1969 was in pari materia to section 
37(1) of the Copyright Act 1987. 
Section 14(5) of the Copyright Act 1969 was in pari materia to section 
37(2) of the Copyright Act 1987. 
Supra n 48. 
[1896] 1 QB 147. 
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including injury to his feelings and pride. On this basis, his Lordship awarded 
aggravated damages in the sum of RM2,500. 
On the authority of Mokhtar' s case, 53 aggravated damages can be 
awarded for copyright infringement independently of the "additional damages" 
provision in section 37(2) of the Copyright Act 1987. If aggravated damages 
come within the purview of section 37(1) of the Copyright 1987, one is left to 
wonder what role, if any, is played by section 37(2) and how the section is to be 
read. It is submitted that section 37(2) should be interpreted as empowering the 
court to grant exemplary damages in appropriate circumstances. 
4.1.3 Account of Profits 
An account of profits is the other category of monetary remedies available to a 
plaintiff in an action for infringement of copyright spelt out in section 37(1) of 
the Copyright Act 1987. This remedy is an equitable one having its origins in 
the Chancery Courts. 54 Although section 37(1) specifically provides that relief 
by way of accounts "shall be available to the plaintiff", the equitable nature of 
the remedy dictates that the ultimate decision on whether an account of profits 
53 
54 
Supra n 48. 
An action for an account of profits has its roots in the common law action 
but this was superseded by the equitable action for account of profits 
primarily as a result of the procedural difficulties attendant in common 
law actions. See Meagher RP, Gummow WMC, Lehane JRF, Equity-
Doctrines and Remedies 3rd Ed (Sydney, Butterworths, 1992) at paras 
2501-2503, and Kirby CL, 'To Account or Not to Account? An Account' 
[1991] 10 EIPR 367. 
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should be ordered or not rests with the discretion of the court.55 Unlike 
damages which are compensatory in nature, an account of profits is restitutionary 
in that the defendant is made to account for profits he has made out of his 
infringement and is required to restore it to the plaintiff. 56 The basis for 
ordering an account of profits is that the defendant should be prevented from 
being unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff and should therefore be 
deprived of any profit made by him which is attributable to the infringement.57 
An account of profits will conceivably yield a more precise figure 
of the defendant's profits than damages because the taking of an account involves 
an examination of the defendant's actual accounts whereas damages are more 
often than not an estimation of the plaintiff's losses. A major drawback of an 
account is the lengthy and compl_icated procedure involved in the process of 
calculation and the difficulties in ascertaining precisely what profits are 
attributable to the infringement. This is particularly so where various factors 
55 
56 
57 
Kelly v Hooper (1840) 4 Jur 21; 62 ER 852. 
Hogg v Kirby (1803) 8 Ves 215; 32 ER 336, Colbeam Palmer Ltd & 
Anor v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd (1968) 122 CLR 25. 
My Kinda Town v Soli [1982] FSR 147 (a passing off case). This 
rationale is also referred to in Copinger and Skone James (1991) at para 
11-76. One writer suggested that a possible theoretical justification for 
an account of profits lies in the fact that copyright is a property right and 
it is unconscionable for an infringer to retain the benefit which he had 
received by the appropriation of that right. The writer also suggested that 
another possible rationale lies in the deterrent effect of the remedy; the 
removal of any possibility of retaining the profit will remove any 
incentive to infringe. See Bently L, 'Accounting for Profits Gained by 
Infringement of Copyright: When does it End?' [1991] 1 EIPR 5. 
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besides the copyright work contribute to the profits, for example, the marketing 
strategies, advertisement, the public's demand and the price of the product. 
While the copyright statute of some jurisdiction58 provides that 
the remedy of account and damages are mutually exclusive so that one is granted 
to the exclusion of the other, section 37(1) is less clear on this aspect. At 
common law, the House of Lords in De Vitre v Betts59 relying on its earlier 
decision in Neilson v Betts, 60 both involving patent infringement, held that it 
was an established principle that a plaintiff cannot be entitled to both an account 
of profits and an inquiry into damages. According to the House of Lords, a 
claim for damages and profits was irreconcilable since the taking of an account 
tan!amounts to condonation of the infringement while the claim for damages 
reflects the plaintiff's insistence_ that the defendant's act was wrongful.61 
Another view for this principle is that the defendant should not be entitled to be 
58 
59 
60 
61 
For example, section 115(2) of the Australian Copyright Act 1968 and 
section 119(2) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987 (Cap 63, 1988 Ed) 
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Singapore Copyright Act 1987'). 
(1873) LR 6 HL 319. 
(1871) LR 5 HL 1. 
This view has been said to be unsatisfactory particularly in the light of 
recent decisions such as Codex Corp v Racal-Milgo [1984] FSR 87, 
Catnic v Evans [1983] FSR 401 and Attorney-General v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd [1987] 3 All ER 316 which suggested that both an 
account of profits and an inquiry into damages may be available. See 
Bently L, 'Accounting for Profits Gai~ed by Infringement of Copyright: 
When does it End?', supra n 57, where the writer took the view that this 
rationale has long been disapproved and ought no longer to be followed. 
The writer further argued that there seemed no reason why an account 
and compensatory damages might not be available. 
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both reimbursed and compensated as otherwise he would be paid twice in respect 
of the same infringement. 62 The latter view is said to be a better rationale for 
the principle because it does not involve what is, perhaps, a fictional condonation 
of a wrongful act since the plaintiff has no real intention of condoning the 
infringement by seeking the remedy. 63 
In England, the conventional approach to the statutory provision 
on account of profits found in section 96(2) of the UK Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act 198864 which is in pari materia with section 37(1) of the Copyright 
Act 1987 is that a plaintiff must elect between the two remedies of damages and 
an account. 65 This is also the approach taken by the Malaysian courts as seen 
frotp. the final orders given in cases such as Dunia Muzik WEA Sdn Bhd & Anor 
v Koh Tay Eng66 and Longman ~alaysia Sdn Bhd v Pustaka Delta Pelajaran 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
See Cornish WR, Intellectual Property: Patents. Copyright. Trade Marks 
and Allied Rights 2nd Ed (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1989) at 46. 
Ibid. 
Its predecessor being section 17 of the UK Copyright Act 1956. 
Caxton Publishing Co Ltd v Sutherland Publishing Co Ltd [1939] AC 
178, Patton Ltd v Yorkclose Ltd & Ors [1990] FSR 11. In Australia, 
section 115(2) of the Australian Copyright Act 1968 provides that the 
court may order an injunction and "either damages or an account of 
profits" . The Federal Court of Australia in Gentry Homes Pty Ltd v 
Diamond Homes Pty Ltd & Ors (1993) AIPC 91-008 construed this 
section as requiring the plaintiff to make an election. 
[1989] 2 MU 356. 
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Sdn Bhd67 where the court in both cases ordered an inquiry as to damages or 
at the plaintiff's option an account of profits. 
Since the position appears to be that an account of profits and 
damages are alternatives, the question arises as to whether "additional damages" 
are available where the plaintiff seeks an account of profits in a case of flagrant 
infringement. If an account of profits and damages are alternatives, it would 
appear that "additional damages" would not be available to a plaintiff who seeks 
an account of profits even though the defendant's conduct was a flagrant 
infringement of the plaintiff's copyright. 
However, in the New Zealand case of International Credit Control 
Ltd & Anor v Axelsen & Anor68 , th.e court in construing section 24(3) of the 
New Zealand Copyright Act 1962 which is equivalent to section 37(2) of our 
Copyright Act 1987, appeared to take the view that an account of profits could 
be granted together with additional damages for flagrant infringement. In that 
case, however, an account of profits was granted but additional damages refused 
because the court found as a question of fact that the case was not one of flagrant 
infringement. Although this approach is inconsistent with the view that an 
67 
68 
[1987] 2 MU 359. Compare the trade mark infringement case of Tien 
Chu Ve-Tsin Chemical Industries CHK) Ltd v Maui-Kong Ve-Tsin 
Manufacturing (M) Co Ltd [1967] 1 MU 128 where Raja Azlan Shah J 
(as he then was) seemed to suggest that the election rests not with the 
plaintiff but with the discretion of the court based on the evidence 
adduced. 
'[1974] 1 NZLR 695. 
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account of profits and damages are alternatives, it has the advantage of stripping 
the defendant of whatever gains made by him from the infringement while at the 
same time punishing him for his contumelious conduct. 
Where an agreement exists whereby the defendant could purchase 
the plaintiff' s copyright at a certain scale of fees and the defendant, instead of 
doing so, proceeded to make use of the copyright work, any monetary relief for 
infringement will be an account calculated in accordance with the agreement. 
Thus, in Lau Foo Sun v Government of Malaysia69 , the appellant who was an 
engineer had entered into an agreement with the Ministry of Education for the 
preparation of engineering drawings and designs for the construction of 
classrooms for schools . As these drawings could be used again for building 
additional schools with similar designs, the agreement provided that the Ministry 
would purchase the appellant's copyright at a fee calculated on the total cost of 
the reinforced concrete works . The Ministry, without the appellant's consent and 
without paying him the fee as agreed, used some of the drawings whereupon the 
appellant brought the matter to court . The Federal Court determined that 
copyright existed in the drawings and that the Ministry had infringed the 
copyright. The reliefs sought were, inter alia, an account or alternatively 
damages for infringement. In a unanimous judgment delivered by Ali FJ it was 
held that the appellant's entitlement to monetary relief laid not in damages but 
an account in accordance with the agreement. The taking of an account in 
69 [1974] 1 MU 28. 
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respect of the use of the drawings not bought by the Ministry and payment of the 
amount found due after taking the account was therefore ordered. 
Until recently, the conventional view is that the right to an account 
is available only where an injunction is granted. 70 The justification for this 
view is that an account of profits is an adjunct to an injunction and is granted to 
enable equity to complete the relief. 71 However, in recent years, the English 
and Australian courts have made exceptions to this rule that an injunction is a 
prerequisite to an account. In Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 
2}, 72 the House of Lords ordered the taking of an account of profits accruing 
from the publication of the first extract of the intended serialisation by the 
Sun~ay Times, but refused to grant an injunction because the confidential 
information was already in the pub)ic domain. In Australia, the High court in 
Colbeam Palmer's case73 refused to grant an injunction as the plaintiff had 
assigned the trade mark prior to the trial and that mark had already expired but 
nonetheless ordered the taking of an account. The Malaysian cases whereby an 
account of profits were ordered have always been accompanied by the grant of 
an injunction largely because there was a need in those cases for the infringing 
70 
71 
72 
73 
Baily v Taylor 8 U Ch 49, 39 ER 28; Parrott v Palmer (1834) 3 My & 
K 632, 40 ER 241. 
Ibid. 
[1988] 3 All ER 545. 
Supra n 56. Although this was a trade mark case, Windeyer J discussed 
the principles applicable generally in awarding an account of profits. 
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activities to be put to an immediate stop. 74 It is submitted that our courts are 
likely to follow the trend in England and Australia of granting exceptions to the 
general rule where circumstances warrant it, for example, where a defendant 
undertakes not to infringe or is no longer in a position to infringe or where the 
copyright concerned has expired. 
Since an account of profits operate on the basis that the defendant 
is stripped of profits made by him knowingly infringing the plaintiff's right, 
equity requires that knowledge of the infringement be proved by the plaintiff.15 
However, the copyright statute of some jurisdiction reverses this position by 
providing that a plaintiff is entitled to an account of profits even where the 
defendant is not aware that the act is an infringement of copyright. 76 The 
Copyright Act 1987 is silent on this aspect although such a provision was present 
in section 14( 4) of the now repealed Copyright Act 1969. It is therefore open 
to speculation whether the absence of such a provision in the present Act is to be 
taken to mean that the requirement of knowledge on the part of the defendant, 
as is the usual case, is necessary before an account of profits can be ordered. If 
74 
75 
76 
See, for instance, Dunia Muzik WEA Sdn Bhd & Anor v Koh Tay Eng, 
supra n 66 and Longman Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Pustak:a Delta Pelajaran 
Sdn Bhd, supra n 67. 
Hogg v Kirby, supra n 56. 
See section 97(1) of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, 
section 115(3) of the Australian Copyright Act 1968, section 24(2) of the 
New Zealand Copyright Act 1962 and section 119(3) of the Singapore 
Copyright Act 1987. 
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so, then arguably, the defence of innocent infringement may be available where 
an account of profits is sought. 
Whether a plaintiff should opt for an account of profits or an 
inquiry into damages depends very much on which of the two remedies yield the 
greater amount in a particular instant. The question of what comprise "profits" 
for the purpose of account of profits is thus of prime importance to the plaintiff. 
The general rule is that a plaintiff is entitled to an account of gross profits made 
by the defendant diminished by such expenses properly and necessarily incurred 
as might be established on the part of the defendant. 77 Effectively, profits in 
the context of an account means net profits. 78 To determine net profits , the 
defe_ndant, being the accounting party, must make out his accoune9 by 
identifying items such as the sale price of the infringing articles, the number of 
articles sold, the defendant's expenses of manufacturing the articles, the cost of 
labour and other costs including transport, wages, customs duty, advertisement 
and marketing. 80 
In cases where the defendant has used the plaintiff's ·property to 
make profits, the issue arises whether all or part of the profits may be recovered. 
77 
78 
79 
80 
Caxton Publishing Co Ltd v Sutherland Publishing Co Ltd, supra n 65. 
Potton Ltd v Yorkclose Ltd & Ors, supra n 65. 
Rules of the High Court 1980, Order 43 rule 4. 
Patfield F, 'The Modem Remedy of Account' [1987] Adel LR 1 at 17, 
House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Point Blank Ltd [1983] FSR 329, 
Redwood Music Ltd v Chappell & Co Ltd [1982] RPC 109. 
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Where the whole of the article sold infringes the plaintiff's copyright, then all the 
profits will belong to the plaintiff. 81 Where the infringing article consists of 
infringing and non-infringing parts so that only part of the article infringes the 
copyright, the plaintiff is not entitled to the whole of the defendant's profits but 
only so much of the total net profits which is attributable to the defendant's use 
of the copyright unless the article could not have been produced or sold at all 
without the inclusion of the copyright. 82 Apportionment of profits attributable 
to infringing and non-infringing parts is required and the court's decision will 
usually be one of a reasonable approximation instead of mathematical 
exactness. 83 
The question whether unrealised profits could fall within the 
category of "profits" was considereg recently in Potton Ltd v Yorkclose Ltd & 
Ors. 84 In that case, the defendant had infringed the plaintiff's copyright by 
constructing houses which reproduced the plaintiff's architectural drawings. 
Although the defendant had realised the profits by the sale of the houses, Millet 
J remarked (obiter) that even if the houses had not been sold, he would still have 
held that profits had already been made by the defendant when they constructed 
the houses because the value of the houses were greater than the expense of 
81 
82 
83 
84 
House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Point Blank Ltd, ibid. 
Colbeam Palmer Ltd & Anor v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd, supra n 56. 
Ravenscroft v Herbert & Anor, supra n 23. 
Supra n 65. 
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building them. It thus appears that unrealised profits may be taken into account 
in determining the profits made by the defendant. 
Where an account of profits is directed to be taken in an action in 
which the copyright owner and the exclusive licensee have concurrent rights, the 
court must apportion the profits between them in such manner as the court 
considers just subject to any existing agreement between them which determines 
the applications of those profits. 85 This is so irrespective of whether the 
copyright owner and the exclusive licensee are both parties to the action or 
not. 86 
4.2 Delivery Up 
In addition to the monetary remedies available in an action for copyright 
infringement, the court has the inherent jurisdiction to order the delivery up for 
destruction of all articles made in violation of the copyright owner's proprietary 
right. 87 Delivery up as a remedy in proceedings for copyright infringement 
appears to receive the sanction of section 37(1) of the Copyright Act 1987 in that 
the section contemplates the availability of all such reliefs as are available to a 
plaintiff in an action in respect of infringement of other proprietary rights. 
Delivery up of infringing materials is one of the reliefs available in proceedings 
85 
86 
87 
Copyright Act 1987, section 37(6). 
Ibid. 
Hole v Bradbury (1879) 12 Ch D 886. 
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for infringement of patents, 88 registered trade mark, 89 passing off, 90 
designs91 and abuse of confidential information92 . Thus, this remedy should be 
regarded as being also available under section 37(1). As far back as a century 
ago, the courts have been granting orders for delivery up of infringing articles 
in proceedings for copyright infringement and its availability is not now in 
doubt. 93 
Being an equitable remedy, the making of a delivery up order is 
within the discretion of the court and is subject to the usual equitable 
considerations such as laches, acquiescence and lack of clean hands. The order 
is not intended as a punishment on the infringer but is granted as a means of 
prott:cting the plaintiff' s fruits of success in the action. 94 The granting of a 
delivery up order does not preclude _the court from awarding monetary remedies 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
United Telephone Co v Walker & Oliver {1887) 4 RPC 63. . 
Slazenger v Feltham (No 2) (1889) 6 RPC 531, Fabrique Ebel Societe 
Anonyme v Syarikat Perniagaan Tukang Jam City Port & Ors [1988] 1 
MU 188. 
Warwick Tyre Company Ltd v New Motor & General Rubber Company 
Ltd (1910) 27 RPC 161, Lee Kar Choo v Lee Lian Choon [1967] 1 MU 
129. 
Knowles v John Bennet (1895) 12 RPC 137, Redland Tiles Ltd & Ors v 
Kua Hong Brick Tile Works [1966] 2 MU 62. 
Industrial Furnaces Ltd v Reaves (1970) 87 RPC 605. 
Hole v Bradbury, supra n 87. 
Mergenthaler Linotype Company v Intertype Ltd (1926) 43 RPC 381. 
Although this was a patent infringement case, the court discussed the 
general principles relating to a delivery up order. 
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such as damages or account of profits. 95 A delivery up order is granted as 
ancillary to an injunction and is made to render the injunction more effective. 
Although the injunction in itself restrains an infringer from further infringement, 
the presence of infringing articles in his possession may be a source of grave 
temptation to him to commit a breach of the injunction which he would not 
otherwise commit. 96 In addition, a delivery up order puts an end to the free 
circulation of the infringing articles thereby preventing the public from being 
further deceived. 97 
Since an order for delivery up is granted under the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court, the copyright owner does not acquire any right to keep 
the articles as his own. 98 Thus delivery up orders are almost invariably 
accompanied by orders for destruc!ion of the infringing articles. In this regard, 
the delivery up orders given by the court in Longman Malaysia's case99 and 
Dunia Muzik's case1 appear to be unusual. In both cases, there was no 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
Longman Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Pustaka Delta Pelajaran Sdn Bhd, supra n 
67. 
Mergenthaler Linotype Company v Intertype Ltd, supra n 94. 
Meagher, Gummow, Lehane (1992), supra n 54 at para 2701. The 
authors take the view that this forms the justification for a delivery up 
order. 
In contrast, the Australian Copyright Act 1968 and the now repealed UK 
Copyright Act 1956 contain conversion damages provisions which confer 
statutory powers on the courts to order delivery up and in such event, the 
copyright owner is deemed the owner of all the infringing copies so that 
he is under no obligation whatsoever to destroy the articles. 
Supra n 67. 
Supra n 66. 
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accompanying order for destruction of the infringing articles thereby raising the 
question of whether the plaintiffs were under a corresponding obligation to 
destroy. 
As an alternative to the plaintiff destroying the infringing articles, 
the defendant may himself undertake on oath to destroy the articles but the court 
is not bound to rely on the oath especially where the infringer is found not to be 
reliable. 2 The court's power to order delivery up is not confined to infringing 
copies only but may include plates in the infringer's possession, power, custody 
or control. 3 It would seem that the word "plate" is akin in its meaning to 
"contrivance"4 which is the term used in the Copyright Act 1987. The copyright 
statutes of other jurisdictions such as England,5 Australia, 6 New Zealand7 and 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Industrial Furnaces Ltd v Reaves, supra n 92. 
Longman Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Pustaka Delta Pelajaran Sdn Bhd, supra n 
67. 
As to the meaning of 'contrivance', see, Chapter 2 at 2.1.2. See, for 
example, section 54(2) of the Copyright Act 1987 which empowers the 
court, in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction, to order delivery up of, 
inter alia, contrivance seized from the infringer. 
See section 18(2) of the UK Copyright Act 1956. Although under the UK 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, the copyright owner is no 
longer deemed to own infringing copies of his work, the right to delivery 
up is still available under section 99 of the UK Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act 1988. The delivery up order includes both infringing copies 
and articles designed or adapted for making copies of a particular 
copyright work. "Plate" is now omitted from the section. 
Australian Copyright Act 1968, section 10. 
New Zealand Copyright Act 1962, section 2. 
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Singapore8 consistently define a "plate" to include "a stereotype, stone, block, 
mould, matrix, transfer, negative or other similar appliance". 
Even if the infringement involves only certain parts of the 
copyright work, the court has a discretion to order delivery up of the whole 
infringing article particularly where a substantial part of the copyright work was 
copied. 9 Substantiality in this context refers not only to the physical amount of 
the reproduction but also the qualitative significance of the parts reproduced. 
Thus, in Longman Malaysia's case, 10 the plaintiffs sued the defendants for 
infringement of copyright in a textbook alleging that the defendants had 
reproduced the general arrangement, language, features and errors of the 
pla~ntiffs' textbook. The defendants' counsel contended that only a few 
illustrations or diagrams from the plaintiffs' book were reproduced and as such 
the reproduction cannot amount to a substantial pa1t of the plaintiffs' book. 
Gunn Chit Tuan J (as he then was) found as a matter of fact and degree that 
although the actual physical amount of the reproduction was not substantial, the 
significance of what was reproduced was substantial so much so that delivery up 
of the whole infringing articles and plates was ordered. But if the infringing part 
is severable from the non-infringing part, the court may order delivery up of the 
8 
9 
10 
Singapore Copyright Act 1987, section 7. 
Longman Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Pustaka Delta Pelajaran Sdn Bhd, supra n 
67. 
Ibid. 
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infringing part only. 11 The justification for this is based on the rationale that 
the court ought not to go beyond what is necessary for the protection of the 
copyright owner. 12 Since property in the infringing articles remains in the 
infringer despite the infringement, he should only be prevented from using such 
parts of the articles as are used in derogation of the copyright owner's rights, 
hence delivery up of only the severable infringing parts. 
Although an order for delivery up in civil proceedings is granted 
only in the exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction, the Copyright Act 1987 
does provide for the statutory power to order delivery up but only in the exercise 
of the court's criminal jurisdiction pursuant to section 54. Under this section the 
cout:t trying any accused person may order that the infringing copies be delivered 
to the copyright owner, irrespective_ of whether a conviction has been secured or 
not. Whether any useful purpose is served by ordering delivery up of infringing 
copies to copyright owners is questionable in view of the fact that infringing 
copies are invariably inferior in quality to the original ones. On the contrary, 
copyright owners may be saddled with the task of having to dispose off these 
copies . 
11 Warne & Co v Seebohm (1888) 39 Ch D 73. 
12 Mergenthaler Linotype Company v lntertype Ltd, supra n 94. 
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4.3 Final Injunctions 
A final injunction is granted at the trial of the action based on the merits of the 
case and is directed towards the final settlement and enforcement of the rights of 
the parties that are in dispute. 13 Its purpose is to prevent any further repetition 
of the infringing action. At the same time,it has a declaratory effect in that it 
indirectly confirms the plaintiff as owner of the copyright in the subject matter 
of the action and declares that the defendant's actions constitute infringement of 
the copyright. The general principle upon which fmal injunctions are granted is 
whether damages as a remedy or any other legal remedy is adequate. 14 A fmal 
injunction is final only in the sense that it conclusively settles the issues between 
the J?arties but is not final in that it does not outlast the duration of the plaintiff's 
copyright. 15 As with other equita~le remedies, the grant of a final injunction 
is at the discretion of the court. However, fmal injunctions are almost invariably 
given since damages alone are usually not sufficient unless there is no real 
likelihood of future repetition of the infringement. Even if damages are 
sufficient, the courts may still exercise their discretion in favour of granting an 
injunction because to do otherwise would be equivalent to compelling the 
copyright owner to license his right in return for fmancial compensation. 16 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Spry ICF, The Principles of Equitable Remedies (Sydney, The Law Book 
Company Ltd, 1990) at 373. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
See Cornish WR, Intellectual Property: Patents. Copyright. Trade Marks 
and Allied Rights, supra n 62 at 41. 
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Final injunctions are usually directed to restraining further 
commission of the infringing acts by the defendant, his servants or agents. 17 
Thus, the defendant's servants or agents are also bound to obey the injunction 
although they are not parties to the action, probably, to give them warning that 
the acts constitute an infringement. 18 Any refusal to obey the injunction by the 
servants or agents amounts to obstructing the course of justice by aiding and 
abetting in breach of an injunction of the court and is therefore punishable as 
contempt of court. 19 Where individuals are involved, contempt of court is 
punishable by a committal or a fine. Where corporations are involved, contempt 
is punishable by sequestration of the corporation's assets. 
Where the infringin~ part can be severed from the non-infringing 
part of the work, an injunction will be granted only against the infringing part. 20 
But if the infringing part cannot be severed from the rest of the work without 
destroying the use and value of the entire work, an injunction will be granted 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Syed Alwi v Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka [1980] 1 MU 129, Dunia Muzik 
WEA Sdn Bhd & Anor v Koh Tay Eng, supra n 66, Longman Malaysia 
Sdn Bhd v Pustaka Delta Pelajaran Sdn Bhd, supra n 67. 
Copinger and Skone James (1991) at para 11-63. 
Ibid. 
Lamb v Evans [1892] 3 Ch 462. 
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against the whole work. 21 This is so even if the infringing part is an 
insubstantial part of the work. 22 
After the House of Lords decision in Attorney General v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd (No 2),23 it is now settled law that an injunction should not be 
granted to prevent wrongdoing in general but should be directed to prevent some 
specific wrong. In that case, the Attorney-General sought, inter alia, a general 
injunction restraining future publication of confidential information derived from 
members or ex-members of the security service . All the judges24 hearing the 
case were unanimous in refusing the injunction because such an injunctive order 
would be too uncertain since it attempts to answer issues of fact or law that have 
not _yet arisen. Moreover, the injunction would not allow for the possibility that 
defences might be available in ~ future case. Although an injunction to 
specifically restrain publication of the book "Spycatcher" was also refused on the 
ground that the confidential information had fallen into public domain, Scott J at 
the High Court remarked (obiter) that had the action been based on copyright, 
an injunction might have been granted. According to his Lordship, the equitable 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Longman Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Pustaka Delta Pelajaran Sdn Bhd, supra n 
67. 
Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) supra n 72. Although 
the case was argued mainly on confidential information perspective, some 
obiter comments relating to copyright were made by the judges in the 
High Court, Court of Appeal and the House of Lords . 
Ibid. 
The judges at the House of Lords were Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord 
Brightman, Lord Griffiths, Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Jauncey of 
Tullichettle. 
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owner of the copyright was the Crown and Mr Peter Wright, the author of 
"Spycatcher", owed a duty of secrecy to the Crown which he had breached. The 
Crown being the owner of the copyright could have sought an injunction to 
restrain further serialisation of the "Spycatcher". Similar views were expressed 
by Dillon U at the Court of Appeaf5 and Lord Keith, 26 Lord Griffiths27 and 
Lord Gof:f28 in the House of Lords. 
Although a final injunction is usually prohibitory in nature in that 
it orders a person to refrain from doing certain infringing acts, the courts can 
grant a quia timet injunction where the defendant has not yet infringed the 
plaintiff's copyright but it is feared that he will do so in the future. The plaintiff 
must therefore establish that such future breach is likely. At times, it may be 
possible for the plaintiff to show that past infringements in respect of certain 
items of the plaintiff's copyright are likely to give rise to the inference that the 
defendant intends to violate other parts of the copyright in the future. 
Since an injunction merely restrains future infringements, it does 
not remedy infringements which precede its grant. Hence the injunction is 
almost always issued along with other monetary Temedies in copyright 
infringement cases. 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Ibid at 621. 
Ibid at 645. 
Ibid at 654. 
Ibid at 664. 
5.1 Conclusions 
CHAPTER 5 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following conclusions may be drawn from the discussion in the preceding 
chapters. First, for the effective protection of copyright owners, civil and 
criminal remedies for the enforcement of copyright should feature in every 
copyright legislation. With the rampant infringing activities brought about by 
advancement in reproduction tec~ology, it is clear that civil remedies alone will 
not suffice as a solution to the problem of enforcement. Recourse to the 
deterrent features of penal sanctions is necessary. 
Secondly, Parliament places great emphasis on enforcement by 
way of criminal proceedings as is evident from the fact that criminal provisions 
feature prominently in the Copyright Act 1987. 1 The severe penal sanctions 
and, in particular, the establishment of an enforcement unit vested with wide 
powers of search and seizure bear testimony to this. It is submitted that the 
prominence given by the legislature to enforcement by way of criminal 
See Chapter 2. 
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proceedings is regretted because it is out of proportion to the nature of copyright 
as a civil right. 
Thirdly, the civil remedies available to copyright owners both 
under the Copyright Act 1987 and the inherent jurisdiction of the court provide 
a suitable and satisfactory framework for redress of copyright owners in the event 
of infringement. This is reflected in the availability of a wide range of civil 
remedies which the court may grant to copyright owners. 2 Thus, the restraining 
of future infringement is made possible through an injunction, the compensation 
of a copyright owner's losses as a consequence of the infringement through an 
award of damages, the punishment or condemnation of the infringer's conduct 
through an award of exemplary damages and the restitution of benefits acquired 
by the infringer at the expense o~ the copyright owner through an account of 
profits. These remedies are enhanced by an order for delivery up and destruction 
of infringing copies and reproduction equipment. In view of the adequacy of the 
civil remedial framework, more use should be made of it in the battle against 
copyright infringement. 
Fourthly, being a civil right, copyright should be enforced 
primarily by way of civil remedies. As noted above, the current civil remedial 
scheme is sufficient in scope to redress copyright owners and therefore the main 
responsibility of enforcement should be borne by the copyright owners 
themselves as far as possible. Criminal remedies should not displace civil 
2 See Chapters 2 and 3. 
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remedies as the main mode of enforcement as there is no evidence to indicate that 
the former are more likely than the latter to resolve the problem of copyright 
infringement. Instead, criminal remedies should play the role of reinforcing and 
complementing the available civil remedies. Indeed, the intervention of criminal 
remedies in what is actually a civil right is fraught with danger and great care has 
to be exercised to ensure that these criminal remedies do not become 
unnecessarily oppressive. 
Based on the premise that the current civil remedial scheme should 
be the primary means of enforcement of copyright, the writer proposes to 
identify the weaknesses of this scheme and to suggest ways of improving it with 
a view to providing better redress to copyright owners in the event of 
infringement. The following are the weaknesses of the civil remedial scheme 
which are evident from this study. First, the Anton Piller order, though 
particularly suited to copyright infringement cases, is vulnerable to abuses by 
plaintiffs. 3 In recent years, the courts in England and some other countries in the 
Commonwealth have paid closer attention than before to the rights of the 
defendant and given greater emphasis to the proper execution of the Anton Piller 
order but the same degree of scrutiny cannot be claimed to prevail among our 
judges. 4 As Anton Piller applications are regularly made here, 5 there is clearly 
3 
4 
5 
See Chapter 3 at 3.2.2. 
See, for instance, the case of Penerbit Fajar Bakti Sdn Bhd v Cahaya 
Surya Buku dan Alat Tulis [1989] 1 MU 386 discussed in Chapter 3 at 
3.2.1. 
Based on the observation of Mohd Akram, SM in t A Critical Appraisal 
of the Anton Piller Order' [1987] 1 CU 517. 
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a need to seriously consider ways of curbing these abuses. In addition, the 
likelihood of the availability of the privilege against self-incrimination to a 
defendant served with an Anton Piller order poses a serious threat to the order. 6 
Secondly, the exact scope of section 37(2) of the Copyright Act 
1987 is uncertain because the use of the words "additional damages" does not 
indicate whether the section contemplates aggravated or exemplary damages or 
a hybrid of both. 7 
Thirdly, section 37(1) leaves open the question as to whether 
damages and an account of profits are alternatives to each other or whether both 
remedies can be granted concurrently in the same action. 8 In this respect, there 
is a need for certainty because the quantum of monetary award ultimately granted 
to the copyright owner is conceivably very dependent on whether these two 
remedies are granted conjunctively or otherwise. 
Fourthly, as the importance of the remedy of delivery up in 
copyright infringement is no less than that of damages, injunction and account 
of profits, it is puzzling that this remedy is not expressly spelt out in section 
37(1) whereas section 54 makes specific mention of its availability in criminal 
6 
7 
8 
See Chapter 3 at 3.2.3. 
See Chapter 4 at 4.1.2. 
See Chapter 4 at 4.1.3. 
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proceedings. 9 Although this omission is strictly not a weakness in the civil 
remedial scheme because the courts have thus far demonstrated a general 
willingness to grant the remedy, its inclusion in section 3 7 ( 1) will provide a 
greater degree of certainty as to its availability. 
Fifthly, at the moment, there is uncertainty as to what evidential 
principles, if any, govern affidavit evidence given pursuant to section 42 of the 
Copyright Act 1987 because section 2 of the Evidence Act 1950 excludes the 
application of the Evidence Act 1950 to affidavit evidence. 10 While section 42 
has the advantage of enabling copyright owners to give evidence of the 
subsistence and ownership of their copyright without having to be present in 
court, the section favours the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant because it 
allows evidence to be admitted out~ight without testing its accuracy or reliability. 
This is a weakness not only of the civil remedial scheme but also of the criminal 
remedial scheme since section 42 applies to both criminal and civil proceedings. 
5.2 Recommendations 
Having regard to the conclusions stated above, the following recommendations 
are made with the aim of improving the protection currently available to 
copyright owners . At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that infringers 
have fundamental rights accorded by the law which should be respected. In the 
9 
10 
See Chapter 2 at 2.2.6. 
See Chapter 2 at 2.1.2. 
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pursuit of an effective scheme of remedies capable of thwarting infringers, the 
court should not go beyond what is necessary to protect copyright owners. 
The recommendations hereinafter made are presented in two main 
parts. The first pertains to recommendations on the civil remedial framework. 
The second relates to ways in which the existing criminal remedial framework 
can be used to supplement the civil remedial framework. 
5.2.1 Civil Remedies 
(a) Anton Piller Orders 
The recommendations hereinafter made are dealt with under four separate 
aspects, viz. the grant of the order, its execution, its discharge and the privilege 
against self-incrimination. A number of these recommendations are based on 
current developments in countries such as England and Singapore which, in the 
writer's opinion, are applicable to this country. 
(i) The grant of the Order 
As a measure to curb the abuses of the order, it is suggested that the courts 
should be more cautious and should rigorously scrutinise each application before 
granting or refusing the order. This is so especially since the order is at the 
extremity of the court's powers and was originally intended only to be made in 
exceptional and emergency cases. 
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Often, the requirement of full and frank disclosure leads to very 
considerable amounts of material being presented in support of an application for 
the order. In urgent cases , which most interlocutory applications in copyright 
infringement proceedings are, one cannot expect the judge to pore over all the 
material facts given to determine whether an Anton Piller order ought to be 
given. To overcome this, it is suggested that the affidavit supporting the Anton 
Piller application should set out matters in such a sequence as to reflect the order 
in which the three pre-conditions laid down by Ormrod U in Anton Piller KG 
v Manufacturing Process Ltd & Ors 11 are to be considered. 12 This will assist the 
court by drawing its attention to pertinent matters in the affidavit thereby 
enabling it to readily determine whether the separate pre-conditions are satisfied. 
Much time is thus saved in the process. A possible way of implementing this 
course of action is by introducing a provision in the Rules of the High Court 
1980 to specify the structure in which such affidavits should assume. 
Alternatively, a Practice Direction to that effect could be issued . 
.In addition, the court should ensure that the order is not couched 
in too legalistic terms which are beyond the comprehension of lay people. This 
is especially so when one is reminded that many infringers in this country are not 
businessmen well versed in the letter of the law. The order should clearly 
specify, inter alia, the purposes for which entry is sought, the types of evidence 
11 
12 
[1976] Ch 55. 
This recommendation is based on the suggestion of Dockray M & 
Laddie H in 'Piller Problems' (1990) 106 LQR 601. 
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or documents to be taken, the steps which the defendant may take before 
complying with the order and the premises in which the search is to be carried 
out. As it is not infrequent for infringing goods to be stored in vehicles while 
awaiting to be transported to the various outlets for commercial distribution, it 
is suggested that the order should also be drafted so as to encompass vehicles as 
well. 
Where the order allows interrogatories to be made, it is suggested 
that the list of questions to be asked of the defendant should be made known to 
the court at the time of making the application so as to ensure relevancy of these 
questions. Where such questions merely require the defendants to disclose to the 
pl~intiffs the names and addresses of both suppliers and customers of the 
infringing goods, there appears t? be no reason for insisting on an immediate 
answer. The defendant should be given the liberty of answering in writing within 
a certain time. 
Since the Anton Piller order is a very potent weapon in the battle 
against infringement, it is proposed that the order should have a more definite 
basis in law and be statutorily incorporated in copyright legislation. 13 At the 
same time, it has to be borne in mind that the order is an equitable one and any 
statutory provision must not fetter the court's discretion to grant or refuse the 
13 This proposal was initially put forth .by Dockray M and Laddie H in 
'Piller Problems' ibid. It was subsequently incorporated in the recently 
published report 'Anton Piller Orders - A Consultation Paper' (the Lord 
Chancellor's Department, November 1992) drawn up by a committee of 
English judges. As to this committee, see Chapter 3 at 3.2. 
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order. Statutory guidelines on the granting of the order will help ensure that 
such orders are not made unless the requirements are met. It is often the case 
that statutory requirements are less easily overlooked in an emergency application 
than statements in the law reports. An incidental consequence of legislative 
intervention is the opportunity for Parliament to critically review the Anton Piller 
order and examine its strengths and expose its dangers. Appropriate measures 
to minimise these dangers can thus be taken into account when drafting the 
statutory guidelines. 
(ii) Execution of the Order 
The various safeguards and guidelines laid down by the English courts in 
Columbia Picture Industries Inc v Robinson14 and Universal Thermosensors Ltd 
v Hibben15 were directed towards ensuring the proper and efficient execution 
of Anton Piller orders. 16 Although these cases are merely persuasive authorities 
in this country, it is submitted that our courts should give weighty consideration 
to them because the abuses of this order are not exceptional to Anton Piller cases 
in England but are also prevalent in countries adopting the .Anton Piller 
jurisdiction. The court should consider the extent to which these safeguards and 
14 
15 
16 
[1987] Ch 38. 
[1992] 1 WLR 840. See, too, Computerland Com v Yew Seng Computers 
Pte Ltd [1991] 3 MU 201 and Peters Edition Ltd v Renner Piano Co 
[1990] 1 MU 337 where the Singapore courts commented on the need to 
exercise extreme care in granting the Anton Piller order. 
See Chapter 3 at 3. 2. 2 for the safeguards laid down in these cases. 
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guidelines are legally binding and the consequences to the evidence obtained in 
the event of non-compliance. 
It cannot be denied that the adherence to some of the safeguards 
laid down in the cases will lead to an increase in costs which may ultimately be 
shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant if judgment is entered against the latter. 
In particular, the engaging of an experienced solicitor other than a member of the 
firm of solicitors which applied for the order to conduct the execution will 
undoubtedly be costly. This is an unavoidable consequence if an unbiased search 
and accountability to the law are to be assured. 
Anton Piller orders usually allow the defendant's servants or agents 
to permit entry. 17 This is an inju~tice to the defendant because, in reality, no 
employee or agent has the ostensible or apparent authority to allow a stranger to 
enter, rummage through and remove property belonging to his employer. To 
predicate that such an authority exists is to deprive the defendant of his right to 
take legal advice before consenting to execution. 
At times, the executing party may have entered the premises 
during the hours specified in the order but because of the huge amount of 
materials that have to be searched in the premises, it is not possible to complete 
the execution within the hours specified in the order. Therefore, it is suggested 
17 See, for instance, the Anton Piller order sought in PMK Rajah v 
Worldwide Commodities Sdn Bhd & Ors [1985] 1 MU 86. 
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that all Anton Piller orders be phrased such as to allow the executing party to 
search beyond office hours if the circumstances so require provided that entry to 
the premises is made within the times specified in the order. 
(iii) Discharge of the Order 
The main difficulty insofar as discharge of the Anton Piller order is concerned 
lies in reconciling, on the one hand, the duty of a defendant to comply 
immediately with an Anton Piller order and, on the other hand, the right to 
challenge the order and be heard by the court. Usually, the threat of contempt 
proceedings compels a defendant to comply with the order, even though the order 
was not properly made in the first place and would have been discharged on 
application. 18 Since the consequences of non-compliance are severe, it is 
proposed that the court should impose on the executing solicitor the strict 
obligation to explain carefully to the defendant the likelihood of contempt 
proceedings being brought and the consequences to the defendant's case of non-
compliance Qf the order. 
(iv) Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
Currently, the entitlement of a defendant served with an Anton Piller order to 
rely on the privilege against self-incrimination where discovery of documents or 
interrogatories is sought is uncertain because of the conflicting decisions of Chan 
18 Wardle Fabrics Ltd v G Myristis Ltd [1984] FSR 263. 
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J in Television Broadcasts Ltd v Mandarin Holdings Video Sdn Bhd19 and 
Zakaria Yatim J in PMK Rajah v Worldwide Commodities Sdn Bhd.20 Zakaria 
Yatim J's view that the privilege is available to such a defendant poses a serious 
obstacle to Anton Piller orders because it paves the way for the principle in Rank 
Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre21to apply in this country 
leading to a situation whereby plaintiffs will not be able to obtain information 
leading to other sources of illegal copying. The divergence in views of both 
these judges stems from a difference in interpretation of the word "witness" in 
section 132 of the Evidence Act 1950. To amend section 132 to clarify that the 
word "witness" encompasses all persons giving evidence regardless of whether 
the evidence was given in a court of law or otherwise may not solve the problem 
because of section 2 which excludes the application of the Evidence Act 1950 to 
affidavit evidence. Since answer~s to interrogatories pursuant to Anton Piller 
orders are tendered as affidavit evidence in court proceedings, section 2 would 
come into operation. 
The better solution is for Parliament to intervene by legislating 
along the lines of section 72 of the UK Supreme Court Act 1981 which overcame 
the threat to Anton Piller orders posed by Rank Film.22 Section 72 abolished 
19 
20 
21 . 
22 
[1983] 2 MU 346. See Chapter 3 at 3.2.3. 
Supra n 17. 
[1982] AC 380. 
Ibid. As to section 72 of the UK Supreme Court Act 1981, see Chapter 
3 at 3.2.3. 
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the privilege against self-incrimination in all proceedings pertaining to intellectual 
property thereby restoring the potency of the Anton Piller order. 
Instead of legislative intervention, the court could adopt the 
approach of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Bushby v Thorn EMI Video 
Programmes Ltd23 whereby the court required the plaintiff to give an 
undertaking that he would not either directly or indirectly use any document, 
information or answers obtained from the defendant in an Anton Piller order for 
the purposes of any criminal prosecution of the defendant nor make the same 
available to the police. This procedure enables discovery and interrogatories to 
be made while at the same time preserves the privilege. 
This approach has J!Ot been tested here but it should be noted that 
some jurisdictions regard it as unacceptable. Thus, the Singapore Court of 
Appeal in Lee Thin Tuan v Louis Vuitton24 rejected this approach because it 
was of the view that the question of prosecution lies solely with the Public 
Prosecutor who cannot be constrained by such an undertaking. Moreover, the 
civil courts have no power to order that certain information ought not to be 
admitted in evidence in a criminal prosecution. 
It is submitted that the latter view is preferable because the 
privilege against self-incrimination is an established rule and thus the legislature, 
23 
24 
[1984] 1 NZLR 461. 
[1992] 2 SLR 273. 
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and not the court, should decide whether a defendant should be compellable to 
answer questions when the answers tend to incriminate him. Furthermore, such 
an undertaking would unnecessarily hamper the proper administration of criminal 
justice. 
(b) Aggravated and Exemplary Damages 
As discussed earlier, Gunn Chit Tuan J (as he then was) in Mokhtar Haii 
Jamaludin v Pustaka Sistem Pelajaran25 held that since damages for copyright 
infringement are at large, aggravated damages to compensate the copyright owner 
for injury to his feelings and pride may be granted under the general power to 
award damages provided by the predecessor to section 37(1). In view of this 
decision, it is submitted that sect_ion 37(2) should be interpreted as permitting 
exemplary damages in copyright infringement. Such an interpretation enables the 
court to do justice in cases where an award of compensatory damages under 
section 37(1) is inadequate to punish, deter or condemn a defendant for his 
outrageous conduct. The availability of exemplary damages, therefore, 
strengthens the court's powers to award punitive damages since compensatory 
damages generally do not have the desired punitive effect. With the availability 
of exemplary damages in the civil remedial scheme for copyright infringement, 
copyright owners are better assured of a more complete protection. This is 
particularly so where the infringer's conduct is so grave as to warrant a 
substantial award of exemplary damages. 
25 [1986] 2 MU 376. See, also, Chapter 4 at 4.1.2. 
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It is further suggested that the phrase "would not otherwise be 
available to the plaintiff" be deleted from section 37(2) for two reasons. First, 
if an effective deterrent is to be available for copyright infringement, the 
discretion of the court to award exemplary damages should not be fettered by 
whether the copyright owner is effectively relieved or otherwise but should be 
based on the gravity of the defendant's conduct.26 Secondly, the words 
"effective relief" have been interpreted by Ungoed-Thomas J in Beloff v 
Pressdram27 as excluding exemplary damages. If, as submitted above, section 
37(2) encompasses exemplary damages, the deletion of the words "effective 
relief" will serve to reinforce the scope of section 37(2) as a provision on 
exemplary damages. 
It is also suggested that section 37(2)(b) be deleted because the 
benefits accrued to the defendant by reason of the infringement is not a factor to 
be taken into account in assessing exemplary damages. Further, it relates to the 
remedy of an account of profits and its existence in a provision on exemplary 
damages merely confuses the scope of section 37(2). 
26 
27 
See, also, the comments of Great Britain, Reform of the Law relating to 
Copyright, Designs and Performers' Protection - A Consultative 
Document (London, HMSO, 1981) Cmnd 8302 at 48. 
[1973] RPC 765. See, also, the discussion of Beloff v Pressdram m 
Chapter 4 at 4.1.2. 
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(c) Account of Profits 
On a literal interpretation of section 37(1) , it is theoretically possible for 
copyright owners to claim both damages and an account of profits concurrently. 
Whether these two remedies should be alternatives is a difficult question. On the 
one hand, the granting of one of these remedies to the exclusion of the other 
avoids the problem of undeserved windfall to the copyright owner. This is 
especially so where the infringer's profits were made in circumstances in which 
the copyright owner could not have made the profits but for the skills and 
seryices of the infringer. On the other hand, the infringer' s profits were made 
at the expense of the copyright 0\yner in the sense that it would not have been 
made but for the infringement of the copyright. The infringer ought, therefore, 
to be deprived of any profits which he obtained as a result of his infringement. 
To do otherwise would be to permit the infringer to benefit from his wrongdoing. 
The approach of other countries in the Commonwealth is that 
damages and an account of profits are mutually exclusive. For example, the 
copyright statutes of Singapore28 and Australia29 explicitly state that these two 
remedies are alternatives. Although the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988 and its predecessor do not contain explicit provision to this effect, the view 
28 
29 
See the Singapore Copyright Act 1987 (Cap 63 , 1988 Ed), section 119. 
See the Australian Copyright Act 1968, section 115(2). 
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of English judges has always been that these two remedies are alternatives where 
copyright infringement cases are concerned. 30 
Since this is the prevailing trend, it is suggested that we do not 
diverge from the position adopted in other common law systems . Thus it is 
proposed that a provision be introduced along the lines of section 119(2) of the 
Singapore Copyright Act 1987 (Cap 63, 1988 Ed) (hereinafter referred to as ' the 
Singapore Copyright Act 1987') so as to clarify the law. The liberty to elect 
should be left to the copyright owner and not the court. 
(d) Delivery Up 
It is suggested that the court should be given a statutory power to make orders 
not only for the delivery up of infringing copies but also for the delivery up of 
any reproduction equipment. At the same time, provisions should also be made 
' 
for the forfeiture, destruction or disposal of these items. To spell out in statutory 
form the availability of this remedy serves to reflect its importance in copyright 
law. 
30 Caxton Publishing Co Ltd v Sutherland Publishing Co Ltd [ 1939] AC 
178, Patton Ltd v Yorkclose Ltd & Ors [1990] FSR 11. 
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(e) Admissibility of Affidavit Evidence 
The need to relieve copyright owners who are not within the country from having 
to attend court to give evidence of the subsistence and ownership of their 
copyright must be balanced against the need to ensure that controverted questions 
of facts are properly admitted in evidence. Currently, the former is adequately 
met by section 42(1) of the Copyright Act 1987 but not the latter. It is therefore 
proposed that a provision be introduced along the lines of section 134A of the 
Australian Copyright Act 1968. An identical provision is also found in section 
137(2) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987. This provision allows a defendant 
or accused who wishes in good faith to cross-examine the deponent of the 
affidavit to do so. In such a case, the affidavit will not be admitted in evidence 
unless the deponent appears as a ~itness for cross-examination. 
The Australian and Singapore copyright statutes also give the court 
a broad discretion to permit the affidavit to be used without the deponent 
appearing even though the defendant or accused in good faith wishes to challenge 
the contents of the affidavit. It is not, however, proposed that this limb be 
included because a defendant or accused who establishes to the satisfaction of the 
court that his request for cross-examination was made in good faith must be 
accorded his right to cross-examination and not be deprived of it. 
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5.2.2 Criminal Remedies 
Although the power of search and seizure vested in enforcement officers under 
Part VII of the Copyright Act 1987 may be likened in its effect to the grant and 
execution of an Anton Piller order under civil proceedings, the writer concedes 
that the deterrent effects of raids by enforcement officers and the subsequent 
criminal prosecutions often exceed that created by the execution of Anton Piller 
orders. For this reason, it is suggested that the search and seizure powers be 
exercised primarily against the manufacturers and suppliers from whom the 
infringing copies emanated. The stamping out of the source of the infringing 
copies is the most vital strategy in the attack against infringers because it ensures 
an end to their production. With regard to the dealers and retailers who are 
involved in the process leading to the circulation of the infringing copies in the 
market, the existing civil remedies offer sufficient protection to the copyright 
owners and they should be required to pursue these remedies on their own 
accord. 
Since the enforcement unit is also entrusted with the responsibility 
of enforcing the Trade Descriptions Act 1972, the Price Control Act 1946 
(revised 1973), the Control of Supplies Act 1961 (revised 1973), the Hire 
Purchase Act 1967 (revised 1973) and the Weights and Measures Act 1972, it is 
not surprising that the limited resources and manpower of the enforcement unit 
are currently overtaxed. Bearing in mind that prompt prosecution of infringers, 
particularly the manufacturers and suppliers, is essential, it is submitted that the 
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task of prosecution be shouldered, so far as is reasonably appropriate, by the 
copyright owners or their own trade organisations. It is submitted that this 
procedure is possible pursuant to section 377 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
which allows an advocate to be the prosecuting officer in a seizable offence 
provided that express authority to do so is obtained from the Public 
Prosecutor _31 It is envisaged that a greater use of this procedure of private 
prosecution by copyright owners will expedite prosecution and serve as a warning 
to potential infringers on the abhorrence of the law towards infringing 
activities. 32 Clearly, co-operation between the enforcement unit and the 
advocate concerned is required because the results of the raid on the infringer's 
premises and further investigations are vital to the advocate who is prosecuting 
th~ case. These results are needed in the prosecution and should therefore be 
made available. 
It is also suggested that after a criminal trial the enforcement unit 
should forward particulars of the infringers to the Inland Revenue Department to 
31 
32 
See Chapter 2 at 2.1.1, particularly, the case of Public Prosecutor v KM 
Basheer Ahmad [1982] 2 MU 78. 
It is to be noted that such ·a procedure is rarely used in this country. 
Indeed, it may be argued that section 377 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
was intended by Parliament to be read together with section 379. If so, 
the scope of section 377 relating to the use of advocates in criminal 
prosecutions may be a restrictive one, that is, confmed to the situation 
when the advocate is employed to do so by the Government. It is 
submitted that there is no obvious reason to adopt such a restrictive 
interpretation of section 3 77. 
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look into the tax issues . This serves as an added deterrence to infringers because 
not only will their infringing activities be exposed but their other activities, 
whether legal or illegal, will also be subject to the scrutiny of the tax department. 
Where it is clear to the enforcement officers that the infringing 
activities are at their infancy stage, it is suggested that the enforcement unit be 
empowered to give a cautionary letter to infringers as the mildest remedial 
measure. 
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that reproduction 
technology will continue its onward march and one may hazard a guess that 
cop_yright infringement will assume a new character in the future. Be this as it 
may, the legislature should never place too much emphasis on criminal 
enforcement as to do so would be to rock the foundation of copyright as a civil 
right. In addition, the intervention of the criminal law in what is actually a civil 
right can result in the enforcement mechanism becoming unnecessarily 
oppressive. 
New challenges posed to copyright owners in this country in the 
coming years may require a reconsideration of the types of civil remedies which 
are appropriate to accommodate the new needs of copyright owners. The 
adaptability of the courts in meeting the challenges posed by technological 
advancement as demonstrated by the advent two decades ago of, particularly, the 
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Anton Piller order, holds promise of its continued adaptability to meet the future 
needs of copyright owners. As the state of technology stands in this country 
today, the use of civil remedies as the primary means of enforcement 
supplemented in appropriate cases by criminal remedies are adequate to meet the 
present needs of copyright owners. Needlees to add, the vigilance and concerted 
efforts of copyright owners in bringing infringers to court are also needed . 
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